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Abstract
The striatum, the input region of the basal ganglia, has been shown to mediate many cognitive
functions. The striatum itself can be functionally segregated into dorsal (DS) and ventral
striatum (VS). For more than 60 years, DS has been reported to mediate stimulus-response
learning, though evidence has been accruing pointing to a role in decision making. These
literatures have been growing independently and an aim of this thesis was to bridge these two
bodies of knowledge. We directly investigated the role of DS in stimulus-response learning
versus decision making using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in patients with
Parkinson’s disease (Chapter 2) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4,
the role of DS in stimulus-response habit learning was tested in healthy individuals using fMRI.
In three separate experiments (Chapters 2-4), all of the results strongly support the notion that
DS mediates decision making and not learning. DS is implicated in many disorders ranging
from Parkinson’s disease, obsessive compulsive disorder and addiction, and clarifying the role
of DS in cognitive function is paramount for understanding substrates of disease and
developing treatments.

Keywords
Striatum; Stimulus-response Learning; Parkinson’s disease; Obsessive compulsive disorder;
functional MRI.
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Chapter 1

1

Literature Review

1.1 Striatum and the Basal Ganglia
The basal ganglia (BG) are a collection of sub-cortical nuclei responsible for the generation
of motor movements, and increasingly, in cognitive functions (Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen,
2009; Monchi, Petrides, Petre, Worsley, & Dagher, 2001). The BG are comprised of four
interconnected structures: the striatum, globus pallidus, substantia nigra (SN), and
subthalamic nucleus (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Bonelli & Cummings, 2007).
The striatum is the main input nuclei, receiving glutamatergic afferents from all cortical
areas except for primary visual and primary auditory cortices, as well as dopaminergic
afferents from SN pars compacta (SNc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA). Striatal
efferents project to either the internal globus pallidus (i.e., direct pathway) or to the external
globus pallidus; which, in turn, projects to the subthalamic nucleus and then the internal
globus pallidus (i.e., indirect pathway). Subsequently, both pathways project to the
thalamus; which, in turn, project to the cortex (Koob, Balcom, G.J., Meyerhoff, &
Meyerhoff, 1975). An illustration of the basic cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuit
is presented in Figure 1.1. One of the functions of dopamine in the striatum is to regulate
the balance between the indirect, and the direct pathways (Newton & Price, 1975).
The role of dopamine in balancing between direct and indirect pathways has been modelled
by Cohen and Frank (2009) with respect to approach and avoidance learning, also referred
to as Go/No-Go learning. Dopamine is viewed as playing a modulatory role in the basal
ganglia, interacting with different dopamine receptors that populate the direct and indirect
pathways. In the direct pathway, dopamine receptor type 1 and 5 (DRD1 and DRD5,
respectively) are expressed and subsequently facilitate an increase in cortical activity
(Kravitz, Tye, & Kreitzer, 2012). Conversely, the indirect pathway expresses DRD2, 3,
and 4 and activation of this pathway results in attenuated cortical activity (Kravitz et al.,
2012). Dopamine pulses that arrive after receiving a reward facilitate activity through the
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direct pathway and inhibit the indirect pathway, leading to a Go response. When negative
feedback or punishments are received, dopamine levels decrease resulting in activity
through the indirect pathway and inhibition of the direct pathway, leading to a No-Go, or
absence of that particular response. When the concentration of dopamine is altered greatly,
as in Parkinson’s disease (PD), a variety of motor and cognitive symptoms develop.

Figure 1.1 Schematic diagram of the basal ganglia and its afferents and efferents
Lines that terminate in arrowheads are excitatory connections; lines that terminate in circles are inhibitory
connections; purple lines are dopaminergic connections; grey solid lines represent the direct pathway and
grey dotted lines represent the indirect pathway. VTA – Ventral tegmental area; SN – Substantia nigra.

1.2 Cytoarchitecture of the Striatum
The cytoarchitecture of the striatum is different compared to the other nuclei in the basal
ganglia. The most common neuronal type is 𝛾-aminobutyric acid (GABAergic) medium
spiny neuron (MSN). These neurons receive inputs from the thalamus and cortex via
glutamatergic neurons, dopaminergic afferents from the SNc and VTA, and inter-neuronal
connections via GABAergic and cholinergic neurons (Gonzales & Smith, 2015). Whereas
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glutamatergic neurons synapse on the dendrites of the MSNs, dopaminergic neurons are
uniquely positioned mainly on the necks of MSN dendritic spines (Difiglia, Pasik, & Pasik,
1978). The location of dopaminergic neurons allows dopamine to modulate the corticostriatal connections needed for striatum function, such as voluntary motor movements, and
reinforcement learning (Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007; Kravitz et al., 2012). Cholinergic
interneurons have recently been under intense investigation. Originally thought to just be
a class of tonically-active neurons with no behavioural role (M. Kimura, Rajkowski, &
Evarts, 1984), the current hypothesis indicates a role in responding to salient environmental
stimuli. Specifically, the firing frequency of cholinergic neurons decreases in response to
salient stimuli (e.g., noxious, rewarding environmental stimuli) and this change in activity
may prime MSNs of the presence of the stimulus (Bohnen et al., 2012; Calabresi, Picconi,
Parnetti, & Di Filippo, 2006; Gonzales & Smith, 2015). Subsequently, dopaminergic
inputs may assign a value to the stimulus (Gonzales & Smith, 2015).

1.3 Divisions of the Striatum
The striatum can be subdivided in many different ways, such as anatomically into the
caudate nucleus, putamen, and nucleus accumbens (NAcc), and functionally into dorsal
striatum (DS), and ventral striatum (VS; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Wickens,
Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007; see Figure 1.2). A brief discussion of the common
divisions is below along with a rationale of our chosen method.
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Figure 1.2 The functional and anatomical divisions of the striatum
The striatum can be subdivided functionally and anatomically. A. The striatum can be subdivided functionally
into the dorsal and ventral striatum. The dorsal striatum is composed of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and
putamen, shown in blue, whereas the ventral striatum is composed of ventral aspects of the caudate nucleus,
putamen as well as the NAcc. B. The anatomical subdivisions of the striatum: caudate nucleus (shown in
red), putamen (shown in green), and NAcc (shown in orange). Figure adapted from Haber and Knutson
(2010).

1.3.1 Caudate, Putamen, and Nucleus Accumbens
Reported in hundreds of studies over the past 50 years, and represented in most
neuroscience and neuroanatomy textbooks, the striatum is said to be composed of two
structures, the caudate nucleus and putamen (G E Alexander, M R DeLong, & Strick, 1986;
Hewitt, 1961; Künzle, 1975). Occasionally, the NAcc is also included in the striatum
proper (Szabo, 1980; Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004).
In humans and non-human primates, the caudate nucleus appears to be anatomically
separated from the putamen by a large bundle of ascending axons called the internal capsule
(see Figure 1.2). There is no gross anatomical division between the caudate nucleus and
putamen, and the NAcc but it is generally denoted as the region that connects the caudate
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and putamen located inferior to the internal capsule (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Postuma
& Dagher, 2006; Voorn et al., 2004).
From the work of Künzle, DeLong and Alexander in the 1970’s and 1980’s, we began to
understand that the striatum is organized into semi-discrete cortico-basal gangliathalamocortical circuits, each responsible for a different function (G E Alexander et al.,
1986). Künzle (1975) used autoradiography in adult monkeys to trace axonal pathways
from the cortex to the striatum. Specifically, radiolabeled amino acids were injected into
specific areas of the primary motor cortex (M1) and the axon terminals within the caudate
nucleus and putamen were visualized and mapped. Künzle (1975) found that nearly all
projections from M1 terminated in the putamen and were topographically organized, such
that neurons originating from the face region of M1 were mapped separately from those
originating from the leg-tail region of M1. Additionally, there was very little input to the
caudate nucleus, supporting the notion of an anatomically separate caudate and putamen.
Alexander and DeLong (1985) used microstimulation to identify connections between the
striatum and cortex. Neurons within the caudate and putamen were stimulated and motor
responses were measured in awake monkeys. They replicated Künzle in showing the
topographic map of the putamen resulting in motor movements. Interestingly, stimulating
the caudate did not result in any motor movement. Similar stimulations were conducted
on other areas of the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc resulting in five non-overlapping
functional loops: motor, oculomotor, dorsolateral prefrontal, lateral orbitofrontal, and
anterior cingulate. The motor loop passed through the putamen, oculomotor, dorsolateral
prefrontal and lateral orbitofrontal traversed through different areas of the caudate nucleus,
and the anterior cingulate loop included the NAcc (G E Alexander et al., 1986). The lack
of overlap between the circuits resulted in the classification of the caudate nucleus,
putamen and NAcc as separate structures, anatomically connected to different cortical
partners.
The division of the striatum into the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc is pervasive; it
exists in many current textbooks such as the recently published 5th edition of Principles of
Neural Science (Kandel, Schwartz, Jessell, Siegelbaum, & Hudspeth, 2013) but it may not
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be the most apt division. This division begins to break down in recent studies utilizing
modern neuroimaging techniques and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) that show functional
divisions may not be separated by the internal capsule but rather follow a ventromedial to
dorsolateral gradient where the same functional loop can implicate both the caudate
nucleus and putamen (Choi, Yeo, & Buckner, 2012; Tziortzi et al., 2014; see Section 1.2.3
below).

1.3.2 Dorsomedial and Dorsolateral Striatum
In rodents, distinctions between caudate nucleus and putamen are not typically made as
these regions merge into one another and form a unitary structure referred to as DS (Voorn
et al., 2004), and VS is typically defined as the NAcc (Burton, Nakamura, & Roesch, 2015).
Instead, divisions are made along the anterior to posterior, and medial to lateral axes and
are based on function rather than anatomy (Burton et al., 2015). For example, dorsal medial
striatum (DMS) is often reported to mediate early, goal directed learning, whereas dorsal
lateral striatum (DLS) is recruited during habit learning (Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Learning
is a main focus of this thesis and will be defined later on.
In the rodent literature, NAcc is often reported to respond to the value of an outcome.
Specifically, neurons in the NAcc will increase firing frequency when presented with a
high value reward and will reduce activity when faced with a small reward or punishment
(Burton et al., 2015). This change in firing frequency of the NAcc is utilized by DMS in
goal-directed learning (Burton et al., 2015; Wolfram Schultz, 1998; W. Schultz, Apicella,
Scarnati, & Ljungberg, 1992).

1.3.3 Dorsal and Ventral Striatum
In humans, caudate and putamen appear to be separate structures and many studies report
these two regions perform different functions (Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Minoru
Kimura, 1992; Rolls, Thorpe, & Maddison, 1983; Seger & Cincotta, 2005; Thompson,
1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Yanike & Ferrera, 2014), however there is a lot of structural
and functional data suggesting the opposite; that these regions are a unitary structure.
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If caudate nucleus and putamen were functionally and anatomically separate structures,
one would expect non-overlapping cortical, subcortical connections, facilitating the
various functions, as we see in other areas with various nuclei like the thalamus (Angeles
Fernandez-Gil, Palacios-Bote, Leo-Barahona, & Mora-Encinas, 2010). However, this is
not the case. Neuronal connections to and from the striatum are not segregated into caudate
and putamen connections, but rather form an anterior to posterior gradient that transcends
the internal capsule, the bundle of axons that ‘separate’ the striatum into the caudate and
putamen. The anterior to posterior gradient of connectivity has been confirmed by a variety
of methods, including DTI and functional connectivity for both cortical connectivity (Choi
et al., 2012; Janssen, Jylanki, Kessels, & van Gerven, 2015; Jung et al., 2014; Tziortzi et
al., 2014), and brainstem, dopaminergic connectivity (Chowdhury, Lambert, Dolan, &
Duzel, 2013; Haber, 2014; Roeper, 2013).
The anterior to posterior pattern of connectivity is highly supported in the literature and
there is much overlap between the varying methodologies and tractography seeds used.
Generally, areas of the prefrontal and frontal cortex are reciprocally connected to the
anterior portions of the striatum (including NAcc, caudate nucleus and putamen) and as
you move posteriorly through the striatum, more posterior cortical regions connect to the
striatum. Choi et al. (2012) discerned the functional organization of striatal subregions
using resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with 1000 subjects. The
authors were able to parcellate the striatum into five distinct networks using cortical seeds
chosen from other studies including tractography studies in monkeys. A limbic network
that included NAcc and most ventral portions of caudate and putamen, a ventral attention
network connected predominantly to anterior putamen, a motor network that concentrated
on lateral regions of the posterior putamen, and two association networks (i.e., frontoparietal and default-mode) that included regions of both caudate nucleus and putamen. The
five broad networks, specifically the association networks were then further parcellated
into smaller networks. The five networks correlate highly with tractography studies done
in monkeys, as well as other methods parcellating the human striatum (Janssen et al., 2015;
Jung et al., 2014; Tziortzi et al., 2014).
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Studies that report a functional or structural divide between caudate and putamen often
examine connectivity using striatal-based (i.e,. caudate and putamen derived) seeds
(Janssen et al., 2015). Choosing striatal-based seeds biases the results and interpretation
towards examining the caudate nucleus and putamen as separate structures. Similar to Choi
et al. (2012), Janssen et al. (2015) investigated striatal connectivity using resting state fMRI
but chose seeds within caudate nucleus and putamen instead of cortical regions. The six
resulting functional subdivisions were divided along the internal capsule into, dorsal
caudate, ventral caudate, rostral/caudate accumbens, rostral putamen, caudal putamen, and
dorsal putamen. The authors used a correlation matrix to examine inter-hemispheric cluster
correlations and similarities between neighbouring clusters. An interesting finding that is
not discussed are the intermediate correlations between non-neighbouring clusters. For
example, the ventral caudate cluster is moderately correlated with the rostral putamen and
dorsal putamen clusters, indicating that they may share aspects of their respective
networks. Applying this result to the Choi et al., 2012 framework, the ventral caudate and
rostral putamen clusters, together resemble the limbic or default network. Taken together,
the literature points more to functional subdivisions that differ on an anterior to posterior
axis, rather than a caudate/putamen anatomical axis.
Similar to cortical connections to the striatum, the dopaminergic connectivity also has an
anterior to posterior gradient that does not discriminate between caudate and putamen.
Haber (2014) reviewed the dopaminergic connectivity to the striatum and their role in
integrating information processing across limbic, cognitive and motor functions. The
striatum is innervated by dopamine neurons that originate primarily from the SNc and
VTA. The VTA and SNc are not wholly separate structures and therefore merge into one
another and have overlap in the striatal areas they innervate. VTA-innervated structures
consist mainly of VS or the limbic networks (Choi et al., 2012). The SNc can be subdivided
into two populations based on the presence of calbindin, a group of calcium-binding
proteins. Calbindin-positive dopamine cells are situated in the dorsal aspect of the SNc
and merge into the VTA, which are also calbindin-positive. The ventral region of SNc is
composed of calbindin-negative dopamine cells. Respectively, these regions of dopamine
cells are referred to as dorsal tier and ventral tier SNc cells. The presence or absence of
calbindin allows for the visualization of the dorsal and ventral tier SNc neurons and
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correlates highly with striatal connectivity. Dorsal tier SNc neurons are reciprocally
connected to caudate nucleus and putamen along the middle of the striatum that are part of
the association networks. Ventral tier SNc neurons, conversely, are connected to dorsal
lateral regions of the striatum, specifically in the motor network (Chowdhury et al., 2013;
Haber, 2014).
Interestingly, SNc and VTA have been implicated in reinforcement learning, with SNc
involved in response selection and decision-making whereas, VTA is recruited during
reward signalling and motivation (Roeper, 2013).
It is based on the dopaminergic segregation of the striatum—VTA innervating ventral areas
of the caudate nucleus, putamen and NAcc (i.e., VS), and SNc projecting to the rest of the
caudate and putamen (i.e., DS)—that we and others have chosen to divide the striatum
(Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Helie, Roeder, &
Ashby, 2010; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; J.
O'Doherty et al., 2004; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & MacDonald, 2015).
Anatomically, slight cytoarchitectural differences, as well as divergent glutamatergic
afferents, and non-anastomosing blood supplies separate DS and VS. On a macroscopic
level, there is no wholly agreed upon point of division. Pragmatic division often use
different anatomical landmarks, such as the internal capsule (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011),
or fMRI slices along the z-axis have been used (Postuma & Dagher, 2006).

1.4 Dorsal Striatum
1.4.1 Anatomy
DS is comprised of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and putamen and is vascularized by the
lateral lenticulostriate arteries, off of the middle cerebral artery (Feekes & Cassell, 2006).
The main neuronal type in the striatum is the MSN. Through a wide range of firing
frequencies, dopamine stimulation from SNc is rapid and maximal in DS (Wickens et al.,
2007; Zhang et al., 2009). This is a result of a high concentration of dopaminergic afferents
to these MSNs. Dopamine Transporter (DAT), a membrane-spanning protein responsible
for the synaptic clearance of dopamine, is in high abundance in DS, resulting in rapid
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clearance, and therefore, short stimulation periods (Wickens et al., 2007). The anatomical
makeup of DS, with high concentrations of dopaminergic afferents and DAT, results in
almost binary responding, with maximal stimulation at a range of dopamine firing
frequencies, followed by rapid clearance of synaptic dopamine. Through reciprocal
glutamatergic afferents, DS is connected to the primary, supplementary, and pre-motor
cortex, as well as to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, parietal association cortex, and
somatosensory cortex (Leh, Chakravarty, & Ptito, 2008). As a result of the rapid binary
responding of DS, coupled with reciprocal connections to effector areas such as the motor
cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, it is well-adapted to perform functions such as
deciding among alternatives and response selection.

1.4.2 Function
DS has been implicated in a multitude of functions including selective attention (Agnoli &
Carli, 2011), both explicit (Benke, Delazer, Bartha, & Auer, 2003) and implicit retrieval
(Boyd & Winstein, 2004), complex planning (Su, Chen, Kwan, Lin, & Guo, 2007), and
task switching (i.e., switching between response strategies; Aarts et al., 2014; Aarts et al.,
2010; Cameron, Watanabe, Pari, & Munoz, 2010). Most notably however, DS has been
implicated in learning (Waldschmidt & Ashby, 2011; Yin & Knowlton, 2006), and decision
making (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen,
2008), which will be discussed in depth below.

1.4.3 Dorsal Striatum in Learning
DS has long been implicated in learning situations, both early goal-directed learning
(Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli, Laksiri, Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2008;
Delgado, Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Brian Lau
& Glimcher, 2007; B. Lau & Glimcher, 2008; R. A. Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, &
Gabrieli, 1999; Thompson, 1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Xue, Ghahremani, & Poldrack,
2008), and late-stage, habit learning or automaticity (Helie et al., 2010; R. A. Poldrack et
al., 2005; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, & Ashby, 2013; Yamamoto, Kim, & Hikosaka, 2013;
Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Much of the literature implicating DS in learning involves
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different versions of a stimulus-response task (explained in depth in 1.6). Briefly, stimulusresponse learning is a form of implicit learning where responses (e.g., button presses) are
associated, typically through trial and error, with a certain stimulus (e.g., abstract image).
Stimulus-response learning typically involves reinforcement learning or instrumental
conditioning. Below is an in-depth discussion of several models implicating DS in
learning.

1.4.3.1

DMS- and DLS-mediated Learning

Briefly discussed in section 1.3.2, DMS- and DLS-mediated learning theories originated
in the rodent literature and have subsequently been investigated in humans. Experiments
often involved lesioning areas of DMS or DLS of rodents and investigating subsequent
impairments on goal-directed or habit learning. This theory ascribes early, goal-directed
learning to DMS with the bulk of later-stage learning occurring in DLS, during which
habits are formed (Hernandez, Redgrave, & Obeso, 2015; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012;
Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014; Redgrave et al., 2010; Voorn et al., 2004). Habit
learning is variously defined as reflecting stimulus-specific responses that a) persist even
when feedback is omitted or is reversed, generalizing across situations (Myers et al., 2003;
Shohamy & Wagner, 2008), b) are unaffected by distracting information or tasks (Foerde
et al., 2006), and c) interfere with enacting new incongruent responses (C. M. MacLeod &
Dunbar, 1988). Roughly, the homologous structures in humans for DMS and DLS are the
anterior, dorsomedial DS (i.e., head of the caudate nucleus) and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, versus dorsolateral putamen respectively (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Yin &
Knowlton, 2006). Some views further claim that DLS, in addition to being implicated in
forming stimulus-response habits, mediates and sustains habitual or automatic responding
once these associations are acquired and well entrenched, so-called action control (Balleine
& O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Tricomi, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009) but
see (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010).
Many studies in this area aim to differentiate the neural correlates characterizing goaldirected and habit learning. One main technique utilized is outcome devaluation. Adams
and Dickinson (1981) trained rats to press a lever by providing them with a sucrose solution
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reward after each lever press. After a period of training, lithium chloride, a mild poison
resulting in illness, was added to the sucrose solution, devaluing the reward. This lead to
a reduction in lever pressing until the behaviour was extinguished.

The change in

behaviour suggests that rats initially learned a lever-press-sucrose association and this
association was altered with the addition of illness and the devaluing of the outcome.
Learning what actions will most likely yield rewards is termed goal-directed learning.
Since this form of learning is facilitated through receiving rewards, the learned associations
are sensitive to the changing value of the outcome. If the outcome is no longer rewarding
the organism will terminate the behaviour (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; de Wit, Barker,
Dickinson, & Cools, 2011; Redgrave et al., 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). In the same
study, Adams and Dickinson (1981) found that outcome devaluation could be influenced
by the length of training, such that if the association was overtrained, it was no longer
sensitive to devaluation and the rat would continue to press the lever while being made ill.
This type of learning is referred to as habit learning. The association has progressed
beyond the reward, and the response will be continued irrespective of the outcome
(Thorndike, 1898; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Without intervention, stimulus-response
learning typically proceeds through a goal-directed learning phase, transitioning into habit
learning once the association is overtrained (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).
DMS is reciprocally connected to the prefrontal cortex, specifically the prelimbic region,
and lesions of either of these areas abolish goal-directed behaviour in early learning, with
animals relying on previously-formed habitual behaviour. Lesions to DLS—a region of
the striatum reciprocally connected to areas of the motor and pre-motor cortex—results in
an association that is perpetually goal-directed (Yin & Knowlton, 2006) and reliant on
outcome information.
Tricomi et al. (2009) investigated the role of DLS in habit learning using humans and fMRI.
A free-operant task was developed from rodent literature and involved self-paced buttonpresses in response to an abstract image. There were two groups, one group received 16
minutes of training and the other group received 48 minutes of training. Briefly, an image
would appear on the projection screen that included an abstract image and an indication of
what button to press. Participants could press this button as often as desired and after each
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button press would appear a grey circle indicating no reward, or an image of an M&M or
Frito, indicating a reward. The proportion of rewards given was based on a variableinterval schedule that averaged one reward every 10 seconds. Rewards accumulated during
the task were given to the participants after the scanning session. Following training, one
food reward was devalued through satiation. Participants were instructed to eat one of the
rewards (either M&Ms or Fritos) until further consumption was no longer pleasurable.
Subsequently, participants were scanned during an extinction task, identical to the training
sessions but no rewards were given. If the stimulus-response associations formed habits,
it was expected that the number of button-presses would be similar between the devalued
and pleasurable reward. If the associations did not form habits and still exhibited a goaldirected nature, it was expected that participants would make fewer button-press responses
for the devalued reward. Participants in the short-training group retained goal-directed
behaviour and responded less often to the devalued reward, whereas participants in the
long-training group exhibited habitual responding. FMRI data revealed that an area of the
ventral putamen, indicated to be a region of the DLS was active more in habitual responders
compared to those who were goal-directed, and this activity increased across the training
session. The authors concluded that this area in the ventral putamen must be involved in
stimulus-response habit learning.

1.4.3.2

COVIS Model

The competition between verbal and implicit systems, or COVIS model, asserts that
category learning, another version of stimulus-response learning, involves two competing
systems, (1) a verbal system that classifies stimuli into categories that can be verbalized,
and (2) an implicit system that uses procedural learning (Ashby, 1998). For example,
categorizing rectangles that are taller than they are wide into one category and rectangles
that are wider then they are tall into another category, would be an example of a rule that
is easily verbalized. Learning in this case is explicit and involves frontal and temporal
language areas, among others. Rules that are not easily verbalized tend to involve attributes
that differ in units and are therefore difficult to explicitly describe. For example, it would
be difficult to verbalize the categories if you need to categorize objects that differ in the
diameter of a circle as well as the angle of a radial line that spans the diameter of the circle.
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The difficulty arises because circle diameter and line angle have different units. Learning
in this latter case is implicit, or procedural and linked to the motor and supplementary
motor areas. Both learning systems intersect with DS, and it is here where the competition
takes place. Ashby (1998) references the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits and
assert that verbal category learning involves a frontal circuit including the frontal language
areas, anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex. The implicit system, rather, is mediated by
a striatal loop that passes through the extrastriate visual areas, as well as the prefrontal
cortex. In any categorization task, Ashby (1998) contends that only one of the two systems
will dominate and the DS is responsible for mediating and switching between the two
systems. More importantly, the DS is claimed to mediate the stimulus-response association
learning.

1.4.3.3

Actor-Critic Model

The actor-critic model, first hypothesized by Sutton and Barto (1998) and later supported
by J. O'Doherty et al. (2004), states that reinforcement learning consists of two separate
components, a critic which utilizes feedback to learn to predict future rewards, and an actor
which uses the information from the critic to make better decisions. The critic uses a
prediction error signal generated by the phasic firing of midbrain dopaminergic neurons.
A prediction error signal is generated whenever an unexpected reward is given (Rutledge,
Dean, Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010; W. Schultz et al., 1992). J. O'Doherty et al. (2004)
scanned healthy participants using 3 Tesla (T) MRI while they completed a stimulusresponse learning task. The experiment consisted of two tasks, one instrumental and the
other Pavlovian. In the instrumental conditioning task, two abstract images appeared on
the screen, one left- and the other right-of-centre, and the participant made a button-press
response choosing one of the two images. In the reward trials of the task, one image was
more likely to produce a juice reward compared to the other and the participants were
required to learn the most rewarding images. In the neutral version, the outcome was a
neutral solution, not deemed to be rewarding. In the Pavlovian task, the same trial structure
was used, however the computer made the responses and the participant indicated which
image the computer chose. The rationale for using an instrumental and Pavlovian task was
to examine value predictions by the critic in the presence (i.e., instrumental task) and
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absence (i.e., Pavlovian task) of action selections by an actor. The results showed that VS
correlated strongly with the prediction error signal in both tasks, whereas DS correlated
with prediction error only during the instrumental task. Authors concluded that VS is the
critic, coding for the prediction error signal and sending this information to the DS, or
actor, where this information is used to learn the stimulus-response association and
perform rewarding future responses. In other words, VS is implicated in reward processing
and motivation and DS is implicated in stimulus-response learning and decision-making.

1.4.3.4

SPEED Model

The formation of habits requires many trials, often several hundred or thousands of trials,
compared to studies examining early learning. Additionally, the associations learned after
so many trials are less reliant on feedback and are in fact, often resistant to changes in
feedback (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). The subcortical pathways enable expertise
development (SPEED) was postulated by the same group that hypothesized the COVIS
model and thus many similarities are apparent (Ashby et al., 2007). SPEED relies on
cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits, as does COVIS, but SPEED focuses on
posterior circuits that involve the body and tail of the dorsal caudate. SPEED postulates
that the role of DS is to acquire stimulus-response associations and to train cortical-cotrical
connections between higher order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie
et al., 2010; Soto et al., 2013). The theory maintains that the head of the caudate nucleus
mediates early learning, and as the associations become more practiced progressing toward
automaticity, more posterior regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the
caudate nucleus, underlie late stage learning. Once automaticity has been achieved,
involvement of dorsal caudate nucleus ceases, and stimulus-specific, automatic behaviours
become mediated by cortical regions (i.e., pre-motor, motor and visual cortices; Ashby, et
al., 2007).
Helie et al. (2010), cited as support for the SPEED model, investigated automatization of
responses in a rule-based categorization learning paradigm that included over 10,000 trials,
across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1, 4, 10, and 20.
They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the end of which
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high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%). In subsequent
sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas cortical
activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization even after extensive training.

1.4.4 Dorsal Striatum in Decision Making
Within the last 10-15 years, the claim that DS mediates decision making and response
selection has gained traction with a large literature now bolstering this contention (Atallah
et al., 2007; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Brian Lau & Glimcher, 2007; B. Lau &
Glimcher, 2008; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P. A.
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Smittenaar et al., 2012; Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan, 2012).
Decision-making in this context is defined as the process of representing and assigning
values to different response possibilities, then selecting and executing the most appropriate
action (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Ryterska, Jahanshahi, & Osman, 2013). The
claims regarding DS’s role in learning versus decision making are inconsistent and their
respective literatures have been developing independently from one another.
In examinations of DS in early learning, results often do not confer on this regions attributes
that one would expect for a learning region. In naïve participants who are learning novel
stimulus-response associations, learning regions are expected to be most active early on,
when much of the learning is occurring (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), and to decrease
their activity once the associations have been learned. The frequent finding that DS activity
remains significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005),
categorization rules (Helie et al., 2010, Seger et al., 2010), or stimulus-reward (Daw and
Doya, 2006, Seger et al., 2010), and response-reward (Delgado et al., 2005, Ohira et al.,
2010) associations have been acquired should challenge the notion that DS underlies
learning, yet has not instigated such a revision. The alternative interpretation that DS
mediates response selection, which predictably improves once stimulus-response
associations are learned, accounts for both the pattern of brain-behaviour relations and the
observation that DS activity changes with exposure to learning events. Using single-cell
recording in a go/no-go reversal learning paradigm in rats, Takahashi, Roesch, Stalnaker,
and Schoenbaum (2007) found increased DS activity for rewarded odour cues only after
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behavioural learning criteria were achieved. These findings support the view that DS
mediates decision making, not learning per se.
Not only is there evidence that DS mediates decision making, but it seems to be specifically
implicated in decision making that requires a degree of deliberation, before responses are
enacted with little reflection or automatically (R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Robertson et
al., 2015). In fMRI studies, DS activity correlates with degree of uncertainty in category
(Daniel et al., 2010), response-reward (Ohira et al., 2010), and stimulus-response decisions
(Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011). Further,
investigations in patients with DS deficits reveal significant impairments for decisions
requiring consideration and often superior performance relative to healthy controls for
choosing more automatic responses (Ali et al., 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013;
Robertson et al., 2015).

1.4.5 DS mediates learning or decision making?
Decision-making and learning processes are often confounded in experimental designs
looking at learning (Garrison et al., 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011). In stimulusresponse learning experiments, for example, trials typically proceed as follows: a) a
stimulus is presented and participants decide among a set of responses, and b) feedback
regarding accuracy is provided, shaping stimulus-response associations. Learning is
generally measured by the accuracy in selecting responses. Consequently, failing either to
acquire stimulus-response associations or to select responses based on these learned
associations could lead to impaired performance in these paradigms. In this way, learning
and response selection are confounded. Further, in fMRI studies, a) deciding upon and
enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback regarding response accuracy, are
typically treated as a single event with all significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a
role in learning per se (Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011). For
example, Delgado et al. (2005) examined learning to associate cards with concepts of
‘high’ versus ‘low’ via feedback. As is typical, they considered response selection (i.e.,
high vs. low decisions) and feedback portions of each trial (i.e., high vs. low feedback) as
a single event. Compared to baseline, they found significant peaks in dorsal caudate
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nucleus and VS, concluding that both regions mediate learning. Combining decisionmaking and feedback events caused ambiguity. Consequently, concluding that preferential
DS activation was related to the response selection operation, whereas VS activity reflected
learning through feedback is an alternative explanation for these data that is equally
plausible.
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie decision processes guided by learned
associations could erroneously be assigned a role in learning. Given that these processes
are temporally intertwined and functionally interdependent, distinguishing them is very
challenging, requiring novel experimental designs and nuanced interpretations. Learning
and decision selection are entirely different processes phenomenologically, however, and
distinguishing neural substrates of these different operations is important, with
implications for understanding cognition in health and disease.
The small number of authors who also attempt to separate learning and decision-making
find results that concur with this rationale. Wunderlich et al., 2012 provide a great example
of a study that nicely distinguishes between learning and planning (a component of decision
making), concluding that dorsal caudate is involved in planning whereas the posterior
putamen (along the border between VS and DS) is recruited during habit learning. There
are few papers that attempt to make this distinction between decision making and learning.
In Liljeholm and O’Doherty (2012) and many of the studies outlined in Yin and Knowlton
(2006), lesions in DS seem to impair different forms of learning, usually suggested from
impaired performance on learning tasks involving selections. To perform these tasks
correctly, the rodent must select the correct response using specific cues or feedback
provided. Deficits in either selecting the response or learning from feedback will result in
equally impaired performance on the task. What tends not to be discussed is the possibility
that the DS lesions impair the ability to select the correct response even if the association
might have been accurately learned. In an elegant study, Atallah et al., 2007 investigated
the role of DS in learning versus selecting responses relying on learned associations. In a
Y-maze task using odour cues, Atallah and colleagues observed impairment in rats’ ability
to consistently select a rewarded versus unrewarded arm for animals receiving infusions of
inhibitory GABA agonist into DS compared to a saline solution during the learning phase
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of the experiment. Initially, this seemed to suggest that animals receiving inhibitory
infusions to DS were learning associations between odour cues and rewards more poorly.
When both groups were later tested once the infusions were stopped, however, both
experimental and control groups performed the selection task similarly. This demonstrated
that associations were learned equally well for both experimental and control (i.e., salineinfused) groups during the learning session and suggested that inhibition of DS impaired
the animal’s ability to use learned associations to perform selections reliably.

To

complement this interesting finding, in another study, they found that GABA infusions to
DS, at test phase, resulted in impaired selection performance compared to saline infusions
to DS, although both groups had previously shown identical learning of these odour-reward
associations during the training phase.
Taken together, these studies challenge the direct involvement of DS in learning and
instead suggest a more specific role in performing selections based on previously-learned
associations.

1.5 Ventral Striatum
1.5.1 Anatomy
VS is vascularized by the recurrent artery of Heubner, a branch of the anterior cerebral
artery (Feekes & Cassell, 2006), and is composed of the NAcc and ventral portions of the
caudate nucleus and putamen. As in DS, VS is populated by MSNs. However, MSNs in
VS are smaller, and the dopaminergic input to VS is less dense compared to DS.
Consequently, a dopamine pulse from VTA will stimulate VS more slowly, and with more
variable intensity (Wickens et al., 2007). In an experiment by Zhang and colleagues
(2009), neurons in rats were stimulated by nicotine, and firing frequency was monitored in
both the dorsolateral striatum, and NAcc, homologous to DS and VS respectively in
humans.

In NAcc, dopamine responses to nicotine were graded and incremental,

depending on the frequency and intensity of the stimulation. This is in stark contrast to the
maximal (i.e., plateau) stimulation of DS in response to even the lowest frequency and
intensity. In addition, VS stimulus durations are longer due to lower DAT concentration
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(Wickens et al., 2007). These characteristics of VS suggest that it is adapted to a different
function than DS, and perhaps that these attributes suit it to associating events or stimuli
over time, for example in associative learning. The presence of specific glutamatergic
connections aids in confirming this function.

VS is connected, reciprocally, to the

orbitofrontal, anterior cingulate, anterior temporal, as well as several limbic areas including
the hippocampus, amygdala and hypothalamus (Kincaid, Zheng, & Wilson, 1998). These
areas are heavily involved in encoding and associating salient environmental events as well
as in motivating behaviour.

1.5.2 Function
VS is the downstream receiver of midbrain dopaminergic neurons from the VTA.
Dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain are modulated by rewards and punishments
(Redgrave & Gurney, 2006; Wolfram Schultz, 1998). Specifically, when a reward is
received, a burst of dopamine is sent to VS, and when the organism receives punishing or
negative feedback (i.e., no reward or lesser reward than was expected), dopamine tone is
decreased in VS (Redgrave & Gurney, 2006; Wolfram Schultz, 1998). Therefore, the
traditional role of the VS was to anticipate and respond to feedback via the midbrain
dopamine signal (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; B. Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, &
Hommer, 2001). This was then expanded to include a role in reward learning (R. Cools,
Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; R. Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007; Daw &
Doya, 2006; Delgado et al., 2005; J. P. O'Doherty, 2004) and even general feedback-based
learning in the absence of an overt reward (Atallah et al., 2007; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et
al., 2014; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011)
A result often reported is that VS and DS are both ascribed a role in feedback-based
learning. For example, in a recent meta-analysis of 35 fMRI studies of reinforcement
learning through feedback—the majority of which confounded neural activity for response
selection and feedback phases—found both VS and DS to be equally strongly associated
with performing feedback-based learning. We argue that combining decision-making, and
feedback events causes ambiguity. A plausible alternative explanation, consequently, is
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that preferential DS activation could relate to the response selection operation, whereas VS
activity reflected learning through feedback.

1.6 Striatum-mediated disorders
The striatum is central to many neurological and psychiatric disorders such as Parkinson’s
disease (Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988), Huntington’s disease (Bano, Zanetti,
Mende, & Nicotera, 2011), addiction (Volkow, Wise, & Baler, 2017), bipolar disorder
(Clark & Sahakian, 2008), schizophrenia (Barch & Ceaser, 2012), depression (Arnone,
McIntosh, Ebmeier, Munafo, & Anderson, 2012), autism spectrum disorder (Park et al.,
2017) and obsessive compulsive disorder (Jung et al., 2011), to name a few. Basic science
research into the functions of the DS and VS is integral to understanding and developing
effective treatments for striatum-mediated disorders. Two disorders, Parkinson’s disease
and obsessive compulsive disorder are discussed in depth below as these disorders will be
central to later chapters.

1.6.1 Parkinson’s disease
1.6.1.1

Pathophysiology

PD is a neurodegenerative disorder affecting 1% of the population over 60 years of age and
3% of the population over 80 in industrialized countries (Tanner & Goldman, 1996). It is
mainly characterized by the motor symptoms of bradykinesia, or slow movement, rigidity,
and tremor. The cardinal motor symptoms of this disorder are caused by the degeneration
of dopamine-producing neurons in the SNc.

This degeneration is caused by the

accumulation of alpha-synuclein, a protein regularly found in healthy neurons that may
function in neurotransmitter vesicle trafficking (Diao et al., 2013). It is thought that
aggregation of alpha-synuclein negative impacts other cell processes ultimately leading to
programmed cell death (Dauer & Przedborski, 2003; Jellinger, 2012). When enough
degeneration occurs in the SNc, delivery of dopamine to the DS, declines causing the
balance between the direct and indirect pathways of the cortico-basal gangliathalamocortical motor circuit to increase signaling through the indirect pathway releasing
DRD2, 3, 4 from dopaminergic inhibition, and decrease signaling through the direct

22

pathway (Wichmann, DeLong, Guridi, & Obeso, 2011). These changes result in increased
activity in the internal segment of the globus pallidus, inhibiting the thalamus, and
ultimately, regions of the motor cortex. When between 50-80% of the SNc dopaminergic
neurons degenerate, the hypokinetic features seen in PD begin to emerge.

1.6.1.2

Treatment Strategies

At all stages of the disease, dopamine replacement is an effective treatment for improving
motor symptoms. Dopamine replacement therapy can be prescribed in a variety of forms,
namely dopamine precursors such as ι-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (ι-dopa), or dopamine
agonists. Dopamine precursors are often prescribed in conjunction with a dopamine
decarboxylase inhibitor to prevent the conversion of ι-dopa to active dopamine in the
peripheral circulation, thereby increasing the availability of ι-dopa within the brain.
Dopamine precursors elevate dopamine levels in the brain, alleviating the motor symptoms
associated with PD. Dopamine agonists are chemical substrates with a similar structure to
dopamine, and can bind to and activate dopamine receptors directly.

1.6.1.3

Cognitive Deficits

Cognitive dysfunction is now an undisputed, non-motor symptom of PD that leads to
significant impairment in quality of life (Barone et al., 2009; Schrag, Jahanshahi, & Quinn,
2000). In PD, some cognitive deficits relate to dopamine depletion in DS, and are
remediated, at least partially, by dopaminergic therapy. Other cognitive deficits arise as a
consequence of dopaminergic therapy. Increasingly, it is understood that impairment can
occur due to overdose of brain regions that receive dopamine from VTA (see R. Cools,
2006; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011 for reviews). These regions include VS,
prefrontal, and limbic cortices. Unlike SNc, the VTA is relatively spared throughout the
course of PD, and as a result, regions innervated by VTA retain near-normal levels of
dopamine (R. Cools, 2006). Therefore, it has been proposed that dopamine replacement
therapy overdoses VTA-innervated regions, impairing functioning.

As the disease

progresses alpha-synuclein accumulates in cortical cells throughout the cortex leading to
broader cognitive symptoms (Pereira et al., 2012).

Finally, other transmitter systems

23

including acetylcholine and serotonin also deteriorate in patients with PD leading to
cognitive dysfunction as well as mood and anxiety (Calabresi et al., 2006; Ray & Strafella,
2012; Scatton, Javoy-Agid, Rouquier, Dubois, & Agid, 1983).
The most common method in testing the effect of dopaminergic therapy on cognition is
through the use of the exogenous dopamine withdrawal procedure. Patients are instructed
to abstain from taking dopamine precursors for a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 18
hours, and dopamine agonists for a minimum of 16 to a maximum of 20 hours before
testing begins, constituting the OFF state. Performance in this state is then compared to
the ON state where the patient takes the medication as prescribed. Another method for
investigating this effect involves comparing performance of medicated PD patients with
patients who have never been medicated, or de novo PD patients. The advantage of the
former method is that it removes the confounds related to receptor changes due to chronic
dopaminergic therapy as well as disease progression. Severity can differ significantly
across patients at the time of clinical diagnosis and as the disease progresses (Postuma et
al., 2015). By comparing performance in ON and OFF states in a single patient, withinsubject differences can be examined without the likelihood of comparing patients who have
different disease durations.

1.6.1.4

Dopamine Overdose Hypothesis

The dopamine overdose hypothesis attempts to explain the cognitive impairments seen in
PD as a function of varying concentrations of endogenous dopamine in different brain
regions. Those that are dopamine depleted at baseline are improved; whereas, brain regions
that are dopamine replete are impaired by dopaminergic therapy. DS is a brain region that
is improved by dopamine replacement therapy; whereas, those mediated by a VTAinnervated regions are impaired.
Gotham, Brown, and Marsden (1988) were among the first to propose the overdose
hypothesis. They investigated cognitive function in patients with PD both on and off
dopaminergic medication using a series of tasks including the Paced Auditory Serial
Addition Task, Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, Visual-visual Conditional Associative
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Learning Test, Word Fluency Tasks, and Subject-ordered Pointing Task.

A short

description of each task is presented below.
1) The Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task is a measure of general attention, and
working memory. Participants hear a series of numbers and are instructed to add
the most recent number to the number that followed it in the series. For example,
in the series one, two, three, the participant would be required to add the number
two with one, resulting in three and then add the next number, three, to the previous
numbers, resulting in six.
2) The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task is a measure of set-shifting, or the ability to
flexibly update changing rules. Briefly, participants are told to match sample cards
containing objects of various shapes, colours, and numbers to a probe card. They
are not told on what dimension (i.e., colour, shape, or number) to match sample
cards to the probe card, however, and need to determine this using a trial-and-error
approach. The category matching rules change throughout the task.
3) The Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Test involves learning
associations between arbitrary visual stimuli. Before the test, one of six cards with
geometric designs is randomly paired to one of six colours. Participants are shown
cards with geometric designs and are instructed to choose the colour that the card
belongs to, and are given feedback. Through trial and error, participants learn to
associate a particular colour to each geometrical design.
4) In the Word Fluency Tasks, participants are instructed to generate words based on
a category cue, in a defined period of time (i.e., animals or boys names).
5) Finally, the Subject-ordered Pointing Task involves initiating a series of responses
whilst monitoring their execution. Briefly, a series of stimuli are arranged on a
sheet of paper. On several successive sheets of paper, the stimuli are presented in
a different order. The participant is instructed to point to one stimulus per page,
aiming to point to each different stimulus without pointing to the same one twice.
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Stimuli include representational drawings, abstract images, and words that evoke a
low amount of imagery.
All participants completed all of these measures and were tested both on and off dopamine
replacement therapy. The delay between the two testing sessions was approximately one
week.

PD patients were randomly divided into two groups with order of testing

counterbalanced across patients such that one group began the first testing session on
dopaminergic medication, and the other first performed testing off medication. Each
testing session involved a different version of the tasks listed above, and the order of the
tasks was further counterbalanced with half of the participants beginning with one version,
and the other half with the other version.
When tested in the OFF state, PD patients made more errors in the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Task, and generated fewer words per category on the Word Fluency Tasks compared to
their ON state. When tested on their medication, they performed more poorly on the
Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Task, as well as the Subject-ordered
Pointing Task. At its most basic level, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, and the Word
Fluency Tasks are measures of decision-making, or response selection. Conversely, the
Visual-visual Conditional Associative Learning Test and the Subject-ordered Pointing
Task involve learning and working memory. Studies of decision-making and response
selection have implicated DS, a result that is entirely in line with the results of Gotham and
his colleagues. In addition, VS and the pre-frontal cortex, two regions that are innervated
by VTA, have been shown to mediate association learning and working memory,
respectively.
Since the overdose hypothesis was first proposed in 1988, few functional neuroimaging
studies in PD have confirmed increased activity related to dopamine therapy in DS and/or
in cortical regions reciprocally connected to DS.

Even fewer studies demonstrate

behavioural improvements and associated neural changes related to dopaminergic therapy
in PD. Mattay et al. (2002) found that activations in motor regions during a simple motor
response (i.e., supplementary motor area, cerebellum, lateral premotor, sensorimotor, and
parietal cortical regions) were larger on compared to off dopaminergic therapy in PD
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patients measured with fMRI. Keypress responses to single-digit stimuli were neither
improved nor impaired by dopamine replacement in this study, however. Similarly, Feigin
et al. (2003) found that ι-dopa increased activation in premotor cortex, a region reciprocally
connected to SNc-innervated DS, though motor learning performance was not altered.
Finally, Fera et al. (2007) reported medication-induced behavioural improvements in
interference in a modified, colour-word Stroop task involving key-presses. Stroop-related
interference has been shown previously to be mediated by DS (Ali et al., 2010). Though
neural activity in DS was not increased, it was in cortical regions reciprocally connected to
DS (i.e., dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, and parietal lobe) on compared to off medication
corresponding to improved performance when print colour and colour word were
incongruent.
Using functional neuroimaging, a small number of investigations support or at least
partially bolster the dopamine overdose hypothesis (Argyelan et al., 2008; R. Cools et al.,
2007; Feigin et al., 2003; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; Van Eimeren
et al., 2009). R. Cools et al. (2007) examined the effect of dopaminergic therapy on
regional brain activity with fMRI in PD patients while they learned stimulus-reward
associations and reversals through trial-and-error and probabilistic feedback.

ι-dopa

attenuated regional brain activity in the VTA-innervated NAcc on the final error during
stimulus-reward contingency reversals, just before patients began correctly responding to
the updated stimulus-reward association. Arguably, this is the point at which patients
learned the new stimulus-reward relationship, guiding correct responses on the subsequent
trial.

Despite fMRI signal differences, however, dopaminergic therapy did not

correspondingly impair learning of the stimulus-reward contingency reversal. Argyelan et
al. (2008) investigated the effect of dopaminergic therapy using positron emission
tomography (PET) on default mode network (DMN). DMN normally deactivates during
externally-oriented and goal-directed cognition (Di & Biswal, 2014). They found that parts
of the DMN that are VTA-innervated—the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and insula—
deactivated as expected during motor sequence learning in healthy controls and PD patients
tested off dopaminergic therapy but not in PD patients following an ι-dopa infusion.
Though there were no corresponding ON-OFF performance differences, absence of
deactivation could be interpreted as abnormal processing in VTA-innervated brain regions
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in PD patients related to dopaminergic therapy. Van Eimeren et al. (2009) found that
dopamine agonists and ι-dopa reduced the reward prediction error-related neural response
(i.e., the response related to the difference between expected and actual rewards received)
in VS, whereas only dopamine agonists reduced the reward prediction error-related neural
response in the VTA-innervated orbitofrontal cortex. These responses were not correlated
with online behavioural changes, though the reward prediction error response in
orbitofrontal cortex on dopamine agonists correlated with risk-taking behaviour in a task
performed once patients were out of the scanner. Feigin et al. (2003) found that ι-dopa
reduced occipital association cortical activity measured with PET in PD patients during
motor sequence learning. Trial-by-trial motor sequence learning efficiency and accuracy
was not worsened by an ι-dopa infusion, though PD patients had less accurate explicit
report of final motor sequences suggesting some learning impairment. Finally, Kwak et
al. (2012) found that ι-dopa reduced fMRI activation in ventral putamen in PD patients
while they explicitly learned motor sequences and this reduction in neural signal correlated
with decreased early phase learning. This study directly supported the dopamine overdose
hypothesis.
At odds with the prefrontal, peri-cingulate, anterior cingulate, and parietal cortical regions
dopamine overdose hypothesis, Mattay et al. (2002) used fMRI to investigate the effect of
ι-dopa on working memory. In an n-back task, PD patients indicated when the current
stimulus matched the stimulus from n trials earlier. Similar cortical regions were engaged
during this task in PD patients in the ON and OFF states, though activations of VTAinnervated brain regions were larger in the OFF condition, consistent with notions of
dopamine overdose. However, greater ON-OFF differences in fMRI activations correlated
with poorer accuracy in the OFF relative to ON states. These findings were most easily
interpreted as poorer working memory performance related to less efficient function of
VTA-innervated brain regions in the OFF state. Van Eimeren et al. (2009) found that
dopamine agonists increased feedback-related activation in orbitofrontal cortex in PD
relative to testing on ι-dopa or off dopaminergic therapy. This activation in orbitofrontal
cortex correlated positively with a measure of risk-taking. Finally, Shiner et al. (2012)
investigated the effect of dopaminergic therapy in PD patients on a) stimulus-reward
discrimination learning through probabilistic feedback in the Learning Session and
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subsequently on b) selecting the most probabilistically-rewarded stimuli in the
Performance Session. In the Performance Session, a) all pairs from the Learning session
and b) novel pairs formed by coupling the most-rewarded and least-rewarded stimuli and
all stimuli with which they had not previously been paired during the Learning session
were tested. Contrary to previous findings, (Ghilardi et al., 2007; A. A. MacDonald et al.,
2014; Seo, Beigi, Jahanshahi, & Averbeck, 2010; Vo et al., 2014), and there were no ONOFF fMRI signal differences (R. Cools et al., 2007) dopaminergic therapy had no
detrimental effect on efficiency or accuracy of stimulus-reward association learning. In
the Performance Session, greater accuracy in choosing the most probabilistically rewarded
stimuli was achieved in the ON relative to OFF state for newly-created stimulus pairs only,
when greater integration of information was required, though no ON-OFF fMRI signal
differences were noted. The dopamine overdose hypothesis was not supported and though
dopaminergic therapy improved response selections that have previously been shown to be
DS-mediated (Grahn et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), corresponding neural
signal changes did not occur in this study.
PD and dopaminergic therapy are expected to simultaneously have opposing effects on
neural activation in, and functions associated with, SNc- versus VTA-innervated brain
regions. Recognizing an evidence gap, Aarts et al. (2014) aimed to critically test this
concept using a rewarded task-switching paradigm. Task-switching refers to the ability to
shift strategies, adapting to changing situational demands (R. Cools, Barker, Sahakian, &
Robbons, 2001). It has been shown to depend upon the SNc-supplied DS (R. Cools et al.,
2001; Robertson et al., 2015). Reward processing and anticipation of reward have been
shown to engage VTA-innervated VS and orbitofrontal cortex (B. Knutson & Cooper,
2005). Aarts et al. (2014) investigated the effect of a) cued-switching between responding
to simultaneously-appearing word stimuli (i.e., left or right) and arrows (i.e., pointing left
or right), and b) reward anticipation. As predicted, PD patients’ abilities to switch between
responding to simultaneously appearing word or arrow stimuli, based on a preceding cue,
was improved in the ON state. This correlated with greater DS blood-oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) signal on relative to off dopaminergic therapy. In contrast, anticipating
a high versus low reward, based on a cue that preceded each trial, had no effect on accuracy
or response time (RT) though previous research has shown that higher relative to lower
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anticipated rewards results in greater errors and longer RTs, a so-called reward cost (Aarts
et al., 2010). Further, dopaminergic therapy had no effect on behaviour based on reward
anticipation. Despite no behavioural differences, signal in the VTA-innervated VS ROI
was lower on relative to off dopaminergic therapy during reward anticipation.
Investigating individual differences through correlational analyses, PD patients with
greater ON relative to OFF VS region of intrest (ROI) activation evidenced greater ON
more than OFF reward costs (i.e., poorer behaviour).

That is, medication-induced

increases in VS ROI activation correlated with poorer performance, not fully consistent
with the dopamine overdose hypothesis.
Especially in early PD, a) endogenous dopamine levels in SNc- versus VTA-innervated
brain regions, and b) replenishing versus overdosing effects of exogenous dopamine in
these brain regions respectively, are proposed to be important determinants of the cognitive
profile (R. Cools, 2006; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011). This framework is prevalent
and effectively accounts for behavioural patterns across numerous PD studies (R. Cools,
2006; Dirnberger & Jahanshahi, 2013; Vaillancourt, Schonfeld, Kwak, Bohnen, & Seidler,
2013).

Studies that fully support these concepts are lacking, however.

In fact,

demonstrations of simultaneous but opposite effects of dopaminergic therapy on both
behavioural and neural measures of SNc- versus VTA-innervated brain regions to this point
are not found in the literature. Previous studies included only small numbers of PD
patients, in some cases ten or fewer (Feigin et al., 2003; Mattay et al., 2002; Van Eimeren
et al., 2009), possibly contributing to the lack of strong support to date. In some cases, the
behavioural measures potentially resulted from combined operations ascribed to both SNcinnervated brain regions (e.g., response selection, retrieval processes) and VTA-supplied
areas (e.g., stimulus-response learning) accounting for patterns that were not
straightforward (Feigin et al., 2003; Mattay et al., 2002; Shiner et al., 2012).
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1.6.2 Obsessive compulsive Disorder
1.6.2.1

Pathophysiology

Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder prevalent in 1.2% of adults
and is described by the National Institute of Mental Health as typically chronic with a
gradual onset (Bokor & Anderson, 2014). OCD is characterized by two major symptoms:
obsessions and compulsions (Bokor & Anderson, 2014).

The former is defined as

disturbing thoughts, urges, or impulses, such as thoughts of harm and death of a loved one,
fears of contamination, persistent doubting, counting and the need for symmetry (Bokor &
Anderson, 2014; Chamberlain, Blackwell, Fineberg, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2005).
Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts that individuals affected by the
disorder feel driven to perform, including repeatedly checking locks and appliances,
excessive hand-washing, and organizing objects symmetrically (Bokor & Anderson, 2014;
Chamberlain et al., 2005).
The disorder exhibits diversity in severity, however, the symptoms tend to follow a general
pattern: obsessive thoughts, anxiety, compulsions, and temporary relief (Bokor &
Anderson, 2014). For example, with respect to sanitization, patients may have an irrational
fear of being contaminated by germs, resulting in illness or death. Anxiety often ensues
and patients feel driven to carry out certain tasks to reduce their distress. The individual
may wash or clean repetitively until a “feeling” of cleanliness is achieved, whereas a typical
individual may wash until observing that they are clean. Completion of the respective
compulsions result in temporary relief and the cycle repeats. Patients spend a substantial
amount of time with their obsessions and carrying out compulsions, and this can be costly
to maintaining jobs and relationships. Anxiety is at the core of OCD and the disorder was
in fact classified as an anxiety disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders IV (DSM-IV). In the current iteration, DSM-V, OCD is now classified as a
separate disorder.
Recently, OCD has been linked to deficits in the striatum using evidence from structural
and functional MRI. Structural MRI studies utilizing voxel-based morphometry have
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consistently found volumetric differences within the striatum with the consensus being
reduced volume of DS (Piras et al., 2015; Riffkin et al., 2005) and increased volume of VS
(Piras et al., 2015; Pujol, Soriano-Mas, Alonso, & et al., 2004; Yoo et al., 2008; Zarei et
al., 2011). The volumetric abnormalities in OCD are also reflected in resting state basal
activity. PET and resting fMRI have found increased glucose metabolism and increased
activity in regions of VS compared to controls (Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017;
Del Casale et al., 2011; Gursel, Avram, Sorg, Brandl, & Koch, 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010;
Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997). Conversely, resting state activity in DS is reduced
compared to controls (Del Casale et al., 2011; Rubin, Villanueva-Meyer, Ananth, Trajmar,
& Mena, 1992). Interestingly, activation in VS increased compared to rest in response to
symptom-provoking stimuli (Figee et al., 2011; Mataix-Cols et al., 2004; Rauch, Jenike,
Alpert, & et al., 1994). Mataix-Cols et al. (2004) categorized OCD patients based on their
subtype, either contamination, checking, or hoarding subtype, and conducted a block
design symptom-provocation task where patients with OCD and healthy controls viewed
blocks of images pertaining to each of those subtypes as well as neutral images.
Interestingly, different OCD-subtypes evidenced dissimilar brain activity patterns in the
striatum. Contamination-subtype patients had higher activity in ventral caudate nucleus
compared to controls, whereas ventral putamen was increased compared to control in
patients with the checking-subtype. Hoarding-subtype did not result in changes in the
striatum. This study supported the notion that OCD is a multifaceted psychiatric disorder
that may involve different brain regions depending on subtype.

Taking everything

together, OCD patients seem to have increased volume and baseline activity in VS, and
diminished volume and activity in DS.

1.6.2.2

Treatment Strategies

The first line pharmacological therapy for the treatment of OCD, as it is for anxiety
disorders and depression, is selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which inhibit
serotonin transporters (SERT or 5-HTT) impairing the removal of serotonin from synapses
and prolonging their effects (Chamberlain et al., 2005; Hirschtritt, Bloch, & Mathews,
2017; Seibell & Hollander, 2014). Unfortunately, between 40-60% of patients do not
respond to SSRI treatment suggesting that augmenting serotonin may not be addressing the
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underlying pathology and instead masking it by reducing the anxiety associated with the
disorder (Atmaca, 2016; Chamberlain et al., 2005; Seibell & Hollander, 2014). SSRIs are
typically used as adjunct therapy with cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) focusing on
exposure and response prevention (ERP; Chamberlain et al., 2005; Hirschtritt et al., 2017;
Seibell & Hollander, 2014). Patients with OCD undergoing ERP first create a hierarchy
of triggers related to their symptoms.

For example, if a patient suffered from the

contamination-subtype of OCD, he or she may rank using a public water fountain as less
anxiety-provoking than touching a public bathroom doorknob. Patients then carry out
controlled exposures, working up their hierarchy. An example of an exposure from the
instances above would be using a public water fountain until the level of anxiety diminishes
significantly. Using ERP in conjunction with developing strategies to understand and resist
compulsions typically constitutes the psychological therapy component (Hirschtritt et al.,
2017; O'Neill & Feusner, 2015). Even with CBT and pharmacological intervention,
between 30-40% of patients do not respond to treatment (Atmaca, 2016), stimulating
research into non-serotonergic medications and other treatment options.

1.6.2.3

Cognitive Deficits

Structural and functional changes in patients with OCD could be linked to cognitive
dysfunction related to OCD symptomatology. Deficits in VS and DS could lead to
dysfunction in reward processing, error detection, decision making, and cognitive
flexibility.
VS has been implicated in reward processing (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; W. Schultz et
al., 1992) stimulus-response learning through feedback (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo,
Ganjavi, & MacDonald, 2014; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2014), and
reversal learning (i.e., behavioural adaptations in response to changing stimulus-reward
contingencies; R. Cools et al., 2002; R. Cools et al., 2007; Remijnse, Nielen, van Balkom,
& et al., 2006; Swainson et al., 2000). It appears that reversal learning (Remijnse et al.,
2006) and reward learning (Nielen, den Boer, & Smid, 2009) are diminished in OCD
patients, coupled with decreased VS activity compared to healthy controls. Remijnse et al.
(2006), ascribe striatal deficiencies that contribute to impairments in task-switching and
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reversal learning to be the neurological foundations of cognitive inflexibility and
ineffective behavioural adaptation to changing stimuli in OCD patients, which manifest as
compulsive behaviours. As discussed above, obsessive-compulsive behaviours have been
linked to hyperactivity in the reward-processing circuitry, as evidenced by augmented
striatal metabolism in OCD patients at rest and in response to symptom-provoking stimuli
(Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel
et al., 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997). Figee et al. (2011),
contend that this hyperactivity of the VS occurs by surrendering the regular responsiveness
of VS to natural rewards (e.g., food, water, sex). Augmented baseline VS activity in
patients with OCD hinders performance on VS-mediated tasks and may play an integral
role in OCD symptomatology.
As discussed above, DS has been reported to mediate cognitive flexibility (P. A.
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011), selective attention (A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014), and
decision making (Atallah et al., 2007; N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald,
2017; Robertson et al., 2015). OCD patients have shown impaired executive functions in
tasks examining cognitive flexibility (Del Casale et al., 2011; Vriend et al., 2013), and
response inhibition (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van den Heuvel,
2014). As cognitive flexibility and response inhibition appear to be impaired in OCD
patients, this may be linked to the inability to choose naturally rewarding behaviours over
compulsive actions (Vriend et al., 2013). Nakao et al. (2005) conducted a colour-word
Stroop task, where colour words (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), are presented in font colours that
are either congruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), or incongruent with the
colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green). Patients with OCD and healthy controls were
instructed to name the colour of the font, rather than read the colour word while brain
activity was simultaneously recorded using fMRI. Patients with OCD took longer to
complete the Stroop task and did not exhibit significant activity in DS, as did the healthy
controls. In this task, the role of DS has been shown to mediate inhibiting the response
that is more salient (i.e., colour word) and outputting the visual, font colour information
(Ali et al., 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013; Djamshidian, O'Sullivan, Lees, &
Averbeck, 2011; Fera et al., 2007; Larson, Clayson, Primosch, Leyton, & Steffensen, 2015;
C. M. MacLeod, 1991; C. M. MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000; Nakao et al., 2005; Wright

34

& Wanley, 2003). Impaired cognitive flexibility and response inhibition could be related
to deficits in OCD which in turn might lead to compulsive actions.
A present model of OCD based on data discussed above suggests that obsessions and
compulsive behaviours may be linked to a disproportion between hyperactivity in the VS
and hypoactivity in the DS while processing incoming information. Dysfunctional reward
circuitry centred in the VS is expected to result in an ability to respond to natural rewards
and instead is modulated by stressful, obsession-related stimuli (Baxter et al., 1987; de
Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel et al., 2018; Le Jeune
et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997). Hypoactivity in DS producing deficits in
cognitive flexibility and response inhibition might produce difficulty switching away from
thinking of obsessions, and performing adaptive actions over maladaptive compulsions
(Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen et al., 2014; Vriend et al., 2013).

1.7 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
MRI is a non-invasive technique that allows for the visualization of brain structures using
a large electromagnet and radio waves. While in the magnet, all water molecules inside
the tissues become aligned. During data collection, radio waves are introduced causing the
water molecules to increase in energy and spin away from this alignment. After the radio
wave is stopped, these molecules release this energy and relax back to alignment. The rate
at which these molecules relax depends on many factors including tissue type. What MRI
measures is the different relaxation times allowing for the visualization of different tissues
within the brain. Generally, the larger the electromagnet, the higher spatial resolution of
the images. At 3T, the spatial resolution of the images ranges from 1-3mm in most studies.
In higher field strength, such as 7T, the resolution increases to around 500µm (Glover,
2011). Functional MRI uses an electromagnet to visualize differences in oxygenated and
deoxygenated blood, referred to as BOLD in the brain. This BOLD response in different
brain regions can be correlated with various functions relative to rest or other control
functions. The theory behind fMRI is that areas of the brain that recruit more oxygenated
blood, stored as oxyhemoglobin, are more active than areas that do not. All processes
involved in neural signaling from action potential propagation, neurotransmitter vesicle
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binding to the synaptic junction, and release and reuptake of neurotransmitters, require
energy in the form of adenosine triphosphate (Glover, 2011). To utilize this energy
effectively requires oxygen absorbed from the bloodstream. Oxygen uptake by neurons
results in an increased local concentration of deoxyhemoglobin and waste products
resulting in vasodilation and increased blood flow containing oxygenated blood (Glover,
2011). This process is called the hemodynamic response and is what is most often
modelled in fMRI experiments. Changes in blood oxygenation and blood flow, referred to
as Blood-Oxygenation Level Dependent responses, are visualized and measured in fMRI.
Specifically, it is the difference in magnetic characteristics between deoxygenated and
oxygenated blood that allow for visualization. Deoxyhemoglobin is highly paramagnetic
compared to oxyhemoglobin and this paramagnetism creates magnetic fields that change
the relaxation rates of the water molecules that can be visualized (Glover, 2011). An
important feature of fMRI is temporal resolution which refers to ability to measure changes
in BOLD over time. Action potentials are very fast, on the order of milliseconds, whereas
the hemodynamic response function is sluggish, peaking approximately 5 seconds after the
neural stimulus, and returning to resting levels after 8-16 seconds (Glover, 2011). By
taking great consideration when stimuli or responses occur, and using sophisticated
analysis methods, clearer pictures of BOLD activity can be obtained and correlated with
neural responses (Glover, 2011).
While in the fMRI scanner, subjects complete tasks, or just simply rest, and active brain
areas can be visualized during these processes. Using healthy participants, fMRI-generated
BOLD responses can suggest brain regions that are preferentially correlated with certain
functions. Once the cognitive functions have been mapped in healthy individuals using
fMRI, testing functions of interest in patient populations that have demonstrated
impairment in the target brain regions can better assess whether these regions are critical
for the function under investigation.

1.8 Stimulus-response Learning
Stimulus-response learning, discussed in sections 1.4 and 1.5, has been an area of intense
research for a multitude of reasons. (1) Stimulus-response learning forms the basis for how
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organisms interact and thrive in their environments due to its role in adaptive behaviour
(Thorndike, 1898), (2) stimulus-response learning is easily tested with tasks adaptable for
non-human primate and rodent animal models as well as for humans, and (3) stimulusresponse learning is mediated by the striatum, a region implicated in many disorders. Many
models of reinforcement learning and instrumental conditioning, have been created using
stimulus-response tasks. Here, we adapt a stimulus-response learning and decision-making
task to address the controversy regarding DS’s role in learning versus decision-making
(Chapter 2). Additionally, we implement this task in patients with striatum-mediated
disorders, namely Parkinson’s disease (Chapter 3), and obsessive compulsive disorder
(Chapter 4) to investigate the neural mechanisms of cognitive deficits and symptoms in
these disorders.

Our stimulus-response learning task was designed to individually

investigate, and tease apart, decision making and learning, as well as to identify the brain
regions that mediate them. Briefly, participants learned to associate abstract images with
button-presses while brain activity was recorded in 3T fMRI. We modeled a) the phase
during which participants decided amongst options and selected responses, separately from
b) the stage when participants learned about associations through feedback regarding the
accuracy of their choices (Figure 1.3; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014). In some
experiments, we further tested participants’ ability to select and enact responses that they
learned during the first phase of the study, investigating the brain regions that mediated
these decisions.

Figure 1.3 Schematic of the stimulus-response task used
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The stimulus-response task used in in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), as well as in Chapters 2-4. The
task was designed to allow for separate investigation of decision making and learning. In each trial there is
a Decision Making Event and a Learning Event. In the Decision Making Event, an abstract image appears
on the screen and the participant chooses a response out of multiple response options. After the response
is made, the Learning Event occurs, during which participants receive and process feedback as to whether
their response was correct or incorrect. Participants use this feedback to learn image-button press pairings
(i.e., stimulus-response associations).

Using this task in healthy, young adults (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), we found
activation in DS only during the Decision Making Event, not during learning through
feedback (i.e., the Learning Event). Further, DS activity during the decision stage of our
trials only occurred for trials occurring later in the learning session, when the slope of
learning was shallower, as participants were already selecting responses guided by
associations that they had acquired in earlier trials. In contrast, activity in VS correlated
with the Feedback Event of our stimulus-response learning trials as has been shown by
others (R. Cools et al., 2007; W. Schultz et al., 1992). Further, feedback-related VS
activation was greatest in the earliest phase of learning when the slope of behavioural
change was steepest, indicative of greatest stimulus-response association learning.
In addition to the fMRI experiment in healthy adults described above (Nole M. Hiebert,
Vo, et al., 2014), we have previously tested behaviour only in patients with PD on and off
dopaminergic therapy completing a similar task (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, et al., 2014;
Vo et al., 2014).

Learning stimulus-response associations in patients with PD was

comparable to controls at baseline and impaired with dopaminergic therapy. This pattern
suggests that learning stimulus-response associations is not mediated by the dopaminedeficient DS in PD but rather a VTA-innervated brain region.
All results support the original investigation in that DS does not mediate stimulus-response
learning. Given the robustness and replicability of the results, this task was chosen to
investigate the role of DS in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic therapy (Chapter
2), in patients with OCD (Chapter 3) and DS in habit learning (Chapter 4). Combining
fMRI with our stimulus-response task on and off dopaminergic therapy in PD, as well as
in patients with OCD provides an extremely powerful paradigm for testing the neural
substrates of learning and decision making. Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) provided
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fMRI data that was correlational making it impossible to definitively state the necessity of
brain regions for various functions. Conversely, in our behavioural studies investigating
stimulus-response learning in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic medication, allow
us only to speculate regarding the brain regions mediating these functions using
behavioural and pharmacological effects.

Testing patients with PD on and off

dopaminergic therapy while measuring brain activity using fMRI allows us to make causal
inferences rather than just correlational. To reiterate, in unmedicated PD patients, DS
functions and neural activity are depressed, whereas VS operations and activation levels
are spared. Dopaminergic therapy remediates DS dopamine depletion and improves
function (R. Cools, 2006; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011). Additionally, exogenous
dopamine distributes non-selectively, increasing dopamine even to the relatively-replete
VS. As a consequence, dopaminergic medications have been shown to attenuate neural
activity and worsen functions performed by VTA-innervated brain regions, presumably
due to dopamine overdose (R. Cools, 2006). In this way, comparing the OFF and ON
states, a double dissociation in terms of behaviour and neural activity is observed
comparing DS and VS. In OCD, we will test for the first time both learning and decision
making in the same patients within the same scanning session to truly understand deficits
in OCD. Finally, we will modify this task by pre-training participants on stimulus-response
association learning to investigate DS’s role in late-stage learning to the point of
automaticity.

1.9

Hypotheses
We hypothesize that DS does not mediate stimulus-response learning—either goal-directed
or habit learning—but rather underlies selections among response options, referred to as
decision making. VS, on the other hand, mediates feedback-based stimulus-response
learning but only in the early stages. In three experiments, DS and VS will be probed using
similar stimulus-response paradigms in patients with PD on and off dopaminergic therapy,
in patients with OCD, and in healthy, young controls testing later-staged stimulus-response
learning.
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Chapter 2 explored the role of DS and VS in goal-directed, stimulus-response learning in
patients with PD tested on and off dopaminergic medication. To review, functions
mediated by DS have been shown consistently to be impaired off dopamine replacement
therapy, and improved with medication. However, functions mediated by VTA-innervated
regions, such as VS, are expected to be impaired on medication due to dopamine overdose,
and normal off medication. Much of the data supporting this hypothesis is behavioural
only with speculation that these are the brain regions that are affected by dopamine. We
have a task that contrasts, in contiguous experimental conditions, functions of DS and of
VTA-innervated brain regions. Contrasting PD patients on and off dopamine replacement
therapy, while brain activity is estimated with fMRI, we predict a double dissociation of
function that can be related to neural activity in different brain regions because we are
pairing tests of PD patients off and on dopaminergic therapy with fMRI. This method
allows us to directly test whether behavioural effects arise because of changes in activity
in brain regions that differ in their dopaminergic innervation depending on whether the
patient is off or on dopaminergic therapy. For example, this will allow us to fully refute
DS’s role in learning if we see dopaminergic therapy worsens learning efficiency but
simultaneously increases DS activation in fMRI. In contrast we expect that when learning
slope declines, VS activity will parallel this. These predicted double dissociations in terms
of behaviour and brain function would be compelling evidence that DS is a decision
making brain region rather than a region that mediates learning. Further, this paradigm
allows for fully testing the dopamine overdose hypothesis. The effect of exogenous
dopamine on VTA-innervated regions will be directly investigated. We hypothesized that
decision making would be impaired and correspondingly activity in DS would be
diminished at baseline and improved with dopaminergic medication in PD patients. In
contrast, we predict that stimulus-response learning and activity in VS will be near-normal
at baseline and impaired with dopaminergic therapy. In this way, we are using PD as a
model to answer basic science questions about the neural substrates of cognitive functions.
With this approach, we can separately investigate the role of DS and VS in decision making
and stimulus-response learning by modulating the level of dopamine in the brain regions
that we expect to mediate these separate functions, causing changes in the functioning and
fMRI signal in these regions. Understanding DS- and VS-mediated cognitive functions
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additionally informs cognitive symptoms present in patients with PD, and has implications
for treatment. Currently, dopaminergic therapy is titrated to relieve DS-mediated motor
symptoms, without taking into account the potential overdose of VTA-innervated regions.
Ultimately, this greater understanding will prompt clinicians to formulate medication
strategies that consider both motor and cognitive symptoms, as well as individual patient
needs. This further provides a critical test for the prevalent dopamine overdose hypothesis
discussed in section 1.6.1.4.
Chapter 3 investigated the cognition related to changes in DS and VS activation in patients
with OCD using a similar version of the stimulus-response learning task previously applied
in healthy young controls (Hiebert et al., 2014) and in PD patients (Chapter 2 of this current
thesis). Though the literature focusing specifically on the separate functions of VS and DS
in OCD is relatively sparse, there is some evidence that in OCD VS is hyperactive and DS
is hypoactive at baseline. During striatal-mediated tasks however, DS and VS are both
impaired, with respect to behaviour and activity (Remijnse et al., 2006; Vriend et al., 2013).
We speculate that these baseline levels of VS and DS activity adversely impact VS- and
DS-mediated cognitive functions, such as reward learning (Remijnse et al., 2006) and
cognitive flexibility (Vriend et al., 2013), respectively. We hypothesize that OCD patients
will exhibit stimulus-response learning and decision making impairments and that these
effects will correlate with VS and DS task-related activation respectively. The stimulusresponse task allows for simultaneous investigation of DS and VS function within-subject.
Within-subject, and within the same testing session is essential in patient populations like
PD and OCD, where severity of symptoms and medication levels can fluctuate from day
to day, and even during different time points throughout the day that can impact
behavioural performance and brain activity compared to healthy controls. Using our
paradigm removes these confounds. The overarching aim of this study was to further our
investigations of DS- and VS-mediated cognitive functions and to better understand how
various disease states impact them. Further, this research has the potential to clarify the
cognitive deficits that arise in OCD and how they might be better treated, based on an
improved understanding of their neural basis.
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Chapter 4 investigated the role of DS in late-stage, stimulus-response, so-called habit
learning in the animal literature. Young, healthy participants learned to associate abstract
images with right or left button presses explicitly before strengthening these associations
through stimulus-response trials with (Session 1) and without (Session 2) feedback. In
Session 1, trials were divided into response-selection and feedback events to separately
assess decision versus learning processes. In Session 2, trials consisted only of responseselection with no feedback. Session 3 evaluated the degree to which stimulus-response
associations had achieved automaticity using a location Stroop task. We hypothesized that
DS-dependent decision making occurs specifically when deliberation is required. We
hypothesized that DS would only be recruited when associations still required some
consideration before responding. Critically, we expected that DS activation would cease
before stimulus-response automaticity arose, which would refute the role of DS in this
process. The overarching aim of this investigation was to address the controversy that DS
mediates late-stage stimulus-response automaticity versus decision making.

1.10 Objectives
The objectives of the studies were to:
1. Delineate the function of DS and VS in early goal-directed, and late stimulusresponse association learning
2. Determine how dopaminergic therapy affects behavioural performance and brain
activity in stimulus-response learning and decision making in PD.
3. Directly test the dopamine overdose hypothesis within-subject, assessing different
brain regions at the same time, within the same task.
4. Investigate how different patterns of DS and VS activity in OCD relate to
decision making and stimulus-response learning functions, as well as how they
might mediate different symptoms of this disorder.

42

1.11 References
Aarts, E., Nusselein, A. A., Smittenaar, P., Helmich, R. C., Bloem, B. R., & Cools, R.
(2014). Greater striatal responses to medication in Parkinsons disease are
associated with better task-switching but worse reward performance.
Neuropsychologia, 62, 390-397. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.05.023
Aarts, E., Roelofs, A., Franke, B., Rijpkema, M., Fernandez, G., Helmich, R. C., &
Cools, R. (2010). Striatal dopamine mediates the interface between motivational
and cognitive control in humans: evidence from genetic imaging.
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(9), 1943-1951. doi:10.1038/npp.2010.68
Adams, C. M., & Dickinson, A. (1981). Instrumental Responding following Reinforcer
Devaluation. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section B,
33(2b), 109-121. doi:10.1080/14640748108400816
Agnoli, L., & Carli, M. (2011). Synergistic interaction of dopamine D(1) and glutamate
N-methyl-D-aspartate receptors in the rat dorsal striatum controls attention.
Neuroscience, 185, 39-49. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2011.04.044
Alexander, G. E., & DeLong, M. R. (1985). Microstimulation of the primate neostriatum.
II. Somatotopic organization of striatal microexcitable zones and their relation to
neuronal response properties. J Neurophysiol, 53(6), 1417-1430.
doi:10.1152/jn.1985.53.6.1417
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., & Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel Organization of
Functionally Segregated Circuits Linking Basal Ganglia and Cortex. Annu Rev
Neurosci, 9(1), 357-381. doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.09.030186.002041
Ali, N., Green, D. W., Kherif, F., Devlin, J. T., & Price, C. J. (2010). The Role of the Left
Head of Caudate in Suppressing Irrelevant Words. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 22(10), 2369-2386.
Angeles Fernandez-Gil, M., Palacios-Bote, R., Leo-Barahona, M., & Mora-Encinas, J. P.
(2010). Anatomy of the brainstem: a gaze into the stem of life. Semin Ultrasound
CT MR, 31(3), 196-219. doi:10.1053/j.sult.2010.03.006
Argyelan, M., Carbon, M., Ghilardi, M. F., Feigin, A., Mattis, P., Tang, C., . . . Eidelberg,
D. (2008). Dopaminergic Suppression of Brain Deactivation Responses during
Sequence Learning. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(42), 10687-10695.
doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2933-08.2008
Arnone, D., McIntosh, A. M., Ebmeier, K. P., Munafo, M. R., & Anderson, I. M. (2012).
Magnetic resonance imaging studies in unipolar depression: systematic review
and meta-regression analyses. Eur Neuropsychopharmacol, 22(1), 1-16.
doi:10.1016/j.euroneuro.2011.05.003

43

Ashby, F. G. (1998). A neuropsychological theory of multiple systems in category
learning. Psychol Rev, 105(3), 442-481.
Ashby, F. G., Ennis, J. M., & Spiering, B. J. (2007). A neurobiological theory of
automaticity in perceptual categorization. Psychol Rev, 114(3), 632-656.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.3.632
Atallah, H. E., Lopez-Paniagua, D., Rudy, J. W., & O'Reilly, R. C. (2007). Separate
neural substrates for skill learning and performance in the ventral and dorsal
striatum. Nat Neurosci, 10(1), 126-131. doi:10.1038/nn1817
Atmaca, M. (2016). Treatment-refractory obsessive compulsive disorder. Prog
Neuropsychopharmacol Biol Psychiatry, 70, 127-133.
doi:10.1016/j.pnpbp.2015.12.004
Balleine, B. W., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2010). Human and rodent homologies in action
control: corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action.
Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 48-69. doi:10.1038/npp.2009.131
Bano, D., Zanetti, F., Mende, Y., & Nicotera, P. (2011). Neurodegenerative processes in
Huntington's disease. Cell Death Dis, 2, e228. doi:10.1038/cddis.2011.112
Barch, D. M., & Ceaser, A. (2012). Cognition in schizophrenia: core psychological and
neural mechanisms. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(1), 27-34.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.015
Barone, P., Antonini, A., Colosimo, C., Marconi, R., Morgante, L., Avarello, T. P., . . .
group, P. s. (2009). The PRIAMO study: A multicenter assessment of nonmotor
symptoms and their impact on quality of life in Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord,
24(11), 1641-1649. doi:10.1002/mds.22643
Baxter, L. R., Jr, Phelps, M. E., Mazziotta, J. C., Guze, B. H., Schwartz, J. M., & Selin,
C. E. (1987). Local cerebral glucose metabolic rates in obsessive-compulsive
disorder: A comparison with rates in unipolar depression and in normal controls.
Archives of General Psychiatry, 44(3), 211-218.
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1987.01800150017003
Benke, T., Delazer, M., Bartha, L., & Auer, A. (2003). Basal ganglia lesions and the
theory of fronto-subcortical loops: neuropsychological findings in two patients
with left caudate lesions. Neurocase, 9(1), 70-85. doi:10.1076/neur.9.1.70.14374
Boettiger, C. A., & D'Esposito, M. (2005). Frontal networks for learning and executing
arbitrary stimulus-response associations. J Neurosci, 25(10), 2723-2732.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3697-04.2005
Bohnen, N. I., Muller, M. L., Kotagal, V., Koeppe, R. A., Kilbourn, M. R., Gilman, S., . .
. Frey, K. A. (2012). Heterogeneity of cholinergic denervation in Parkinson's

44

disease without dementia. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab, 32(8), 1609-1617.
doi:10.1038/jcbfm.2012.60
Bokor, G., & Anderson, P. D. (2014). Obsessive-compulsive disorder. J Pharm Pract,
27(2), 116-130. doi:10.1177/0897190014521996
Bonelli, R. M., & Cummings, J. L. (2007). Frontal-subcortical circuitry and behavior.
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 9(2), 141-151.
Boyd, L. A., & Winstein, C. J. (2004). Providing Explicit Information Disrupts Implicit
Motor Learning After Basal Ganglia Stroke. Learn Mem, 11(4), 388-396.
doi:10.1101/lm.80104
Brovelli, A., Laksiri, N., Nazarian, B., Meunier, M., & Boussaoud, D. (2008).
Understanding the neural computations of arbitrary visuomotor learning through
fMRI and associative learning theory. Cereb Cortex, 18(7), 1485-1495.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm198
Burton, A. C., Nakamura, K., & Roesch, M. R. (2015). From ventral-medial to dorsallateral striatum: neural correlates of reward-guided decision-making. Neurobiol
Learn Mem, 117, 51-59. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2014.05.003
Calabresi, P., Picconi, B., Parnetti, L., & Di Filippo, M. (2006). A convergent model for
cognitive dysfunctions in Parkinson's disease: the critical dopamine–acetylcholine
synaptic balance. The Lancet Neurology, 5(11), 974-983. doi:10.1016/s14744422(06)70600-7
Cameron, I. G., Watanabe, M., Pari, G., & Munoz, D. P. (2010). Executive impairment in
Parkinson's disease: response automaticity and task switching. Neuropsychologia,
48(7), 1948-1957. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.03.015
Chamberlain, S. R., Blackwell, A. D., Fineberg, N. A., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. J.
(2005). The neuropsychology of obsessive compulsive disorder: the importance of
failures in cognitive and behavioural inhibition as candidate endophenotypic
markers. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 29(3), 399-419.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.11.006
Chiu, Y. C., Jiang, J., & Egner, T. (2017). The Caudate Nucleus Mediates Learning of
Stimulus-Control State Associations. J Neurosci, 37(4), 1028-1038.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0778-16.2017
Choi, E. Y., Yeo, B. T. T., & Buckner, R. L. (2012). The organization of the human
striatum estimated by intrinsic functional connectivity. J Neurophysiol, 108(8),
2242-2263.
Chowdhury, R., Lambert, C., Dolan, R. J., & Duzel, E. (2013). Parcellation of the human
substantia nigra based on anatomical connectivity to the striatum. Neuroimage,
81, 191-198. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.043

45

Clark, L., & Sahakian, B. J. (2008). Cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging in bipolar
disorder. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 10(2).
Coderre, E., & van Heuven, W. (2013). Modulations of the executive control network by
stimulus onset asynchrony in a Stroop task. BMC Neuroscience, 14, 79.
Cohen, M. X., & Frank, M. J. (2009). Neurocomputational models of basal ganglia
function in learning, memory and choice. Behav Brain Res, 199(1), 141-156.
doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2008.09.029
Cools, R. (2006). Dopaminergic modulation of cognitive function-implications for LDOPA treatment in Parkinson's disease. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 30(1), 1-23.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.03.024
Cools, R., Barker, R. A., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbons, T. W. (2001). Mechanisms of
cognitive flexibility in Parkinson's disease. Brain, 124, 2503-2512.
Cools, R., Clark, L., Owen, A. M., & Robbins, T. W. (2002). Defining the Neural
Mechanisms of Probabilistic Reversal Learning Using Event-Related Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The Journal of Neuroscience, 22(11), 4563-4567.
Cools, R., & D'Esposito, M. (2011). Inverted-U-shaped dopamine actions on human
working memory and cognitive control. Biol Psychiatry, 69(12), e113-125.
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.03.028
Cools, R., Lewis, S. J., Clark, L., Barker, R. A., & Robbins, T. W. (2007). L-DOPA
disrupts activity in the nucleus accumbens during reversal learning in Parkinson's
disease. Neuropsychopharmacology, 32(1), 180-189. doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301153
Daniel, R., Wagner, G., Koch, K., Reichenbach, J. R., Sauer, H., & Schlösser, R. G. M.
(2010). Assessing the Neural Basis of Uncertainty in Perceptual Category
Learning through Varying Levels of Distortion. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 23(7), 1781-1793. doi:10.1162/jocn.2010.21541
Dauer, W., & Przedborski, S. (2003). Parkinson's Disease: Mechanisms and Models.
Neuron, 39(6), 889-909. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00568-3
Daw, N. D., & Doya, K. (2006). The computational neurobiology of learning and reward.
Curr Opin Neurobiol, 16(2), 199-204. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2006.03.006
de Vries, F. E., de Wit, S. J., van den Heuvel, O. A., Veltman, D. J., Cath, D. C., van
Balkom, A., & van der Werf, Y. D. (2017). Cognitive control networks in OCD:
A resting-state connectivity study in unmedicated patients with obsessivecompulsive disorder and their unaffected relatives. World J Biol Psychiatry, 1-13.
doi:10.1080/15622975.2017.1353132

46

de Wit, S., Barker, R., Dickinson, A., & Cools, R. (2011). Habitual versus Goal-directed
Action Control in Parkinson's Disease. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(5),
1218-1229.
Del Casale, A., Kotzalidis, G. D., Rapinesi, C., Serata, D., Ambrosi, E., Simonetti, A., . . .
Girardi, P. (2011). Functional neuroimaging in obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Neuropsychobiology, 64(2), 61-85. doi:10.1159/000325223
Delgado, M. R., Miller, M. M., Inati, S., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). An fMRI study of
reward-related probability learning. Neuroimage, 24(3), 862-873.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.10.002
Di, X., & Biswal, B. B. (2014). Identifying the default mode network structure using
dynamic causal modeling on resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Neuroimage, 86, 53-59. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.07.071
Diao, J., Burre, J., Vivona, S., Cipriano, D. J., Sharma, M., Kyoung, M., . . . Brunger, A.
T. (2013). Native alpha-synuclein induces clustering of synaptic-vesicle mimics
via binding to phospholipids and synaptobrevin-2/VAMP2. Elife, 2, e00592.
doi:10.7554/eLife.00592
Difiglia, M., Pasik, T., & Pasik, P. (1978). A Golgi study of afferent fibers in the
neostriatum of monkeys. (0006-8993 (Print)).
Dirnberger, G., & Jahanshahi, M. (2013). Executive dysfunction in Parkinson's disease: a
review. J Neuropsychol, 7(2), 193-224. doi:10.1111/jnp.12028
Djamshidian, A., O'Sullivan, S. S., Lees, A., & Averbeck, B. B. (2011). Stroop test
performance in impulsive and non impulsive patients with Parkinson's disease.
Parkinsonism Relat Disord, 17(3), 212-214. doi:10.1016/j.parkreldis.2010.12.014
Dobryakova, E., & Tricomi, E. (2013). Basal ganglia engagement during feedback
processing after a substantial delay. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci.
doi:10.3758/s13415-013-0182-6
Everitt, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2005). Neural systems of reinforcement for drug
addiction: from actions to habits to compulsion. Nat Neurosci, 8(11), 1481-1489.
doi:10.1038/nn1579
Feekes, J. A., & Cassell, M. D. (2006). The vascular supply of the functional
compartments of the human striatum. Brain, 129(Pt 8), 2189-2201.
doi:10.1093/brain/awl158
Feigin, A., Ghilardi, M. F., Carbon, M., Edwards, C., Fukuda, M. D., Dhawan, V., . . .
Eidelberg, D. (2003). Effects of levodopa on motor sequence learning in
Parkinson's disease. Neurology, 60, 1744-1749.

47

Fera, F., Nicoletti, G., Cerasa, A., Romeo, N., Gallo, O., Gioia, M. C., . . . Quattrone, A.
(2007). Dopaminergic modulation of cognitive interference after pharmacological
washout in Parkinson's disease. Brain Res Bull, 74(1-3), 75-83.
doi:10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.05.009
Figee, M., Vink, M., de Geus, F., Vulink, N., Veltman, D. J., Westenberg, H., & Denys,
D. (2011). Dysfunctional reward circuitry in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biol
Psychiatry, 69(9), 867-874. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.12.003
Foerde, K., Knowlton, B. J., & Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Modulation of competing memory
systems by distraction. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 103(31), 11778-11783.
doi:10.1073/pnas.0602659103
G E Alexander, M R DeLong, a., & Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel Organization of
Functionally Segregated Circuits Linking Basal Ganglia and Cortex. Annu Rev
Neurosci, 9(1), 357-381. doi:doi:10.1146/annurev.ne.09.030186.002041
Garrison, J., Erdeniz, B., & Done, J. (2013). Prediction error in reinforcement learning: a
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 37(7), 12971310. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.03.023
Ghilardi, M. F., Feigin, A. S., Battaglia, F., Silvestri, G., Mattis, P., Eidelberg, D., & Di
Rocco, A. (2007). L-Dopa infusion does not improve explicit sequence learning in
Parkinson's disease. Parkinsonism Relat Disord, 13(3), 146-151.
doi:10.1016/j.parkreldis.2006.08.006
Glover, G. H. (2011). Overview of functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neurosurg
Clin N Am, 22(2), 133-139, vii. doi:10.1016/j.nec.2010.11.001
Gonzales, K. K., & Smith, Y. (2015). Cholinergic interneurons in the dorsal and ventral
striatum: anatomical and functional considerations in normal and diseased
conditions. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1349, 1-45. doi:10.1111/nyas.12762
Gotham, A. M., Brown, R. G., & Marsden, C. D. (1988). 'Frontal' Cognitive Function in
Patients with Parkinson's Disease 'On' and 'Off' Levodopa. Brain, 111, 299-321.
Grahn, J. A., Parkinson, J. A., & Owen, A. M. (2008). The cognitive functions of the
caudate nucleus. Prog Neurobiol, 86(3), 141-155.
doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2008.09.004
Grahn, J. A., Parkinson, J. A., & Owen, A. M. (2009). The role of the basal ganglia in
learning and memory: neuropsychological studies. Behav Brain Res, 199(1), 5360. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2008.11.020
Gursel, D. A., Avram, M., Sorg, C., Brandl, F., & Koch, K. (2018). Frontoparietal areas
link impairments of large-scale intrinsic brain networks with aberrant frontostriatal interactions in OCD: a meta-analysis of resting-state functional

48

connectivity. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 87, 151-160.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.01.016
Haber, S. N. (2014). The place of dopamine in the cortico-basal ganglia circuit.
Neuroscience, 282C, 248-257. doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.10.008
Haber, S. N., & Knutson, B. (2010). The reward circuit: linking primate anatomy and
human imaging. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35(1), 4-26.
doi:10.1038/npp.2009.129
Hart, G., Leung, B. K., & Balleine, B. W. (2013). Dorsal and ventral streams: The
distinct role of striatal subregions in the acquisition and performance of goaldirected actions. Neurobiol Learn Mem. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2013.11.003
Helie, S., Roeder, J. L., & Ashby, F. G. (2010). Evidence for cortical automaticity in rulebased categorization. J Neurosci, 30(42), 14225-14234.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2393-10.2010
Hernandez, L. F., Redgrave, P., & Obeso, J. A. (2015). Habitual behavior and dopamine
cell vulnerability in Parkinson disease. Front Neuroanat, 9, 99.
doi:10.3389/fnana.2015.00099
Hewitt, W. (1961). The development of the human internal capsule and lentiform
nucleus. Journal of Anatomy, 95(Pt 2), 191-199.
Hiebert, N. M., Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017). Dorsal
striatum mediates deliberate decision making, not late-stage, stimulus-response
learning. Hum Brain Mapp. doi:10.1002/hbm.23817
Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Vo, A., Ganjavi, H., & MacDonald, P. A. (2014).
Dopaminergic therapy affects learning and impulsivity in Parkinson's disease.
Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology, 1(10), 883-843.
doi:10.1002/acn3.128
Hiebert, N. M., Vo, A., Hampshire, A., Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P.
A. (2014). Striatum in stimulus-response learning via feedback and in decision
making. Neuroimage, 101, 448-457. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.07.013
Hirschtritt, M. E., Bloch, M. H., & Mathews, C. A. (2017). Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorder: Advances in Diagnosis and Treatment. JAMA, 317(13), 1358-1367.
doi:10.1001/jama.2017.2200
Ikemoto, S., & Panksepp, J. (1999). The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in
motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to rewardseeking. Brain Research Reviews, 31(1), 6-41. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S01650173(99)00023-5

49

Janssen, R. J., Jylanki, P., Kessels, R. P., & van Gerven, M. A. (2015). Probabilistic
model-based functional parcellation reveals a robust, fine-grained subdivision of
the striatum. Neuroimage, 119, 398-405. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.06.084
Jellinger, K. A. (2012). Neuropathology of sporadic Parkinson's disease: evaluation and
changes of concepts. Mov Disord, 27(1), 8-30. doi:10.1002/mds.23795
Jessup, R. K., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2011). Human dorsal striatal activity during choice
discriminates reinforcement learning behavior from the gambler's fallacy. J
Neurosci, 31(17), 6296-6304. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6421-10.2011
Jung, W. H., Jang, J. H., Park, J. W., Kim, E., Goo, E. H., Im, O. S., & Kwon, J. S.
(2014). Unravelling the intrinsic functional organization of the human striatum: a
parcellation and connectivity study based on resting-state FMRI. PLoS One, 9(9),
e106768. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0106768
Jung, W. H., Kang, D. H., Han, J. Y., Jang, J. H., Gu, B. M., Choi, J. S., . . . Kwon, J. S.
(2011). Aberrant ventral striatal responses during incentive processing in
unmedicated patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Acta Psychiatr Scand,
123(5), 376-386. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2010.01659.x
Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., Jessell, T. M., Siegelbaum, S. A., & Hudspeth, A. J.
(2013). Principles of neural science (Fifth ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill
Medical.
Kimura, M. (1992). Behavioral modulation of sensory responses of primate putamen
neurons. Brain Res, 578(1), 204-214. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/00068993(92)90249-9
Kimura, M., Rajkowski, J., & Evarts, E. (1984). Tonically discharging putamen neurons
exhibit set-dependent responses. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 81(15), 4998-5001.
Kincaid, A. E., Zheng, T., & Wilson, C. J. (1998). Connectivity and Convergence of
Single Corticostriatal Axons. The Journal of Neuroscience, 18(12), 4722-4731.
Kish, S. J., Shannak, K., & Hornykiewicz, O. (1988). Uneven Pattern of Dopamine Loss
in the Striatum of Patients with Idiopathic Parkinson's Disease. New England
Journal of Medicine, 318, 876-880.
Knutson, B., & Cooper, J. C. (2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging of reward
prediction. Current Opinion in Neurology, 18, 411-417.
Knutson, B., Fong, G. W., Adams, C. M., Varner, J. L., & Hommer, D. (2001).
Dissociation of reward anticipation and outcome with event-related fMRI. Brain
Imaging, 12(17), 3683-3687.
Koob, G. F., Balcom, G. J., G.J., B., Meyerhoff, J. L., & Meyerhoff, J. L. (1975).
Dopamine and norepinephrine levels in the nucleus accumbens, olfactory tubercle

50

and corpus striatum following lesions in the ventral tegmentalarea. Brain Res,
94(0006-8993 (Print)).
Kravitz, A. V., Tye, L. D., & Kreitzer, A. C. (2012). Distinct roles for direct and indirect
pathway striatal neurons in reinforcement. Nat Neurosci, 15(6), 816-818.
doi:10.1038/nn.3100
Künzle, H. (1975). Bilateral projections from precentral motor cortex to the putamen and
other parts of the basal ganglia. An autoradiographic study inMacaca fascicularis.
Brain Res, 88(2), 195-209. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0006-8993(75)90384-4
Kwak, Y., Müller, M. L. T. M., Bohnen, N. I., Dayalu, P., & Seidler, R. D. (2012). lDOPA changes ventral striatum recruitment during motor sequence learning in
Parkinson's disease. Behav Brain Res, 230(1), 116-124.
doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2012.02.006
Larson, M. J., Clayson, P. E., Primosch, M., Leyton, M., & Steffensen, S. C. (2015). The
Effects of Acute Dopamine Precursor Depletion on the Cognitive Control
Functions of Performance Monitoring and Conflict Processing: An Event-Related
Potential (ERP) Study. PLoS One, 10(10), e0140770.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140770
Lau, B., & Glimcher, P. W. (2007). Action and Outcome Encoding in the Primate
Caudate Nucleus. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(52), 14502.
Lau, B., & Glimcher, P. W. (2008). Value representations in the primate striatum during
matching behavior. Neuron, 58(3), 451-463. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.02.021
Le Jeune, F., Verin, M., N'Diaye, K., Drapier, D., Leray, E., Du Montcel, S. T., . . .
French Stimulation dans le trouble obsessionnel compulsif study, g. (2010).
Decrease of prefrontal metabolism after subthalamic stimulation in obsessivecompulsive disorder: a positron emission tomography study. Biol Psychiatry,
68(11), 1016-1022. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.06.033
Leh, S. E., Chakravarty, M. M., & Ptito, A. (2008). The connectivity of the human
pulvinar: a diffusion tensor imaging tractography study. Int J Biomed Imaging,
2008, 1-5. doi:10.1155/2008/789539
Liljeholm, M., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2012). Contributions of the striatum to learning,
motivation, and performance: an associative account. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(9),
467-475. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.07.007
MacDonald, A. A., Seergobin, K. N., Tamjeedi, R., Owen, A. M., Provost, J.-S., Monchi,
O., . . . MacDonald, P. A. (2014). Examining dorsal striatum in cognitive effort
using Parkinson's disease and fMRI. Annals of Clinical and Translational
Neurology, 1(6), 390-400. doi:10.1002/acn3.62

51

MacDonald, P. A., MacDonald, A. A., Seergobin, K. N., Tamjeedi, R., Ganjavi, H.,
Provost, J. S., & Monchi, O. (2011). The effect of dopamine therapy on ventral
and dorsal striatum-mediated cognition in Parkinson's disease: support from
functional MRI. Brain, 134(Pt 5), 1447-1463. doi:10.1093/brain/awr075
MacDonald, P. A., & Monchi, O. (2011). Differential effects of dopaminergic therapies
on dorsal and ventral striatum in Parkinson's disease: implications for cognitive
function. Parkinsons Dis, 2011, 1-18. doi:10.4061/2011/572743
MacLeod, C. M. (1991). Half a Century of Research on the Stroop Effect: An Integrative
Review. Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 163-203. doi:10.1037/00332909.109.2.163
MacLeod, C. M., & Dunbar, K. (1988). Training and Stroop-Like Interference: Evidence
for a Continuum of Automaticity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 14(1), 126-135.
MacLeod, C. M., & MacDonald, P. A. (2000). Interdimensional interference in the
Stroop effect: uncovering the cognitive and neural anatomy of attention. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 4(10), 383-391.
Macpherson, T., Morita, M., & Hikida, T. (2014). Striatal direct and indirect pathways
control decision-making behavior. Front Psychol, 5, 1301.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01301
Mataix-Cols, D., Wooderson, S., Lawrence, N., Brammer, M. J., Speckens, A., &
Phillips, M. L. (2004). DIstinct neural correlates of washing, checking, and
hoarding symptomdimensions in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 61(6), 564-576. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.61.6.564
Mattay, V. S., Tessitore, A., Callicott, J. H., Bertolino, A., Goldberg, T. E., Chase, T. N.,
. . . Weinberger, D. R. (2002). Dopaminergic modulation of cortical function in
patients with Parkinson's disease. Ann Neurol, 51(2), 156-164.
Monchi, O., Petrides, M., Petre, V., Worsley, K., & Dagher, A. (2001). Wisconsin Card
Sorting Revisited: Distinct Neural Circuits Participating in Different Stages of the
Task Identified by Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The
Journal of Neuroscience, 21(19), 7733-7741.
Myers, C. E., Shohamy, D., Gluck, M. A., Grossman, S., Kluger, A., Ferris, S., . . .
Schwartz, R. (2003). Dissociating Hippocampal versus Basal Ganglia
Contributions to Learning and Transfer. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
15(2), 185-193. doi:10.1162/089892903321208123
Nakao, T., Nakagawa, A., Yoshiura, T., Nakatani, E., Nabeyama, M., Yoshizato, C., . . .
Kawamoto, M. (2005). A functional MRI comparison of patients with obsessivecompulsive disorder and normal controls during a Chinese character Stroop task.
Psychiatry Res, 139(2), 101-114. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.12.004

52

Newton, R., & Price, D. D. (1975). Modulation of cortical and pyramidal tract induced
motor responses by electrical stimulation of the basal ganglia. Brain Res,
85(0006-8993 (Print)). doi:D - NASA: 75091675 EDAT- 1975/03/07 00:00
MHDA- 1975/03/07 00:01 CRDT- 1975/03/07 00:00 PHST- 1975/03/07 00:00
[pubmed] PHST- 1975/03/07 00:01 [medline] PHST- 1975/03/07 00:00 [entrez]
AID - 0006-8993(75)90816-1 [pii] PST - ppublish
Nielen, M. M., den Boer, J. A., & Smid, H. G. (2009). Patients with obsessivecompulsive disorder are impaired in associative learning based on external
feedback. Psychol Med, 39(9), 1519-1526. doi:10.1017/S0033291709005297
O'Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K., & Dolan, R. J. (2004).
Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental conditioning.
Science, 304(5669), 452-454. doi:10.1126/science.1094285
O'Doherty, J. P. (2004). Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human
brain: insights from neuroimaging. Curr Opin Neurobiol, 14(6), 769-776.
doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.10.016
O'Neill, J., & Feusner, J. D. (2015). Cognitive-behavioral therapy for obsessivecompulsive disorder: access to treatment, prediction of long-term outcome with
neuroimaging. Psychol Res Behav Manag, 8, 211-223.
doi:10.2147/PRBM.S75106
Ohira, H., Ichikawa, N., Nomura, M., Isowa, T., Kimura, K., Kanayama, N., . . . Yamada,
J. (2010). Brain and autonomic association accompanying stochastic decisionmaking. Neuroimage, 49(1), 1024-1037. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.07.060
Park, H. R., Kim, I. H., Kang, H., Lee, D. S., Kim, B. N., Kim, D. G., & Paek, S. H.
(2017). Nucleus accumbens deep brain stimulation for a patient with selfinjurious behavior and autism spectrum disorder: functional and structural
changes of the brain: report of a case and review of literature. Acta Neurochir
(Wien), 159(1), 137-143. doi:10.1007/s00701-016-3002-2
Perani, D., Colombo, C., Bressi, S., Bonfanti, A., Grassi, F., Scarone, S., . . . Fazio, F.
(1995). [18F]FDG PET study in obsessive-compulsive disorder. A
clinical/metabolic correlation study after treatment. Br J Psychiatry, 166(2), 244250.
Pereira, J. B., Ibarretxe-Bilbao, N., Marti, M. J., Compta, Y., Junque, C., Bargallo, N., &
Tolosa, E. (2012). Assessment of cortical degeneration in patients with
Parkinson's disease by voxel-based morphometry, cortical folding, and cortical
thickness. Hum Brain Mapp, 33(11), 2521-2534. doi:10.1002/hbm.21378
Piras, F., Piras, F., Chiapponi, C., Girardi, P., Caltagirone, C., & Spalletta, G. (2015).
Widespread structural brain changes in OCD: a systematic review of voxel-based
morphometry studies. Cortex, 62, 89-108. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2013.01.016

53

Poldrack, R. A., Prabhakaran, V., Seger, C. A., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1999). Striatal
Activation During Acquisition of a Cognitive Skill. Neuropsychology, 13(4), 564574.
Poldrack, R. A., Sabb, F. W., Foerde, K., Tom, S. M., Asarnow, R. F., Bookheimer, S.
Y., & Knowlton, B. J. (2005). The neural correlates of motor skill automaticity. J
Neurosci, 25(22), 5356-5364. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3880-04.2005
Postuma, R. B., Berg, D., Stern, M., Poewe, W., Olanow, C. W., Oertel, W., . . . Deuschl,
G. (2015). MDS clinical diagnostic criteria for Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord,
30(12), 1591-1601. doi:10.1002/mds.26424
Postuma, R. B., & Dagher, A. (2006). Basal ganglia functional connectivity based on a
meta-analysis of 126 positron emission tomography and functional magnetic
resonance imaging publications. Cereb Cortex, 16(10), 1508-1521.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhj088
Pujol, J., Soriano-Mas, C., Alonso, P., & et al. (2004). Mapping structural brain
alterations in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry,
61(7), 720-730. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.61.7.720
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., & Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nat Rev Neurosci, 9(7), 545-556.
doi:10.1038/nrn2357
Rauch, S. L. (1997). Neuroimaging and neuropsychology of the striatum. Bridging basic
science and clinical practice. The Psychiatric clinics of North America, 20(4),
741-768.
Rauch, S. L., Jenike, M. A., Alpert, N. M., & et al. (1994). Regional cerebral blood flow
measured during symptom provocation in obsessive-compulsive disorder using
oxygen 15—labeled carbon dioxide and positron emission tomography. Archives
of General Psychiatry, 51(1), 62-70. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1994.03950010062008
Ray, N. J., & Strafella, A. P. (2012). The neurobiology and neural circuitry of cognitive
changes in Parkinson's disease revealed by functional neuroimaging. Mov Disord,
27(12), 1484-1492. doi:10.1002/mds.25173
Redgrave, P., & Gurney, K. (2006). The short-latency dopamine signal: a role in
discovering novel actions? Nature Reviews Neuroscience(1471-003X (Print)).
Redgrave, P., Rodriguez, M., Smith, Y., Rodriguez-Oroz, M. C., Lehericy, S., Bergman,
H., . . . Obeso, J. A. (2010). Goal-directed and habitual control in the basal
ganglia: implications for Parkinson's disease. Nat Rev Neurosci, 11(11), 760-772.
doi:10.1038/nrn2915
Remijnse, P. L., Nielen, M. A., van Balkom, A. M., & et al. (2006). REduced
orbitofrontal-striatal activity on a reversal learning task in obsessive-compulsive

54

disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63(11), 1225-1236.
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.63.11.1225
Riffkin, J., Yucel, M., Maruff, P., Wood, S. J., Soulsby, B., Olver, J., . . . Pantelis, C.
(2005). A manual and automated MRI study of anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices, and caudate nucleus in obsessive-compulsive disorder:
comparison with healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res,
138(2), 99-113. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.11.007
Robertson, B. D., Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Owen, A. M., & MacDonald, P. A.
(2015). Dorsal striatum mediates cognitive control, not cognitive effort per se, in
decision-making: An event-related fMRI study. Neuroimage, 114, 170-184.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.03.082
Roeper, J. (2013). Dissecting the diversity of midbrain dopamine neurons. Trends
Neurosci, 36(6), 336-342. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2013.03.003
Rolls, E. T., Thorpe, S. J., & Maddison, S. P. (1983). Responses of striatal neurons in the
behaving monkey. 1. Head of the caudate nucleus. Behav Brain Res, 7(2), 179210. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0166-4328(83)90191-2
Rubin, R. T., Villanueva-Meyer, J., Ananth, J., Trajmar, P. G., & Mena, I. (1992).
Regional xenon 133 cerebral blood flow and cerebral technetium 99m hmpao
uptake in unmedicated patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder and matched
normal control subjects: Determination by high-resolution single-photon emission
computed tomography. Archives of General Psychiatry, 49(9), 695-702.
doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1992.01820090023004
Rutledge, R. B., Dean, M., Caplin, A., & Glimcher, P. W. (2010). Testing the reward
prediction error hypothesis with an axiomatic model. J Neurosci, 30(40), 1352513536. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1747-10.2010
Ryterska, A., Jahanshahi, M., & Osman, M. (2013). What are people with Parkinson's
disease really impaired on when it comes to making decisions? A meta-analysis of
the evidence. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 37(10 Pt 2), 2836-2846.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.005
Scatton, B., Javoy-Agid, F., Rouquier, L., Dubois, B., & Agid, Y. (1983). Reduction of
cortical dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonin and their metabolites in Parkinson's
disease. Brain Res, 275(0006-8993 (Print)).
Schrag, A., Jahanshahi, M., & Quinn, N. (2000). What contributes to quality of life in
patients with Parkinson's disease? Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery &
Psychiatry, 69, 308-312.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive Reward Signal of Dopamine Neurons. J Neurophysiol,
80(1), 1-27. doi:10.1152/jn.1998.80.1.1

55

Schultz, W., Apicella, P., Scarnati, E., & Ljungberg, T. (1992). Neuronal activity in
monkey ventral striatum related to the expectation of reward. J Neurosci, 12(12),
4595-4610.
Seger, C. A., & Cincotta, C. M. (2005). The roles of the caudate nucleus in human
classification learning. J Neurosci, 25(11), 2941-2951.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3401-04.2005
Seibell, P. J., & Hollander, E. (2014). Management of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
F1000Prime Rep, 6, 68. doi:10.12703/P6-68
Seo, M., Beigi, M., Jahanshahi, M., & Averbeck, B. B. (2010). Effects of dopamine
medication on sequence learning with stochastic feedback in Parkinson's disease.
Front Syst Neurosci, 4, 1-9. doi:10.3389/fnsys.2010.00036
Shiner, T., Seymour, B., Wunderlich, K., Hill, C., Bhatia, K. P., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J.
(2012). Dopamine and performance in a reinforcement learning task: evidence
from Parkinson's disease. Brain, 135(Pt 6), 1871-1883. doi:10.1093/brain/aws083
Shohamy, D., & Wagner, A. D. (2008). Integrating memories in the human brain:
hippocampal-midbrain encoding of overlapping events. Neuron, 60(2), 378-389.
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.09.023
Smittenaar, P., Chase, H. W., Aarts, E., Nusselein, B., Bloem, B. R., & Cools, R. (2012).
Decomposing effects of dopaminergic medication in Parkinson's disease on
probabilistic action selection--learning or performance? Eur J Neurosci, 35(7),
1144-1151. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.08043.x
Soto, F. A., Waldschmidt, J. G., Helie, S., & Ashby, F. G. (2013). Brain activity across
the development of automatic categorization: a comparison of categorization tasks
using multi-voxel pattern analysis. Neuroimage, 71, 284-297.
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.008
Su, C. Y., Chen, H. M., Kwan, A. L., Lin, Y. H., & Guo, N. W. (2007).
Neuropsychological impairment after hemorrhagic stroke in basal ganglia. Arch
Clin Neuropsychol, 22(4), 465-474. doi:10.1016/j.acn.2007.01.025
Sutton, & Barto. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 3(9), 360. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01331-5
Swainson, R., Rogers, R. D., Sahakian, B. J., Summers, B. A., Polkey, C. E., & Robbins,
T. W. (2000). Probabilistic learning and reversal deficits in patients with
Parkinson's disease or frontal or temporal lobe lesions: possible adverse effects of
dopaminergic medication. Neuropsychologia, 38, 596-612.
Szabo, J. (1980). Distribution of striatal afferents from the mesencephalon in the cat.
Brain Res, 188(1), 3-21. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/0006-8993(80)90552-1

56

Takahashi, Y., Roesch, M. R., Stalnaker, T. A., & Schoenbaum, G. (2007). Cocaine
exposure shifts the balance of associative encoding from ventral to dorsolateral
striatum. Front Integr Neurosci, 1(11). doi:10.3389/neuro.07/011.2007
Tanner, C. M., & Goldman, S. M. (1996). Epidemiology of Parkinson's disease.
Neurologic clinics, 14(2), 317-335.
Thompson, R. L. (1959). Effects of lesions in the caudate nuclei and dorsofrontal cortex
on conditioned avoidance behavior in cats. Journal of comparative &
physiological psychology, 52, 650-659.
Thompson RL, M. F. (1963). Permanent learning deficit associated with lesions in the
caudate nuclei. American journal of mental deficiency, Jan(67), 526-535.
Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative
processes in animals. New York, NY, US: Columbia University Press.
Tricomi, E., Balleine, B. W., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2009). A specific role for posterior
dorsolateral striatum in human habit learning. Eur J Neurosci, 29(11), 2225-2232.
doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2009.06796.x
Tziortzi, A. C., Haber, S. N., Searle, G. E., Tsoumpas, C., Long, C. J., Shotbolt, P., . . .
Gunn, R. N. (2014). Connectivity-based functional analysis of dopamine release
in the striatum using diffusion-weighted MRI and positron emission tomography.
Cereb Cortex, 24(5), 1165-1177. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs397
Vaillancourt, D. E., Schonfeld, D., Kwak, Y., Bohnen, N. I., & Seidler, R. (2013).
Dopamine overdose hypothesis: evidence and clinical implications. Mov Disord,
28(14), 1920-1929. doi:10.1002/mds.25687
Van Eimeren, T., Ballanger, B., Pellecchia, G., Miyasaki, J. M., Lang, A. E., & Strafella,
A. P. (2009). Dopamine agonists diminish value sensitivity of the orbitofrontal
cortex: a trigger for pathological gambling in Parkinson's disease?
Neuropsychopharmacology, 34(13), 2758-2766. doi:10.1038/sj.npp.npp2009124
van Velzen, L. S., Vriend, C., de Wit, S. J., & van den Heuvel, O. A. (2014). Response
inhibition and interference control in obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders.
Front Hum Neurosci, 8, 419. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00419
Vo, A., Hiebert, N. M., Seergobin, K. N., Solcz, S., Partridge, A., & MacDonald, P. A.
(2014). Dopaminergic medication impairs feedback-based stimulus-response
learning but not response selection in Parkinson’s disease. Front Hum Neurosci,
8, 784. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00784
Volkow, N. D., Wise, R. A., & Baler, R. (2017). The dopamine motive system:
implications for drug and food addiction. Nat Rev Neurosci, 18(12), 741-752.
doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.130

57

Voorn, P., Vanderschuren, L. J., Groenewegen, H. J., Robbins, T. W., & Pennartz, C. M.
(2004). Putting a spin on the dorsal-ventral divide of the striatum. Trends
Neurosci, 27(8), 468-474. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.06.006
Vriend, C., de Wit, S. J., Remijnse, P. L., van Balkom, A. J., Veltman, D. J., & van den
Heuvel, O. A. (2013). Switch the itch: a naturalistic follow-up study on the neural
correlates of cognitive flexibility in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry
Res, 213(1), 31-38. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2012.12.006
Waldschmidt, J. G., & Ashby, F. G. (2011). Cortical and striatal contributions to
automaticity in information-integration categorization. Neuroimage, 56(3), 17911802. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.02.011
Wichmann, T., DeLong, M. R., Guridi, J., & Obeso, J. A. (2011). Milestones in research
on the pathophysiology of Parkinson's disease. Mov Disord, 26(6), 1032-1041.
doi:10.1002/mds.23695
Wickens, J. R., Horvitz, J. C., Costa, R. M., & Killcross, S. (2007). Dopaminergic
mechanisms in actions and habits. J Neurosci, 27(31), 8181-8183.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1671-07.2007
Wright, B. C., & Wanley, A. (2003). Adults' versus children's performance in the Stroop
task: Interference and facilitation. The British Psychological Society, 94, 475-485.
Wunderlich, K., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2012). Mapping value based planning and
extensively trained choice in the human brain. Nat Neurosci, 15(5), 786-791.
doi:10.1038/nn.3068
Xue, G., Ghahremani, D. G., & Poldrack, R. A. (2008). Neural substrates for reversing
stimulus-outcome and stimulus-response associations. J Neurosci, 28(44), 1119611204. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4001-08.2008
Yamamoto, S., Kim, H. F., & Hikosaka, O. (2013). Reward value-contingent changes of
visual responses in the primate caudate tail associated with a visuomotor skill. J
Neurosci, 33(27), 11227-11238. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0318-13.2013
Yanike, M., & Ferrera, V. P. (2014). Representation of outcome risk and action in the
anterior caudate nucleus. J Neurosci, 34(9), 3279-3290.
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3818-13.2014
Yin, H. H., & Knowlton, B. J. (2006). The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation.
Nat Rev Neurosci, 7(6), 464-476. doi:10.1038/nrn1919
Yoo, S. Y., Roh, M. S., Choi, J. S., Kang, D. H., Ha, T. H., Lee, J. M., . . . Kwon, J. S.
(2008). Voxel-based morphometry study of gray matter abnormalities in
obsessive-compulsive disorder. J Korean Med Sci, 23(1), 24-30.
doi:10.3346/jkms.2008.23.1.24

58

Zarei, M., Mataix-Cols, D., Heyman, I., Hough, M., Doherty, J., Burge, L., . . . James, A.
(2011). Changes in gray matter volume and white matter microstructure in
adolescents with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biol Psychiatry, 70(11), 10831090. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.06.032
Zhang, T., L;, Z., Liang, Y., Siapas, A., Zhou, F.-M., & Dani, J. (2009). Dopamine
Signaling Differences in the Nucleus Accumbens and Dorsal Striatum Exploited
by Nicotine. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(13), 4035-4034-4043.

59

60

Chapter 2

2

Dorsal striatum does not mediate feedback-based, stimulusresponse learning
Learning associations between stimuli and responses is essential to everyday life. Dorsal
striatum (DS) has long been implicated in stimulus-response learning, though recent results
challenge this contention. We have proposed that discrepant findings arise because
stimulus-response learning methodology generally confounds learning and response
selection processes. In 19 patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and 18 age-matched
controls, we found that dopaminergic therapy (DA) decreased the efficiency of stimulusresponse learning, with corresponding attenuation of ventral striatum (VS) activation. In
contrast, DA improved response accuracy related to enhanced DS BOLD signal. Contrasts
between PD patient and control groups fully support these within-subject patterns. These
double dissociations in terms of behaviour and neural activity related to VS and DS in
response to DA, strongly refute the view that DS mediates stimulus-response learning
through feedback. Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS
in decision making rather than learning, and unite two literatures that have been evolving
independently.

A version of this chapter is under review at NeuroImage: Hiebert, N. M., Owen, A. M.,
Ganjavi, H., Mendonça, D., Jenkins, M.E., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017)
Dorsal striatum does not mediate feedback-based, stimulus-response learning.

61

2.1 Introduction
The view that the dorsal striatum (DS)—consisting of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and
putamen—is critical for stimulus-response learning, is well-entrenched (Brovelli,
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Thompson RL, 1963;
Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Despite the prevalence of this view, learning is often preserved
in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, &
MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014) and animals (Atallah,
Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with DS dysfunction.
Potentially underlying the discrepancies in the stimulus-response learning literature,
response selection decisions and learning are often intrinsically confounded (Jessup &
O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004). In stimulus-response learning experiments,
trials generally proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants perform a
response, and b) feedback regarding response accuracy is provided. Feedback is the means
through which stimulus-response associations are learned. Accuracy in selecting a learned
response provides the learning measure. Performance depends upon both decision and
learning processes. Failing either to acquire stimulus-response relations or to correctly
select learned responses produces impaired performance. Further, in fMRI studies, a)
deciding upon and enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated
as a single event with all significantly activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning
per se (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie response selection could erroneously
be assigned a role in learning. The objective of the current study was to directly test this
confound in patients with PD, using a stimulus-response learning paradigm previously
shown to separate decisions and learning, producing differential patterns of activity in DS
and VS (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).
Combining fMRI with behavioural manipulations in patients with PD tested both off and
on dopaminergic therapy, provides a powerful approach for investigating striatummediated cognitive functions. In PD, the quintessential motor symptoms arise when
dopamine-producing neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) degenerate to
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seriously restrict dopamine supply to the DS (Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988). In
contrast, dopamine-producing neurons in the adjacent ventral tegmental area (VTA) are
relatively spared in PD, especially in the early disease stages, resulting in adequate
endogenous dopamine to regions such as VS, composed of the nucleus accumbens and
ventral portions of the caudate and putamen (Kish et al., 1988).

Consequently, in

unmedicated PD patients, DS functions and neural activity are depressed, whereas VS
operations and activation levels are spared.
Dopaminergic therapy remediates DS dopamine depletion and improves function (Cools,
2006; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011). Unfortunately, exogenous dopamine distributes nonselectively, increasing dopamine even to the relatively-replete VS. As a consequence,
dopaminergic medications have been shown to attenuate neural activity and worsen
functions performed by VTA-innervated brain regions, presumably due to dopamine
overdose (Cools, 2006). In this way, comparing the OFF and ON states, a double
dissociation in terms of behaviour and neural activity is observed comparing DS and VS.
If DS mediates stimulus-response learning, it is predicted that a) DS activity will correlate
with learning measures and with the moment when stimulus-response association learning
occurs (i.e., the Feedback Event, when outcome information regarding response accuracy
is provided) and b) learning efficiency and DS signal will improve with dopaminergic
therapy in PD. These outcomes are predicted because the DS is significantly dopamine
depleted and its functions are impaired at baseline in PD. DS functions and activity
improve with dopamine replacement (P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).
In contrast, if DS mediates stimulus-response decision performance and VS mediates
stimulus-response association learning, as we expect, a) DS activity will correlate with
accuracy of decision performance and with the moment when response selection occurs
(i.e., the Stimulus-Response Decision Event), and b) accuracy of stimulus-specific
decisions and DS signal will improve with dopaminergic therapy in PD. Further, we
predict that a) VS activity will correlate with learning measures and with the moment of
learning during the Feedback Event, and b) efficiency of learning and VS signal will
decrease with dopaminergic therapy in PD. These predictions are based on the knowledge
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that DS functions and activation improve with dopaminergic therapy in PD, whereas
functions and activation of VTA-innervated brain areas are attenuated by exogenous
dopamine in PD, which overdoses these relatively dopamine-replete regions.

2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1 Participants
Twenty-three participants with PD and 19 age- and education-matched healthy controls participated
in this experiment. All participants with PD were previously diagnosed by a licenced neurologist,
had no co-existing diagnosis of dementia or another neurological or psychiatric disease, and met
the core assessment for surgical interventional therapy and the UK Brain Bank criteria for the
diagnosis of idiopathic PD (Hughes, Daniel, Kilford, & Lees, 1992). All PD and no control
participants were treated with dopaminergic therapy. Age- and education-matched controls were
within five years of age (average difference was 3.6 years) and five years of education (average
difference was 2.4 years) to the matched PD patient. Participants with PD were recruited through
the movement disorders database at the London Health Sciences Centre. Participants abusing
alcohol, prescription or illicit drugs, or taking cognitive-enhancing medications including
donepezil, galantamine, rivastigmine, memantine, or methylphenidate were excluded from
participating. Additionally, participants obtaining a Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) score
of 24 or less were excluded.
The motor sub-scale of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) was scored by a
licenced neurologist with sub-specialty training in movement disorders (P.A.M.) to assess the
presence and severity of motor symptoms for all patients both off and on dopaminergic medication.
Control participants were also screened to rule out undiagnosed neurological illness. Mean group
demographic, as well as cognitive and affective screening scores for all patients and controls in
each experimental group were recorded (Table 1). UPDRS motor subscale scores off and on
dopaminergic therapy, daily doses of dopamine replacement therapy in terms of ι -dopa equivalents
(LED), and mean duration of PD was also recorded (Table 1). Calculation of daily LED for each
patient was based on the theoretical equivalence to ι-dopa(mg) as follows: ι -dopa dose(mg) × 1 +
ι-dopa controlled release(mg) × 0.75 + ι-dopa(mg) × 0.33 if on entacapone(mg) + amantadine(mg)
× 0.5 + bromocriptine(mg) × 10 + cabergoline(mg) × 50 + pergolide(mg) × 100 + pramipexole(mg)
× 67 + rasagiline(mg) × 100 + ropinirole(mg) × 16.67 + selegiline(mg) × 10 (Wullner et al., 2010).
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All participants provided informed written consent to the protocol before beginning the experiment
according to the Declaration of Helsinki. This study was approved by the Health Sciences Research
Ethics Board of the University of Western Ontario.

2.2.2 Experimental design
Participants with PD were randomly divided into two groups and all participated in two
sessions on separate days. Different stimulus-response pairs were used in Sessions 1 and
2. Both Sessions 1 and 2 were separated into two phases. Phase 1, the learning phase,
constituted the phase during which stimulus-response associations were learned through
feedback. Phase 2, the performance phase, comprised the phase during which stimulusspecific responses learned in Phase 1 were performed without further feedback.
Participants with PD randomly assigned to Group 1 (OFF-ON) performed Session 1 off
dopaminergic therapy and Session 2 on dopaminergic therapy. In contrast, PD patients
randomized to Group 2 (ON-OFF) performed Session 1 in the ON dopaminergic therapy
state and Session 2 in the OFF state.

Although control participants did not take

dopaminergic therapy in either session, their data were analyzed to correspond to the ONOFF order of the PD patient to whom they were matched. Matching was performed prior
to data analysis at the time of data collection. This controlled for possible order, fatigue,
and practice effects. Participants with PD took their dopamine medication as prescribed
by their treating neurologist during ON testing sessions, but abstained from taking all
dopaminergic medication including dopamine precursors such as Ι-dopa, aromatic-Lamino-acid decarboxylase inhibitors such as carbidopa, and catechol-O-methyltransferase
(COMT) inhibitors such as entacapone (Comtan) for a minimum of 12 to a maximum of
18 hours, and dopamine agonists, such as pramipexole (Mirapex), ropinirole (Requip), or
pergolide (Permax), as well as amantadine (Symmeterel), rasagiline (Azilect), and
selegiline (Eldepryl or Deprenyl) for 16 to 20 hours before beginning OFF testing sessions.
All patients confirmed that they complied with these medication instructions. Ten PD
patients and eight controls were in the OFF-ON group, whereas nine PD and ten controls
were in the ON-OFF group.
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In Phase 1, the learning phase of each session, participants learned to associate abstract
images with one of three button-press responses. Images were computer-generated with
GroBoto (Braid Art Labs, Colorado Springs, USA). In each trial, an abstract image
appeared in the centre of a projection screen until the participant responded with a buttonpress. Feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) was provided after every response and in
this way, participants learned to associate each of the abstract images with the appropriate
button-press response through trial and error. Trials were organized into blocks. After
each block, participants were provided with a percentage score, summarizing their learning
performance. Participants completed a maximum of 12 blocks. Once participants scored
greater than 75% on two successive blocks, Phase 1 ended. Our aim was to examine early
learning. Further, we wanted to avoid accuracy reaching ceiling so that we could also
investigate, as a separate measure, decision performance. If after 12 blocks the participant
was not responding at an accuracy level greater than chance (~33%), his/her data were not
included in the analysis for either the OFF or ON Sessions. Before proceeding to Phase 1,
participants received 20 practice trials with different images from those employed during
the main experimental sessions to become familiar with the procedure. In Phase 2, the
performance phase of each session, stimuli presented in Phase 1 were shown again.
Participants were asked to provide the stimulus-specific button-press responses that they
had learned in Phase 1. No feedback was provided to preclude new feedback-based
learning during this phase that was aimed to test selection of accurate responses. Again,
different sets of images were used in Session 1 and Session 2.
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Figure 2.1 Abstract images presented in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Abstract Image Set A and Set B refer to the images presented in Session 1 and Session 2 respectively.
Images were associated with a button pressed by the index, middle, or ring finger buttons.

Both Phases 1 and 2 of Sessions 1 and 2 were performed while fMRI measures were
simultaneously recorded. Twelve abstract images were used in the experiment, six during
each session of testing (Figure 2.1). There were 24 trials per block in Phase 1 of each
session, with each abstract image occurring four times in random order per block. Two
images were assigned to each the second, third, and fourth button on the button box per
session and participants pressed these buttons with their index, middle, and ring fingers,
respectively. A button-press response was required to advance from the feedback phase to
the next trial. In this way, in each trial, motor responses were included in both StimulusResponse Decision and Feedback Events (Figure 2.2A).
Trials in the Learning Phases proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the
projection screen for 500 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image
was presented until a button-press response was performed (i.e., the Stimulus-Response
Decision Event); (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable amount of time sampled from
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v)
feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) appeared for 1000 ms followed by a green circle
that appeared in the centre of the projection screen signifying to the participant to press the
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first button with his/her thumb to advance to the next trial (i.e., the Feedback Event); (vi)
a blank screen appeared for a variable amount of time sampled from an exponential
distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).
A distractor task lasting approximately 15 minutes (data not shown) was employed
between the Phases 1 and 2 in both Sessions 1 and 2. This was to prevent rehearsal of
stimulus-response associations as well as to make stimulus-response decisions more
challenging. In Phase 2 of each session, participants performed three blocks of 24 trials,
in which the same six images studied during Phase 1 were presented in random order, four
times per block. Participants provided the button-press response that they had learned for
each image during Phase 1. No feedback regarding accuracy was provided in Phase 2 of
each session, precluding further feedback-based learning. Parameters for each trial in
Phase 2 were otherwise identical to those in Phase 1 with the exception that the Feedback
Event was omitted. Figures 2.2A and B present example trials in Phases 1 and 2.

Figure 2.2 Example of a single trial in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
A) Participants learned to associate six abstract images with one of three button-press responses in Phase 1.
The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for 500 ms;
(ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the projection
screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e.,
‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time
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sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms). B)
Participants recalled the responses to the learned images in the absence of feedback in Phase 2. Trials in
Phase 2 were identical to the Phase 1 except that feedback was omitted. * The inter-stimulus and inter-trial
intervals (ISI and ITI, respectively) were jittered between the response and feedback and between the offset
of feedback and the beginning of the subsequent trial to create two fMRI events within each trial: a) the
Stimulus-Response Decision Event and b) the Feedback Event for Phase 1. In Phase 2, the ITIs were jittered
between the response and the subsequent trial, as the Feedback Event was omitted.

2.2.3 Statistical analysis
2.2.3.1

Behavioural

Executing stimulus-specific response selections in Phase 2 depended on how well these
associations were learned during Phase 1 in each session. We hypothesized that PD and
medication would affect learning. We therefore implemented measures to better isolate
decision performance. First, we aimed to equate the degree to which stimulus-response
associations were acquired across participants and sessions by imposing a learning criterion
in Phase 1. That is, once participants reached a learning criterion of 75% correct on two
consecutive blocks or once they completed 12 blocks, Phase 1 ended. Second, we used an
Adjusted-Savings Score to evaluate accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections
during Phase 2. This score was calculated as follows for each session: % accuracy of Block
1 of Phase 2 ÷ % accuracy of Last Block of Phase 1. By weighting response-selection
performance relative to previous learning performance in Phase 1, we corrected for
learning differences between participants and across sessions.

This score permitted

evaluation of stimulus-specific response selection performance independent of medication
effects on stimulus-response learning.
Efficiency of encoding stimulus-response associations across the Phase 1 of each session
was estimated by the rate of change of correct responses across the session. The slope of
change was measured by summing the scores obtained at the end of each block over the
total number of blocks required to reach the pre-set learning criterion (i.e., standard slope
of the linear regression function, Microsoft Excel, 2011), as follows:
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b=

∑(x − x )(y − y )
∑(x − x )
2

where b is the slope, and x and y are the sample means of the number of blocks and block
scores, respectively.
For each of our dependent measures, Adjusted-Savings Score and slope, 2 × 2 mixed
ANOVAs with Group (PD versus control) and Medication (ON versus OFF) as the
between-subject, and within-subject variables, respectively.

Simple effects will be

investigated in the case of significant interactions. Simple effects tests will include:
•

Within-subject
o PD OFF versus PD ON
o control OFF versus control ON

•

Between-subject
o OFF PD versus control
o ON PD versus control

2.2.3.2

Imaging acquisition

During data collection of this experiment, the MRI scanner at Robarts Research Institute
at the University of Western Ontario was upgraded. FMRI data were collected either in a
3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio (before upgrade) or Magnetom Prisma (after upgrade)
with Total Imaging Matrix. Nine PD patients and seven control participants were scanned
on the Magnetom Trio. The scanning parameters for each scanner before and after the
upgrade were identical. We obtained a scout image for positioning the participant and T1
for anatomical localization. Number of runs of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions varied
depending on the participant’s rate of learning but ranged from a minimum of one to a
maximum of four runs. Each run was of variable length and therefore consisted of a
variable number of blocks of 24 trials. A distractor task lasting approximately 15 minutes
was administered between Phases 1 and 2 in both sessions. All participants performed
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Phase 2 as the final fMRI run. All runs lasted on average eight minutes with one whole
brain image consisting of 43, 2.5mm-thick slices taken every 2.5s. The field of view was
oriented along the anterior and posterior commissure with a matrix of 88 × 88 pixels, an
isotropic voxel size of 2.5×2.5×2.5 mm3. The echo time was 30ms and the flip angle was
90°.

2.2.3.3

FMRI data analysis

Statistical Parametric Mapping Version 8 (SPM8; Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) was used in conjunction with Matrix Laboratory
(MATLAB; MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) to complete fMRI
analysis. Images were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with
an 8mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0056Hz).
Individual participant data were modeled using fixed effects analysis using SPM8.
Regressors were formed using onsets and durations of psychological events of interest,
particularly Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and post-feedback Rest Events, with
the canonical hemodynamic response function.

The inter-stimulus interval between

Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events was not explicitly modelled to
minimize over fitting the data. If the randomly generated inter-trial interval (ITI) between
the Feedback Event and the Stimulus-Response Decision Event for the next trial was
between 525-2000ms, the final 500ms of this interval was modeled to form the Rest Event.
If the ITI was between 2000-4000ms, the final 1000ms comprised the Rest Event for that
trial. Finally, for ITIs that were greater than 4000ms, the final 2000ms were included as
the Rest measure.

The aims were to a) separate the Stimulus-Response Decision,

Feedback, and Rest Events as much as possible, and b) create Rest events with variable
durations to match the Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events. StimulusResponse Decision Events were defined as the time from the onset of the abstract image
until the participant made a button-press response. The Feedback Event was defined as the
time from the onset of feedback (“Correct” or “Incorrect”) until and including the buttonpress response that participants made when the green circle appeared on the projection
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screen, signalling their readiness to proceed to the next trial. This ended the Feedback
Event. In this way, a motor response occurred during the Stimulus-Response Decision and
Feedback Events.
A single General Linear Model (GLM) was created for Phase 1 in each session to
investigate regional BOLD responses for Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and Rest
Events. Number of predictor functions corresponded to the number of blocks completed
by each participant multiplied by the three event types (i.e., Stimulus-Response Decision,
Feedback, and Rest). A similar GLM was created to for Phase 2 in each session to
investigate regional BOLD responses for Stimulus-Response Decision and Rest Events,
with regressors corresponding to each of the three blocks completed in each of the sessions,
multiplied by the two event types (i.e., Stimulus-Response and Rest). Contrasts were made
at the individual level for each session comparing Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback,
and Rest Events for Phase 1, and Stimulus-Response Decision and Rest Events for Phase
2. Correct and incorrect trials were examined separately. At the group level, two GLMs
were created, one for Phase 1 and the other for Phase 2. The Phase 1 GLM consisted of
separate regressors for correct and incorrect Stimulus-Response Decision minus Rest, and
Feedback minus Rest Events for both PD and control, off and on medication, yielding 16
regressors. Age and Order were also added as covariates. Similarly, the Phase 2 model
contained 8 regressors, separated into correct and incorrect Stimulus-Response Decision
minus Rest Events for both PD and control participants, off and on medication.
First, group-level contrasts examined events collapsed across Group (PD and control)
and Medication (OFF and ON) to confirm that we replicated the results from Hiebert
et al., (2014b). The contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2 were as follows: (i) StimulusResponse Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (ii) Stimulus-Response Decision minus
Feedback Events in Phase 1, (iii) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest in Phase
2, (iv) Feedback Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (v) Feedback Events minus StimulusResponse Decision Events in Phase 1, (vi) correct versus incorrect Feedback Events in
Phase 1. Peaks in these contrasts are reported at a significance level of q<0.05 corrected
for multiple comparisons using false discovery rate (FDR) at the voxel level, unless
otherwise noted.
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We next conducted Bayesian analysis, because critical conclusions regarding DS’s
role in stimulus-response learning depend on accepting null effects. Specifically,
refuting the entrenched view that DS mediates stimulus-response learning is accomplished
by showing that a) DS activation does not arise during the Feedback Event when stimulusresponse associations are learned. There is a justified bias against publishing negative
findings, in that with frequentist approaches, the probabilities of Type II (i.e., falsely failing
to reject the null hypothesis) and Type I errors (i.e., falsely rejecting the null hypothesis)
are asymmetric. Type I errors are set at a clear maximum, usually less than 0.05, whereas
Type II errors vary across studies in terms of magnitude and determinants (Dienes, 2014)
not pre-determined by the experimenter. Bayesian analysis allows directly contrasting the
probability of the null and the alternative hypotheses in a symmetrical way, putting these
hypotheses on an equal footing, and directly comparing the relative fit of the two models
(Dienes, 2014). Bayesian analyses were therefore performed to investigate the strength of
null effects that arose. Additionally, the strength of significant effects was investigated by
conducting Bayesian analyses on the strength of DS and VS activity during StimulusResponse Decision and Feedback events, respectively. Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests
were conducted separately for PD patients and control participants, using average beta
values extracted from left and right anatomical DS and VS ROIs during Stimulus-Response
Decision and Feedback Events in the following contrasts:
i.

Stimulus-Response Decision Events across Phase 1 collapsed across
Medication session (OFF and ON)

ii.

Stimulus-Response Decision Events across Phase 2 collapsed across
Medication session (OFF and ON)

iii.

Correct minus Incorrect Feedback events across Phase 1 collapsed across
Medication session (OFF and ON)

ROIs were created using the Automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.,
2002), and WFU PickAtlas (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) in conjunction
with MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). The left and right DS ROI
included left and right dorsal caudate nucleus and left and right dorsal putamen at a level
of z > 2 mm in MNI space. The left and right VS ROIs were similarly created and included
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the left and right ventral caudate nucleus and putamen at a level of z ≤ 2 mm in MNI space,
as well as the NAcc.
Using the Bayes’ factor of three as the cut-off, previously indicated to be the Bayesian
corollary of p < 0.05 in frequentist hypothesis testing (Dienes, 2014), we tested whether
the extracted beta values were indeed zero. If the Bayes’ factor of the average beta value
is less than three, it strongly supports the null hypothesis, that the activation level is not
greater than zero.
Next, we investigated brain-behaviour correlations to confirm that behavioural
performance was related to DS versus VS activity patterns. We tested whether BOLD
signal in striatal regions correlated with behavioural indices of response selection decisions
and learning respectively. Specifically, we tested whether activity in two DS versus two
VS ROIs taken from Hiebert et al., (2014b), correlated with the Adjusted-Savings Score
(i.e., our measure of response-selection decisions), and with Learning Slope (i.e., our
measure of learning efficiency). Correlations were performed separately for PD and
healthy control groups in the event that learning and response selection performance
differed across groups collapsed across medication session. The two right and left DS and
two right and left VS ROIs from Hiebert et al., (2014b) were employed for the correlation
analysis in the present study using the MarsBar Toolbox in SPM8 (Brett et al., 2002). DS
ROIs were centered on the dorsal head of the caudate nucleus (x=±18, y=24, z=6), and
dorsal putamen (x=±29, y=9, z=6). For VS, x=±10, y=8, z=−4, and x=±12, y=18, z=−6,
centering on the nucleus accumbens and ventral caudate nucleus respectively were used.
Spherical ROIs centred on the aforementioned coordinates were created with a radius of
6mm. Beta values in our ROIs were extracted from four contrasts of interest: (i) StimulusResponse Decision Events across Phase 2 for patients with PD across Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e.,
off and on dopaminergic medication); (ii) Feedback Events across Phase 1 for patients with
PD across Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e., off and on medication); (iii) Stimulus-Response Decision
Events across Phase 2 for healthy controls across Sessions 1 and 2; and (iv) Feedback
Events across Phase 1 for healthy controls across Sessions 1 and 2. These average beta
values for each ROI were correlated with behavioural measures of stimulus-specific
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response selection (i.e., the adjusted savings scores) and learning (i.e., slope values) for
each group separately.
Subsequently, events of interest were examined for PD and Healthy controls
separately comparing OFF and ON Medication sessions directly. These within-subject
contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2 were as follows: (i) PD OFF versus ON StimulusResponse Decision Events in Phase 1; (ii) PD OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision
Events in Phase 2, (iii) PD OFF versus ON medication for Feedback Events in Phase 1;
(iv) PD OFF correct minus incorrect Feedback Events versus ON correct minus incorrect
Feedback Events; (v) control OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase
1; (vi) control OFF versus ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase 2, (vii) control
OFF versus ON medication for Feedback Events in Phase 1; (viii) and control OFF correct
minus incorrect Feedback Events versus ON correct minus incorrect Feedback Events. For
OFF-ON contrasts in PD patients and controls, peaks within the striatum were considered
predicted and are reported at a significance level of p≤0.001, uncorrected for multiple
comparisons. Peaks outside of the striatum are reported at a threshold of q<0.05 FDR
corrected at the voxel level. Striatal regions were defined using the Harvard-Oxford
Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group,
FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom). DS and VS are not distinct anatomical structures,
which creates difficulty when attempting to separate them in an fMRI context. In a review,
Postuma and Dagher (2006) define VS as z≤2, which we employed. Here, DS refers to
portions of the caudate nucleus and putamen at a level of z>2mm in MNI space. VS was
defined as the nucleus accumbens, caudate, and putamen at a level of z≤2mm in MNI space.
All cortical regions were defined using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas in the FMRIB
Software Library version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United
Kingdom). All x, y, z coordinates are reported in MNI space.
Next, to clarify our within-subject contrasts that explored the effects of dopaminergic
therapy on DS and VS function in PD patients, we contrasted Group (PD versus control)
in each of the Medication states separately. The contrasts of interest for Phases 1 and 2
were as follows: (i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (ii)
Stimulus-Response Decision minus Feedback Events in Phase 1, (iii) Stimulus-Response
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Decision Events minus Rest in Phase 2, (iv) Feedback Events minus Rest in Phase 1, (v)
Feedback Events minus Stimulus-Response Decision Events in Phase 1, (vi) correct versus
incorrect Feedback Events in Phase 1. For OFF-ON contrasts in PD patients and controls,
peaks within the striatum were considered predicted and are reported at a significance level
of p≤0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Peaks outside of the striatum are
reported at a threshold of q<0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel level.

2.3 Results
2.3.1 Behavioural data
Demographic, affective, and clinical data are presented in Table 2.1 and behavioural data
for Phases 1 and 2 are presented in Table 2.2.

2.3.1.1

Demographic, affective, and clinical data

Three patients with PD were excluded because they obtained a Montreal Cognitive Assessment
(MoCA) score of 24 or less, and a further one PD patient and one control participant failed to show
any evidence of learning in Phase 1 in either Session 1 or 2 (explained below) and were therefore
excluded from all analyses. Nineteen patients with PD and 18 age- and education-matched healthy
controls were therefore included in the final analyses.
There were no significant demographic differences between PD and control participants (Table
2.1). Participants with PD scored significantly higher on both Beck Depression Inventory II and
Beck Anxiety Inventory compared to controls regardless of medication status as is expected based
on previous research. No differences were found in terms of depressive or anxiety symptoms
between participants with PD measured off or on their dopaminergic medication. UPDRS scores
were significantly higher in participants with PD measured off relative to on dopaminergic
medication (t >6.00, p<0.0001), signifying greater PD signs when patients were in the unmedicated
state.
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Table 2.1 Demographic, clinical, screening cognitive, and affective measures for PD
patients and healthy controls.
Group N

Age

PD

19

65.73 (1.80)

CTRL 18

65.06 (1.70)

Group ANART

MOCA

124.80
(1.63)
124.45
CTRL
(1.51)

27.05
(0.52)
27.00
(0.28)

PD

DA
(n)

3.95
(0.60)

Ɩ-dopa
(mg)
599.50
(46.37)

˗

˗

BDI-II
ON
7.94
(1.23)
3.53
(0.70)

BAI
OFF
7.57
(1.42)
2.41
(0.58)

Edu

Duration

15.21
(0.69)
15.00
(0.59)
BDI-II
OFF
8.31
(1.21)
3.53
(0.56)

UPDRS
OFF
15.26
(1.48)

UPDRS
ON
12.16
(1.32)

˗

˗

˗

BAI
ON
6.47
(1.30)
2.05
(0.55)

Apathy
OFF
10.05
(1.06)
9.88
(0.79)

Apathy
ON
10.68
(1.13)
10.29
(0.95)

9

Values are presented as group means and standard error of the mean (SEM) in braces. Screening cognitive
and affective measures were completed on medication unless otherwise stated. Dopaminergic therapy was
not administered to control (CTRL) participants at any time during the experiment. Their data are presented
here in the ON-OFF order corresponding to their matched PD patient. Edu – Years of education; Duration –
Number of years since PD diagnosis; Ι-dopa (mg) - Ι-dopa equivalent dose in mg; DA – number of PD patients
on dopamine agonists; UPDRS OFF – Unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale motor score off medication;
UPDRS ON – Unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale motor score on medication; ANART – National Adult
Reading Test IQ Estimation; MOCA – Montreal Cognitive Assessment total score out of 30; BDI-II OFF – Beck
Depression Inventory II score measured when patients with PD were off medication and for CTRL participants
during the off session of their corresponding PD patient; BDI-II ON – Beck Depression Inventory II score
measured when patients with PD were on medication and for CTRL participants during the ON Session of
their corresponding PD patient; BAI OFF – Beck Anxiety Inventory score measured when patients with PD
were off medication and for CTRL participants during the OFF Session of their corresponding PD patient; BAI
ON – Beck Anxiety Inventory score measured when patients with PD were on medication and for CTRL
participants during the ON Session of their corresponding PD patient; Apathy OFF – Starkstein Apathy Scale
score measured when patients with PD were off medication and for CTRL participants during the OFF Session
of their corresponding PD patient; Apathy ON – Starkstein Apathy Scale score measured when patients with
PD were on medication and for CTRL participants during the ON Session of their corresponding PD patient.

2.3.1.2

Response selection decision behavioural measure

Accuracy of selecting previously-learned stimulus-specific responses was measured using
an Adjusted-Savings Score. The score obtained in Block 1 of Phase 2 was weighted
relative to the final accuracy obtained during the last block of Phase 1 for each session. A
2×2 mixed ANOVA of the Adjusted-Savings Scores was conducted with Group (PD versus
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control) as between-subject factor and Medication Session (OFF versus ON) as the withinsubject variable. There were no significant main effects of Group (F<1) or Medication
(F1,32=1.327, MSE=235.00, p=0.258). The Group×Medication interaction trended toward
significance, F1,32=4.007, MSE=235.00, p=0.054, and was further investigated using
pairwise comparisons. This revealed a significantly improved Adjusted-Savings Score for
participants with PD tested ON compared to OFF dopaminergic medication (t=2.24,
p=0.038; Figure 2.3A) as would be predicted if DS mediates decisions or response
selections. There were no significant differences between OFF and ON sessions for control
participants (t=0.70, p=0.494). Recall that control participants did not actually receive
dopaminergic therapy but their data were analyzed to correspond to the ON-OFF order of
the PD patient to whom they were matched. Additionally, there were no significant
differences between PD and control groups for either the OFF (t=1.26, p=0.104) or ON
(t=0.50, p=0.308) contrast.
Table 2.2 Behavioural measures for participants with PD and control participants.
Group
PD
OFF
ON
Control
OFF
ON

Adjusted-Savings
Score (%)

Learning Slope

94.00 (3.70)
104.75 (3.65)

0.206 (0.023)
0.165 (0.021)

102.86 (3.80)
99.33 (3.75)

0.186 (0.025)
0.205 (0.23)

Values presented are mean (SEM). To reiterate, Adjusted-Savings Score was measured using the following
equation: percent accuracy in Block 1 of Phase 2 ÷ percent accuracy in the last block of Phase 1. Slope was
calculated using the block accuracy scores over the number of blocks in early and late halves using the slope
of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel 2011). All values are presented separately for PD patients in
the OFF and ON medication sessions, and control participants in the sessions corresponding to the OFF and
ON sessions for the PD patient to whom they were matched. Healthy controls did not receive dopaminergic
therapy at any point in this study.

2.3.1.3

Stimulus-response association learning measure

Efficiency of stimulus-response association learning was estimated using the slope of
accuracy change over the total number of blocks required to reach the learning criterion in
Phase 1 (i.e., 75% accuracy on two consecutive blocks). Slope was calculated using the
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linear regression function in Microsoft Excel (2011). A 2×2 mixed ANOVA on the slopes
of learning obtained during Phase 1 was conducted with Group (PD versus control) as the
between-subject factor and Medication Session (OFF versus ON) as the within-subject
variable. There were no main effects of Group (F<1) or Medication (F<1). However, the
Group×Medication interaction was significant, F1,35=4.46, MSE=0.004, p=0.042.
Investigated further using pairwise comparisons, we found significantly slower learning
ON relative to OFF medication for PD patients (t=2.17, p=0.044; Figure 2.3B) but no
medication difference for control participants (t=0.92, p=0.368), replicating what we found
previously in patients with PD (Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, et al., 2014; Vo et al., 2014)
and supporting the dopamine overdose hypothesis. Additionally, there were no significant
slope differences between PD and control groups for either the OFF (t=-0.17, p=0.568) or
ON (t=0.85, p=0.200) contrast.

Figure 2.3 Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on learning and response selection.
A) Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on Adjusted-Savings Score. Adjusted-Savings Score served as a
measurement of stimulus-specific response selection accuracy. Adjusted-Savings Score was measured using
the following equation: percent accuracy in Block 1 of Phase 2 ÷ percent accuracy in the last block of the
Phase 1. Adjusted-Savings Score was significantly higher in PD patients tested ON compared to OFF
medication. B) Effect of PD and dopaminergic therapy on slope of learning stimulus-response associations.
Slope of learning served as a measurement of learning efficiency. To reiterate, slope was calculated using
the block accuracy scores over the number of blocks in Phase 1 using the slope of the linear regression
function (Microsoft Excel 2011). Slope of learning was significantly slower in PD patients tested ON compared
to OFF dopaminergic medication. All values are presented separately for PD patients tested OFF medication,
PD patients tested ON medication, and control participants tested in the sessions designated as ON and OFF
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though control did not actually receive dopaminergic therapy. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
* p<0.05.

2.3.2 FMRI data
Significant activations in contrasts of interest are presented in Tables 2.3-7 and Figures 2.4
and 2.6. Contrasts collapsing across Group and Medication Session are reported at a
significance level of q<0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel level. Contrasts examining patients
with PD versus healthy controls, as well as exploring each group separately for OFF-ON
effects are reported at a significance level of p≤0.001 for predicted striatal regions,
uncorrected for multiple comparisons.

2.3.2.1

Groups and medication sessions collapsed

Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Significant activity in the right dorsal caudate
occurred during the Stimulus-Response Decision relative to Rest in Phase 1 (peak
coordinates: 12, 5, 5; t=5.76, q<0.001; Figure 2.4A). Significant right dorsal caudate
activity also occurred in the Stimulus-Response Decision minus Feedback contrast in Phase
1 (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2; t=7.51, q<0.001; Figure 2.4B). When Stimulus-Response
Decision Events were compared to Rest in Phase 2, significant activity in the left dorsal
caudate (peak coordinates: 15, -1, 14; t=4.76, q=0.015; Figure 2.4C) occurred. DS was
preferentially recruited during the Stimulus-Response Decision Event, in both Phases 1
and 2, replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).
Table 2.3 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest collapsed across Group
(PD and control) and Medication (OFF and ON) reported in MNI space.
Contrast
Phase 1: SR Events
SR minus rest

Anatomical Area

Cluster
Size

t

q*

x, y, z

Right dorsal
caudate
Right lingual gyrus
Left paracingulate
gyrus
Right middle frontal
gyrus

75

5.76

<0.001

12, 5, 5

6928
427

12.33
6.62

<0.001
<0.001

6, -85, -7
-3, 20, 44

285

6.55

<0.001

48, 32, 32
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SR minus FB

Phase 2: SR Events
SR minus Rest

Phase 1: FB Events
FB minus rest

FB minus SR
FB Correct minus
Incorrect
FB Incorrect minus
Correct

Right dorsal
caudate
Left occipital
fusiform gyrus
Right postcentral
gyrus

**

7.51

<0.001

12, 5, 2

3471

13.70

<0.001

299

4.89

<0.001

-30, -76, 16
36, -31, 41

Right dorsal
caudate
Right lateral
occipital cortex
Right precentral
gyrus
Left precentral gyrus

105

4.76

0.015

15, -1, 14

3567

9.49

<0.001

1011

5.40

<0.001

42, -73, 10
54, 11, 35

1713

5.05

<0.001

-48, 5, 29

Left postcentral
gyrus
Right postcentral
gyrus
No Suprathreshold
activations
Right nucleus
accumbens
Left nucleus
accumbens
No suprathreshold
activations

389

7.55

<0.001

299

4.89

<0.001

-39, -28,
47
36, -31, 41

150

4.87

0.007

18, 11, -7

123

4.49

0.016

-18, 11, -1

Cluster size is reported in voxels. *Significance values are reported at q < 0.05 FDR corrected at the voxel
level. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each
contrast. **Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.

N.B. SR – Stimulus-

Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.

Feedback Learning Events: Correct and incorrect Feedback Events combined relative to
Rest or relative to Stimulus-Response Decision Events revealed no significant striatal
activations. Significant VS but not DS activity occurred in the left (peak coordinates: -18,
11, -1; t=4.49, q=0.016; Figure 2.4D), and right nucleus accumbens (peak coordinates: 18,
11, -7; t=4.87, q<0.007; Figure 2.4D), in the correct minus incorrect feedback contrast,
however. No significant striatal region was active in the reverse (i.e., incorrect minus
correct) contrast.
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Figure 2.4 Significant activations in contrasts collapsing across Group (PD and control)
and medication status (OFF and ON).
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Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, as well as
centred on the striatal activation for visualization purposes. A) BOLD signal for Stimulus-Response Decision
Events minus Rest across all blocks in Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activity that
arose in the right dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 5; t = 5.76, q < 0.001). B) BOLD signal for StimulusResponse Decision minus Feedback Events across all blocks in Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the
significant cluster that arose in the right dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2; t = 7.51, q < 0.001). C)
BOLD signal for Stimulus-Response Decision minus Rest Events across all blocks in Phase 2. The crosshairs are centred on the significant activity that arose in the left dorsal caudate (peak coordinates: 15, -1, 14;
t = 4.76, q = 0.015. D) BOLD signal for correct minus incorrect Feedback Events across all blocks in the
Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activation that arose in the right nucleus accumbens
(peak coordinates: 18, 11, -7; t = 4.87, q < 0.007). A significant cluster was also present in the left nucleus
accumbens (peak coordinates: -18, 11, -1; t = 4.49, q = 0.016). N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events
and FB – Feedback Events in the figure.

2.3.2.2

Bayesian analysis

Beta values extracted from the two right and left anatomical DS and VS ROIs from key
contrasts of interest involving Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback Events (Table
4). Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted on beta values for each of the four
ROIs extracted from each contrast of interest. In this analysis, a Bayes’ factor of less than
three is considered to significantly support the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014).
Phase 1 Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting Stimulus-Response Decision
minus Rest events for Phase 1 in PD patients, collapsed across Medication session revealed
a Bayes’ factor greater than three in the Right DS in both PD patients and control
participants, separately (Right DS: BF10 = 8.705; Right DS: BF10 = 3.691, respectively).
Bayes’ factor for Right VS was also greater than three in PD patients only (BF10 = 3.124).
Phase 2 Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting Stimulus-Response Decision
minus Rest events for Phase 2, collapsed across Medication session, revealed Bayes’
factors greater than three in Left DS for PD patients (BF10 = 4.911), and Right DS for
control participants (BF10 = 6.870).
Phase 1 Correct minus Incorrect Feedback Events: In the correct minus incorrect Feedback
Events, collapsed across Medication session, PD patient’s Bayes’ factors for DS ROIs were
far below three, indicating that beta values in these regions were not significantly above
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zero (Left DS: BF10 = 0.905; Right DS BF10 = 0.963). In contrast, Bayes’ factors for VS
ROIs were above three indicating that VS is preferentially activated during these events
with beta values significantly above zero (Left VS: BF10 = 8.666; Right DS: BF10 = 7.022).
A similar pattern arose in control participants (Left DS: BF10 = 0.129; Right DS BF10 =
0.117; Left DS: BF10 = 4.843; Right DS BF10 = 7.042).
Table 2.4 Bayes’ factors for contrasts of interest in Phases 1 and 2.
Left
DS

Contrasts

Right
DS

Left
VS

Right
VS

8.705

0.561

3.124

2.396

1.222

0.363

0.963

8.666

7.022

1.505

3.691

0.827

1.003

2.684

6.870

0.625

0.625

0.129

0.117

4.843

7.042

PD patients collapsed across Medication session
i)
Stimulus-Response Decision Events in
1.768
Phase 1
ii)
Stimulus-Response Decision Events in
4.911
Phase 2
iii)
Correct minus Incorrect Feedback Events
0.905
minus Rest in Phase 1
Control participants collapsed across Medication session
i)
ii)
iii)

Stimulus-Response Decision Events in
Phase 1
Stimulus-Response Decision Events in
Phase 2
Correct minus Incorrect Feedback
Events minus Rest in Phase 1

Bayes’ factors (BF10) are presented for each of the four anatomical ROIs for contrasts of interest. Bayes’
factors less than three indicate that the results strongly support the null hypothesis, that activation is not
greater than zero.

2.3.2.3

Brain-behaviour correlations: PD and controls separately

Two right and left VS and two right and left DS ROIs were employed in Nole M. Hiebert,
Vo, et al. (2014)—the study in which the current cognitive paradigm was first explored
with fMRI in healthy young controls. BOLD signal in these ROIs was correlated with our
behavioural measures of stimulus-response decision accuracy and feedback-based learning
efficiency. The Adjusted-Savings Score served as our measure of decision accuracy, and
the slope of change in correctly associating stimuli and responses was used our measure of
stimulus-response association learning.
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Striatum and response-selection decisions: Beta values from each of the ROIs were
correlated with adjusted-saving scores in OFF and ON sessions for PD patients and healthy
controls separately. For PD patients, beta values extracted during Stimulus-Response
Decision Events in the Phase 2 from the left dorsal caudate ROI positively correlated with
adjusted savings scores (r=0.35, t=2.19, p=0.035; Figure 2.5A). For control participants,
beta values extracted from the right dorsal putamen ROI significantly correlated with
adjusted savings (r=0.35, t=2.18, p=0.042; Figure 2.5B). Neither of the VS ROIs correlated
with Adjusted-Savings Scores in either the PD or the healthy control group.
Striatum and learning from feedback: Beta values from each of the VS and DS ROIs were
correlated with slope of learning in the OFF and ON sessions combined for PD patients
and healthy controls separately. A significant positive correlation arose between slope and
beta value in the right ventral caudate ROI (r=0.34, t=2.17, p=0.037; Figure 2.5C) for PD
patients only. No other ROIs correlated significantly with slope. Of greatest significance
given our aim of directly testing the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning,
levels of activation in our DS ROIs did not correlate with the slope of stimulus-response
learning in either the PD or control groups.

Figure 2.5 Brain-behaviour correlations between BOLD signal in ROIs and measures of
learning and stimulus-specific response selection.
A) Beta values extracted from the left dorsal caudate ROI in the Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus
Rest contrast correlated positively and significantly with adjusted-savings in patients with PD on and off
medication. B) Beta values extracted from the right dorsal putamen ROI significantly correlated with adjusted
savings in healthy controls. C) Beta values extracted from the right anterior VS ROI in the Feedback Events
minus Rest contrast, correlated positively and significantly with slope of learning in patients with PD on and
off medication.
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2.3.2.4

PD patients: OFF versus ON sessions

Stimulus-Response Decision events OFF minus ON: There was no preferential activity in
the striatum in this contrast for Phase 1 or 2 data.
Stimulus-Response Decision events PD ON minus OFF: Significant left (peak coordinates:
-24, 5, 11; t=3.86, p<0.001) and right dorsal putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 2, 14; t=3.83,
p<0.001) activity arose in the ON relative to OFF Session for Stimulus-Response Decision
Events in Phase 1 (Figure 2.6A). A significant peak of activity in the right nucleus
accumbens (peak coordinates: 12, 11, -10; t=4.40, p<0.001) also arose. Significant left
(peak coordinates: -12, 11, 14; t=3.68, p<0.001) and right dorsal caudate (peak
coordinates: 6, 2, 20; t=3.45, p<0.001) activity occurred in the ON relative to OFF Session
for the Stimulus-Response Decision contrast in Phase 2 (Figure 2.6B). Overall, these
results reveal a task-specific, dopaminergic therapy-related DS BOLD signal enhancement
for decision enactment.
Feedback learning events OFF minus ON: When Feedback Events were investigated in
the OFF minus ON contrast, significantly greater activity occurred in the left ventral
putamen (peak coordinates: -21, 5, -1; t=3.41, p<0.001; Figure 2.6C), suggesting that
medication dampened VS activity.
Feedback learning events ON minus OFF: No significant activity occurred in this contrast.
Feedback learning correct minus incorrect events OFF minus ON: Significantly greater
activity occurred in the right ventral putamen, extending into the nucleus accumbens and
ventral caudate (peak coordinates: 18, 11, -4; t=3.15, p=0.001) when PD patients were
tested off relative to on dopaminergic therapy. Again, this suggests that dopaminergic
therapy attenuates VS activity, consistent with the dopamine overdose hypothesis.
Feedback learning correct minus incorrect events ON minus OFF: No significant striatal
activity occurred in this contrast.
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Table 2.5 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for patients with PD
OFF versus ON dopaminergic medication reported in MNI space.
Contrast
Phase 1: SR Events
OFF minus ON SR
events
ON minus OFF SR
events

Phase 2: SR Events
OFF minus ON SR
events
ON minus OFF SR
events
Phase 1: FB Events
OFF minus ON FB
events
ON minus OFF FB
events
OFF minus ON
Correct minus
Incorrect FB events
ON minus OFF
Correct minus
Incorrect FB events

Anatomical Area

Cluster
Size

t

p*

x, y, z

15

3.83

<0.001

21, 2, 14

36
**

3.86
4.40

<0.001
<0.001

-24, 5, 11
12, 11, -10

No suprathreshold
activations
Left dorsal caudate

43

3.68

<0.001

-12, 11, 14

Right dorsal caudate

61

3.45

<0.001

6, 2, 20

Left ventral putamen 14

3.41

<0.001

21, 5, -1

No suprathreshold
activations
Left ventral putamen 178

3.15

0.001

-21, 20, -1

No suprathreshold
activations
Right dorsal
putamen
Left dorsal putamen
Right nucleus
accumbens

No suprathreshold
activations

Cluster size is reported in voxels. p values are reported at a significance level of at p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected at
the voxel level. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in
each contrast. **Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.
Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.

N.B. SR –
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Figure 2.6 Significant activations in contrasts examining only PD patients ON and OFF
dopaminergic medication.
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Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons and centred
on the striatal activation. A) BOLD signal for ON minus OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events across all
blocks in Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the significant cluster that arose in the left dorsal putamen
(peak coordinates: -24, 5, 11; t = 3.86, p < 0.001). Significant activity also arose in the right dorsal putamen
(peak coordinates: 21, 2, 14; t = 3.83, p < 0.001) and right nucleus accumbens (peak coordinates: 12, 11, 10; t = 4.40, p < 0.001). B) BOLD signal for ON minus OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events across all
blocks in Phase 2. The cross-hairs are centred on the significant activity that arose in the right dorsal caudate
(peak coordinates: -12, 11, 14; t = 3.68, p < 0.001). Significant activity also occurred in the left dorsal caudate
(peak coordinates: 6, 2, 20; t = 3.45, p < 0.001). C) BOLD signal for OFF minus ON Feedback Events across
all blocks in the Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the significant cluster in the left ventral putamen
(peak coordinates: 21, 5, -1; t = 3.41, p < 0.001). D) BOLD signal for OFF minus ON correct minus incorrect
Feedback Events across all blocks in Phase 1. The cross-hairs are centred on the cluster of activation in the
left ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -21, 20, -1; t = 3.15, p = 0.001). N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response
Decision Events and FB – Feedback Events in the figure.

2.3.2.5

Healthy control: ON versus OFF sessions

There was no preferential activity in the striatum in any contrasts comparing OFF and ON
sessions in healthy controls. This is as expected given that healthy control participants did
not actually receive dopaminergic therapy in any condition and their data were simply
analyzed to correspond to the OFF-ON state of the PD patient to whom they were matched.
Table 2.6 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for healthy controls in
the OFF versus ON groups
Contrast
Phase 1: SR Events
OFF minus ON SR events
ON minus OFF SR events
Phase 2: SR Events
OFF minus ON SR events
ON minus OFF SR events
Phase 1: FB Events
OFF minus ON FB events
ON minus OFF FB events
OFF minus ON Correct
minus Incorrect FB events
ON minus OFF Correct
minus Incorrect FB events

Anatomical
Area

Cluster
Size

t

No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations

q*

x, y, z

89

Cluster size is reported in voxels. p values are reported at a significance level of p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons. p values are reported at the voxel level. Coordinates are reported in MNI space.
Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast. **Cluster size unobtainable as peak
coordinates are within a larger cluster. N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback
Events.

2.3.2.6

PD versus controls

OFF Stimulus-Response Decision Events: Contrasting PD minus control revealed no
significant striatal activity in Phases 1 or 2. However, in the control minus PD contrast,
controls exhibited significantly greater activation in the right dorsal caudate nucleus (peak
coordinates: 6, 5, 5; t=3.21, p<0.001) than PD patients who were in the OFF state in Phase
1. No significant activity arose in Phase 2 comparing control and PD participants.
ON Stimulus-Response Decision Events: When PD patients were corrected with exogenous
dopaminergic therapy in the ON Session, no significant striatal activity arose in the PD
minus control or control minus PD contrasts. In Phase 2, in fact, significantly greater
activation arose in the left (peak coordinates: -12, 11, 17; t=3.75, p<0.001) and right dorsal
caudate nuclei (peak coordinates: 6, 5, 20; t=3.35, p<0.001) for PD patients relative to
healthy age-matched controls. Recall that age-matched controls did not actually receive
dopaminergic therapy and rather their data were simply analyzed to correspond to the
dopaminergic state of the PD patient to whom they were matched. No significant striatal
activity occurred in the reverse contrast (i.e., control minus PD).
OFF Feedback Events: No significant striatal activity arose for OFF sessions in the PD
minus control contrast. A significant cluster arose in the left ventral caudate (peak
coordinates: -18, 23, -1; t=3.66, p<0.001) in the control minus PD contrast.
ON Feedback Events: Contrasting PD minus control revealed no significant striatal
activity. However, in the control minus PD contrast, significant activity arose in the left
ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -18, 5, -1; t=2.31, p=0.001).

90

Table 2.7 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest for patients with PD
versus control participants OFF and ON dopaminergic medication reported in MNI
space.
Contrast
Phase 1: SR Events
PD OFF minus control OFF
control OFF minus PD OFF
PD ON minus control ON
control ON minus PD ON
Phase 2: SR Events
PD OFF minus control OFF
control OFF minus PD OFF
PD ON minus control ON
control ON minus PD ON
Phase 1: FB Events
PD OFF minus control OFF
control OFF minus PD OFF
PD ON minus control ON
control ON minus PD ON

Anatomical
Area

Cluster
Size

t

No suprathreshold activations
Right dorsal
2
3.21
caudate
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
Left dorsal
8
3.75
caudate
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
Left ventral
29
3.66
caudate
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations

p*

x, y, z

0.001

6, 5, 5

<0.001

-12, 11, 17

<0.001

-18, 23, -1

Cluster size is reported in voxels. p values are reported at a significance level of at p ≤ 0.001 uncorrected at
the voxel level. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in
each contrast. N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.

2.4 Discussion
In both Phases 1 and 2 across Sessions 1 and 2, we found that DS activity correlated
preferentially with Stimulus-Response Decision Events and not with Feedback Events. It
is notable that feedback-based learning was precluded by the omission of feedback in Phase
2. DS activation persisted in Phase 2 nonetheless, further casting doubt on DS’s role in
feedback-based learning. We also found that beta values in DS ROIs (i.e., left dorsal
caudate in the PD group; left dorsal putamen in the healthy controls) in Phase 2 correlated
with the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections (i.e., Adjusted Savings Score),
intended as our behavioural measure of decision making. Most significant, given our aim
of critically testing DS’s role in stimulus-response learning, intensity of activation in DS

91

ROIs did not correlate with our behavioural measure of learning efficiency in either the PD
or control group. These results implicate DS in stimulus-specific response decisions
entirely replicating our main finding in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), in which we
used this paradigm in healthy young controls.
In contrast, in Phase 1 only, VS was preferentially activated during correct relative to
incorrect Feedback Events. The Feedback Event in each trial is the moment during which
learning stimulus-response relations occurs through deterministic outcome information.
Further, we found that beta values in a VS ROI (i.e., right ventral caudate in the PD group)
correlated significantly with Learning Slope, our measure of learning efficiency but not
with Adjusted-Savings Score, our measure of decision accuracy. These findings support a
role for VS in stimulus-response association learning also replicating our results with
healthy young controls in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014).
In agreement with our frequentist behavioural and fMRI analyses presented above, using
Bayesian analyses we found that in both PD patients and healthy controls investigated
separately, activation in DS ROIs correlated significantly with Stimulus-Response
Decision Events in both Phases 1 and 2 of the experiment. In contrast and of critical
importance given the main aim of our study, with Bayesian analysis, we confirmed that
activation in DS ROIs was not significantly associated with stimulus-response association
learning during Feedback events (i.e., the null hypothesis was supported). VS ROI beta
values were significant during the Feedback event using Bayesian analyses concordant
with our other investigations in suggesting that the VS mediates stimulus-response
association learning through feedback.
Strongly supporting these distinct cognitive roles for DS and VS, PD patients evidenced
impaired response-selection performance, using the Adjusted-Savings Score, off
medication, which was normalized by dopaminergic therapy. Conversely, efficiency of
learning stimulus-response associations, assessed by our slope of learning measure, was
equivalent for PD patients and healthy controls, off dopaminergic medication. However,
the slope of learning was worsened by dopaminergic medication in our PD group. Recall
that in PD, DS is dopamine depleted and its functions are impaired in the OFF state. DS
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functions are remediated by dopaminergic therapy. In contrast, VTA-innervated brain
areas such as VS are relatively dopamine replete and their functions are normal at baseline.
Their functions are actually worsened due to dopamine overdose in the ON state (Cools,
2006). Entirely confirming our interpretation of the behavioural patterns, DS signal
associated with the Stimulus-Response Decision Event was enhanced by dopaminergic
medications in PD patients using within-subject contrasts. In contrast, Feedback Eventrelated VS signal was depressed by exogenous dopamine therapy (i.e., dopamine overdose
effect).
In contrast to our findings in PD, for healthy controls who did not actually receive
dopaminergic therapy but whose data were analyzed to correspond to the ON-OFF order
of the PD patients to whom they were matched, there were no response-selection accuracy
or learning efficiency differences, or differential patterns of fMRI activity comparing the
ON versus OFF sessions, as expected. These findings in controls suggest that differences
observed for PD patients were not the result of order, practice, or stimulus effects across
the OFF and ON sessions.
Bolstering our within-subject patterns in PD, between-group comparisons revealed that DS
activation in PD patients was reduced relative to DS activation in healthy age-matched
controls in the OFF state during Stimulus-Response Decision Events. DS activation
between PD and healthy controls was equivalent, however, in the ON Sessions, once PD
patients were medicated with dopaminergic therapy. Further, VS, but not DS, activation
was decreased for PD patients relative to healthy controls in the ON Session in the exact
region (i.e., left ventral putamen) where dopaminergic therapy attenuated VS activation in
the PD OFF-ON contrast, consistent with the dopamine overdose hypothesis.

2.4.1 Cognitive functions mediated by striatum
The striatum mediates cognitive functions (Atallah et al., 2007; Alex A. MacDonald et al.,
2014) in addition to its better-known role in motor control. We independently assessed
response-selection decisions and stimulus-response learning, using behavioural measures
and distinct fMRI events. We aimed to disentangle neural substrates specifically mediating
these different cognitive processes. DS activation correlated with stimulus-response
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decisions whereas VS signal arose preferentially during delivery of feedback through
which stimulus-response associations were learned. This entirely replicates our results in
healthy, young individuals (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014). Beyond correlational
evidence, however, in PD patients, we found clear double dissociations in DS- and VSmediated behaviour and preferential neural activity contrasting the OFF and ON
dopaminergic therapy states.

PD patients demonstrated enhanced stimulus-specific

response-selection accuracy and DS activity during Stimulus-Response Decision Events,
compared to attenuated stimulus-response association learning and VS activation during
Feedback Events, on relative to off dopaminergic therapy. This pattern of results provides
strong support for the concept that DS mediates response-selection decisions and not
learning─ the latter being mediated by VS rather.
Our results are completely at odds with the large literature attributing feedback-based
learning to DS (Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Yin
& Knowlton, 2006). A potential explanation for the long-standing association of DS with
stimulus-response association learning, despite increasing numbers of contradictory results
(Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008; Ohira et al., 2010; Reiss et al.,
2005), relates to the common confounding of learning and decision-making processes
(Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004). In behavioural studies, learning is
generally measured by the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections that are
provided as evidence that learning has occurred. Poor performance therefore could be the
result of failing either to learn stimulus-response associations or to correctly select
responses based on these learned associations. In fMRI studies, a) enacting a response
when presented with a stimulus, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated as a
single event with all significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se
(Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack et al., 1999). By
separately assessing response-selection decisions and learning, our approach aimed to
resolve the discrepancy between studies that involve DS in feedback-based learning
(Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2004) versus those in PD patients
(Swainson et al., 2000; Vo et al., 2014), and participants with DS lesions (Ell, Marchant,
& Ivry, 2006; Exner et al., 2002) that dispute the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response
learning.
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Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS in decision making
rather than learning per se. In neuroimaging studies, DS activity consistently remains
significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005), categorization
rules (Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, &
Anderson, 2010), stimulus–reward (Daw & Doya, 2006; Seger et al., 2010), and response–
reward associations (Ohira et al., 2010) are well learned. Additionally, DS frequently
correlates with response selections, particularly when an element of deliberation is required
(N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017), even in contexts devoid of new
learning (Grahn et al., 2008), such as in the Stroop task (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, &
Price, 2010), and in making numeric magnitude judgments (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011).
This activation profile is inconsistent with a brain region mediating learning per se and is
more in line with one that underlies decisions.
Our results, in contrast suggest that VS mediates learning stimulus-response associations.
Replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), VS signal occurred
specifically during the Feedback Event and correlated with efficiency of learning assessed
with slope measure. Further, learning efficiency and VS activation were reduced for PD
patients on relative to off dopaminergic therapy, suggesting that VS, a VTA-innervated
structure, was overdosed by exogenous dopamine. This result fits with the larger literature
implicating VS in forms of implicit learning, such as reward (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells,
& Munte, 2010), stimulus-stimulus (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011), sequence (Ghilardi et
al., 2007), motor sequence (Feigin et al., 2003), and category learning (Shohamy, Myers,
Geghman, Sage, & Gluck, 2006).

2.4.2 Effect of dopaminergic therapy on cognition in PD
The notion that abnormalities in dopamine across different brain regions cause cognitive
as well as motor symptoms in PD has long been considered (Brown & Marsden, 1984;
Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 1988). Cognitive functions mediated by SNc-innervated
brain regions such as the DS are expected to be improved by dopaminergic therapy,
whereas the opposite pattern is expected for VTA-supplied brain regions such as VS in PD.
This is due to different rates and degrees of degeneration of dopamine-producing neurons
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in SNc and VTA in PD. This theoretical framework successfully explains complex
behavioural patterns in PD (Cools, 2006; Vaillancourt, Schonfeld, Kwak, Bohnen, &
Seidler, 2013). This framework is prevalent and effectively accounts for behavioural
patterns across a large number of PD studies (Cools, 2006; Dirnberger & Jahanshahi, 2013;
Vaillancourt et al., 2013). Studies that fully support these concepts in a single experiment
are lacking, however.

Here, we provide direct support for this framework for

understanding cognitive patterns in PD. We show for the first time that dopaminergic
therapy simultaneously a) improved DS-mediated response selection and boosted DS
signal and b) impaired VS-mediated stimulus-response learning and attenuated VS activity.
Though previous investigations provide evidence of improved DS function and increased
DS activity (Aarts et al., 2014) or impaired functions mediated by VTA-innervation brain
regions and corresponding reduced signal (Aarts et al., 2014; Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker,
& Robbins, 2007; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; Van Eimeren et al.,
2009), none have provided evidence of these simultaneous and opposite effects within the
same participants, though a number of studies aimed to do so (Aarts et al., 2014; Argyelan
et al., 2008; Shiner et al., 2012; Van Eimeren et al., 2009).

2.4.3 Conclusions
Our findings dispute the prevalent notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning. We
showed that DS mediates response selections whereas VS underlies feedback-based
learning in PD patients and healthy age-matched controls. This study provides strong
support for the view that DS has been erroneously ascribed a role in feedback-based,
stimulus-response learning due to methodology that confounds learning and responseselection processes. Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for
DS in decision performance rather than learning per se.
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Chapter 3

3

Role of baseline dorsal and ventral striatum activity in
stimulus-response learning in patients with obsessive
compulsive disorder
Dorsal striatum (DS) has long been implicated in stimulus-response learning, though recent
results challenge this notion. We have proposed that discrepant findings arise because
stimulus-response learning methodology generally confounds learning and response
selection processes. We implement a design that allows DS and ventral striatum (VS) to
be assessed within the same experimental paradigm, with these conditions interleaved with
one another.

Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a prevalent psychiatric disorder

characterized by obsessions and compulsions. Studies investigating symptomatology and
cognitive deficits in OCD frequently implicate the DS and VS. The main aim of this study
was to dissociate the roles of DS and VS in decision making and stimulus-response learning
in patients with OCD to a) better clarify DS and VS function, as well as b) understand how
DS and VS dysfunction might lead to characteristic symptoms. We found that patients
with OCD (n=14) and healthy age-matched controls (n=15) exhibited decision making
deficits and learned associations slower compared to controls.

Along with these

behavioural deficits, OCD patients had reduced task-relevant activity in DS and VS,
compared to controls. In healthy controls, activity in DS arose during response selection
and correlated with our measure of decision making and not learning, however. When rest
activity was separately investigated, no differences were noted in DS but activity in VS
was significantly higher in patients with OCD compared to controls. Additionally, the
level of activity in VS negatively correlated with the severity of compulsions in patients
with OCD. OCD patients with higher baseline VS activity had less severe compulsions,
potentially because tension-reduction related to compulsion-enactment could not be
encoded as rewarding when VS was chronically hyperactive. This study suggests that DS
does not mediate stimulus-response learning and sheds light on the cognitive deficits and
symptoms experienced by patients with OCD.
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3.1 Introduction
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder prevalent in 1.2% of
American adults and is described by the National Institute of Mental Health as typically
chronic with a gradual onset (Association, 2013; Sasson et al., 1997). OCD is characterized
by two major symptoms: obsessions and compulsions (Association, 2013; Sasson et al.,
1997). The former is defined as disturbing thoughts, urges, or impulses, and the latter as
recurring behaviours or mental acts that individuals affected by the disorder feel driven to
perform (Association, 2013).
Patients with this disorder exhibit diversity in severity, however, the symptoms tend to
follow a general order: obsessive thoughts, anxiety, compulsions, and temporary relief with
reduction in anxiety (Association, 2013; Sasson et al., 1997). For example, with respect to
sanitization, patients may have an irrational fear of being contaminated by germs, resulting
in illness or death (Bokor & Anderson, 2014; Mataix-Cols et al., 2004). Anxiety often
ensues and patients feel driven to carry out certain tasks to reduce their distress. The
individual may wash or clean repetitively until a “feeling” of cleanliness is achieved,
whereas a typical individual may wash until observing that they are clean. Completion of
the respective compulsions result in temporary relief and the cycle repeats. Patients spend
a substantial amount of time with their obsessions and carrying out compulsions, and this
can be costly to maintaining jobs and relationships (Torres et al., 2015).
The basal ganglia, a group of subcortical nuclei, is commonly known to be impaired in
movement disorders (i.e., Parkinson’s disease). However, the striatum, the input region of
the basal ganglia, is increasingly implicated in cognitive functions (Gotham, Brown, &
Marsden, 1988; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).

The striatum can be divided

functionally into two regions, the dorsal and ventral striatum (DS and VS, respectively),
based on independent dopaminergic and glutamatergic inputs, vascular supplies, and
functions (Feekes & Cassell, 2006; Kish, Shannak, & Hornykiewicz, 1988; Tziortzi et al.,
2014). DS encompasses the majority of the caudate nucleus and putamen, and VS is
comprised of the NAcc and ventral regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen (P. A.
MacDonald & Monchi, 2011).
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The view that DS is critical for stimulus-response learning, is well-entrenched (Brovelli,
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; Chiu, Jiang, & Egner, 2017; Thompson RL, 1963;
Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Despite the prevalence of this view, learning is often preserved
in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert, Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, &
MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014) and animals (Atallah,
Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with DS dysfunction.
Potentially underlying the discrepancies in the stimulus-response learning literature,
response selection decisions and learning are often intrinsically confounded (Jessup &
O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004). In stimulus-response learning experiments,
trials generally proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants perform a
response, and b) feedback regarding response accuracy is provided. Feedback is the means
through which stimulus-response associations are learned. Accuracy in selecting a learned
response provides the learning measure. Performance depends upon both decision and
learning processes. Failing either to acquire stimulus-response relations or to correctly
select learned responses produces impaired performance. Further, in fMRI studies, a)
deciding upon and enacting a response, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated
as a single event with all significantly activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning
per se (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).
Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie response selection could erroneously
be assigned a role in learning. The objective of the current study was to directly test this
confound in patients with OCD, using a stimulus-response learning paradigm previously
shown to separate decisions and learning, producing differential patterns of activity in DS
and VS (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).
Notably, a number of studies have observed striatal changes in patients with OCD. It has
been found that the VS in patients with OCD has a higher metabolism compared to controls
at rest (Del Casale et al., 2011; Menzies et al., 2008), as well as in response to symptomprovoking stimuli using PET (Rauch, Jenike, Alpert, & et al., 1994). Interestingly, despite
this baseline increase in activity, during VS-mediated reward-anticipation tasks, Figee et
al. (2011) reported a decreased change in VS activity in patients with OCD compared to
controls.
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In contrast, patients with OCD were found to exhibit decreased DS activity at rest and
during DS-mediated tasks (Del Casale et al., 2011). Nakao et al. (2005) conducted a
colour-word Stroop task, where colour words (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), are presented in font
colours that are either congruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green), or
incongruent with the colour word (i.e., Red, Blue, Green). Patients with OCD and healthy
controls were instructed to name the colour of the font, rather than read the colour word
while brain activity was simultaneously recorded using fMRI. Patients with OCD took
longer to complete the Stroop task and did not exhibit significant activity in DS, as did the
healthy controls. In this task, the role of DS has been shown to mediate inhibiting the
response that is more salient (colour word) and outputting the visual, font colour
information (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; Coderre & van Heuven, 2013;
Djamshidian, O'Sullivan, Lees, & Averbeck, 2011; Fera et al., 2007; Larson, Clayson,
Primosch, Leyton, & Steffensen, 2015; C. M. MacLeod, 1991; C. M. MacLeod &
MacDonald, 2000; Nakao et al., 2005; Wright & Wanley, 2003). DS deficits in patients
with OCD result in poor cognitive flexibility and response inhibition that may lead to
compulsive actions.
If DS mediates stimulus-response learning, it is predicted that a) DS activity will correlate
with learning measures and with the moment when stimulus-response association learning
occurs (i.e., the Feedback Event, when outcome information regarding response accuracy
is provided), and b) learning will be diminished in patients with OCD and related to reduced
DS activity compared to controls.
In contrast, if DS mediates stimulus-response decision performance and VS mediates
stimulus-response association learning, as we expect, a) DS activity will correlate with
accuracy of decision performance and with the moment when response selection occurs
(i.e., the Stimulus-Response Decision Event), and b) accuracy of stimulus-specific
decisions and DS signal will be poorer in patients with OCD compared to controls. Further,
we predict that a) VS activity will correlate with learning measures and with the moment
of learning during the Feedback Event, and b) efficiency of learning and VS task-related
signal (i.e., processing of feedback through which stimulus-response associations are
learned) will be deminished in patients with OCD compared to controls.
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In turn, this task further allowed us to explore cognitive deficits in patients with OCD,
relating them to the DS and VS in particular, as well as other brain regions that might
cooperate with these striatal regions. Further, we planned to explore how striatal signals
related to symptoms of OCD.

3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1 Participants
Fourteen patients with OCD and 15 control participants completed the experiment. All
patients with OCD were previously diagnosed by a licenced psychiatrist. All participants
had no confounding neurological or psychiatric disorders. Patients abusing alcohol,
prescription or street drugs, or taking cognitive-enhancing medications like donepezil,
galantamine, rivastigmine, memantine, or methylphenidate were excluded from
participating.
Mean group demographic, as well as cognitive and affective screen scores for all patients
and controls were recorded (Table 3.1). The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale
(YBOCS) was administered to patients with OCD to quantify the presence and severity of
obsessive and compulsive symptoms. The YBOCS is scored yielding a total OCD severity
score, an obsession sub-score and a compulsive sub-score.

3.2.2 Experimental Design
Each participant completed a stimulus-response task in which they learned to associate
twelve abstract images with one of three button-press responses. These images, shown in
Figure 3.1, were computer-generated with GroBoto (Braid Art Labs, Colorado Springs,
USA). The task was administered within a 3 Tesla fMRI scanner to observe concurrent
regional activity within the striatum.
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Figure 3.1 Abstract images presented in the experiment.
Images were associated with a button pressed by the index, middle, or ring finger buttons.

Figure 3.2 demonstrates an example of an experimental trial. Each trial consisted of an
abstract image being presented in the centre of a projection screen until a response was
selected. The participant chose one of the three button-press options. Feedback regarding
accuracy of the response (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) was provided. This provided the
basis for learning the stimulus-response associations between each abstract image and the
corresponding button-press response.
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Figure 3.2 Example of a single trial in the experiment.
Participants learned to associate six abstract images with one of three button-press responses in Phase 1.
The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for 500 ms;
(ii) a blank screen occurred for 500 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the projection
screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from
an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e.,
‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time
sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).

Trials were organized into five blocks. Each block was comprised of 24 trials–with each
abstract image randomly appearing twice within each block. After each block, a percentage
score was displayed–indicative of their performance.
There were four buttons on the button box. Each of the second, third, and fourth buttons
corresponded to four abstract images. Participants pressed these three buttons with their
index, middle, and ring fingers, respectively. The first button, pressed by the thumb, served
to advance from the feedback phase to the next trial. Therefore, motor responses were
included in both decision-making and feedback phases.
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Trials proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen for
700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented until
a button-press response was made; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of
time ; (v) feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen
appeared until the participant pressed the first button with his/her thumb to proceed to the
next trial; (vii) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time.
The inter-stimulus interval (ISI), the period between the response selection and feedback,
and the inter-trial interval (ITI), the duration between the offset of feedback and the onset
of the following trial, were jittered. These intervals varied in duration and the length of
time was sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms;
maximum: 7000 ms).
These variable intervals served to distinguish two independent events within each trial: the
Stimulus-Response Decision event and the Feedback event (Figure 3.2). As previously
discussed, the Stimulus-Response Decision event consisted of exposure to the abstract
image until a button-press response was selected.

The Feedback or learning event

consisted of the duration in which feedback was provided. In addition to distinguishing
between Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback events, Rest events will serve as
establishing baseline activity.

3.2.3 Behavioural Data Analysis
In each block, each stimulus was presented twice. Comparing response times (RT) for
accurately-performed first presentation of stimuli in the final block of the session (i.e.,
Block 5), with RT for accurately-performed second presentations of stimuli in the second
to last block of the session (i.e., Block 4), provided our measure of stimulus-response
decision performance that was free from new feedback-based learning. Independent t-tests
were conducted on Final Block RT Change Scores between OCD patients and Controls.
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Response accuracy (%) was recorded for each block and the slope was calculated across
all five blocks to operationalize the rate at which participants learned the stimulus-response
associations across all five blocks. Block 0 was included in the calculation with a value of
zero, as participants are assumed to have no prior learned association between the abstract
images and the correct button-press responses. The equation used to calculate slope was
the standard slope of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel, 2017):

b=

∑(x − x )(y − y )
∑(x − x )
2

where b is the slope, and x and y are the sample means of the number of blocks and block
scores, respectively. Statistical analysis involving an independent unpaired Student’s t-Test
for slope of learning scores between OCD patients and healthy controls.

3.2.4 Imaging Acquisition
FMRI data were collected in a 3T Siemens Magnetom Prisma with Total Imaging Matrix
MRI at Robarts Research Institute at the University of Western Ontario. A scout image
was taken to properly orient the participant and T1 for anatomical localization. Five runs
of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions were completed, each consisting of one block with
24 trials. Each run lasted approximately 5 minutes. A whole brain image was taken every
2.5 s, each consisting of 43, 2.5 mm-thick slices. The field of view was oriented along the
anterior and posterior commissure of the brain with a matrix of 88 x 88 pixels. Each
isotropic voxel size was 2.5×2.5×2.5 mm3. The echo time was 30 ms and the flip angle
was 90˚.

3.2.5 FMRI Data Analysis
Statistical Parametric Mapping version 12 (SPM12; Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) was used in conjunction with Matrix Laboratory
(MATLAB, Mathworks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States) to complete fMRI
analysis. The scans were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially
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normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with
an 8 mm full-width, half maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0056 Hz).
Fixed-effect analyses were input into SPM12 to model each participant’s data. Regressors
were generated by convolving onsets and durations of Stimulus-Response Decision,
Feedback, and Rest (i.e., ITI) events with the canonical hemodynamic response function.
The Stimulus-Response Decision event was demarcated as the time between onset of
abstract image presentation and button-press response, the Feedback event as the time
between onset of feedback, lasting 1000 ms, including until the participant pressed the first
button to proceed to the next trial. As a result, participant motor response occurred in both
Stimulus-Response Decision and Feedback events. A general linear model, or GLM, was
created and included the regressors for the Stimulus-Response Decision, Feedback, and
Rest events. The GLM examined regional blood-oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD)
activity associated with these events. A second GLM was created modelling only Rest
events, both ISI and ITI events to investigate baseline activity.

Several studies

investigating baseline activity in patients with OCD have found hypoactive DS and
hyperactive VS compared to controls. The Rest events here were modelled to investigate
this further and determine if baseline activity correlated with behavioural or clinical
measures, including YBOCS.
The Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL
v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom) was used to define striatal
regions. MNI space was used as an x, y, and z coordinate system to delineate each region.
The VS was defined as z < 2 in MNI space, including the nucleus accumbens and the
ventral portion of the caudate nucleus and putamen (Postuma & Dagher, 2006). The DS
was defined as z ≥ 2 in MNI space, consisting of the bulk of the caudate nucleus and
putamen (Postuma & Dagher, 2006).
Contrast models were created to examine differences in VS and DS activity, as well as in
other brain regions, between the OCD and control groups during different events in the
stimulus-response task. The following contrasts of interest were analyzed: (i) StimulusResponse Decision events minus Rest (i.e., ITI interval) collapsed across Group (OCD and
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control); (ii) Feedback events minus Rest collapsed across Group (OCD and control); (iii)
Stimulus-Response Decision events for the OCD group minus for the control group; (iv)
Feedback events for the OCD group minus for the control group; (v) Rest events for OCD
minus for control; and (vi) Rest events for control minus for OCD Rest events. Contrast
images were examined at the group level in SPM12 for Stimulus-Response Decision,
Feedback, and Rest events in a separate model. A secondary analysis was performed
correlating behavioural and clinical data analysis with BOLD analysis during StimulusResponse Decision, and Feedback events for the OCD and control groups.

3.2.6 Correlation Analysis
Next, we investigated brain-behaviour correlations to confirm that behavioural
performance was related to DS versus VS activity patterns. We tested whether BOLD
signal in striatal regions correlated with behavioural indices of response selection decisions
and learning respectively. Specifically, we tested whether activity in two anatomical DS
ROIs consisting of regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen above z=2, and two VS
ROIs, consisting of the NAcc and regions of the caudate nucleus and putamen ventral to
z=2 were correlated with Final Block RT Change (i.e., our measure of response-selection
decisions), and with Learning Slope (i.e., our measure of learning efficiency). Correlations
were performed separately for OCD and healthy control groups in the event that learning
and response selection performance differed across groups. The two DS and VS ROIs
were employed for the correlation analysis in the present study using the MarsBar Toolbox
in SPM12 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). Beta values in our ROIs were
extracted from four contrasts of interest: (i) Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus
Rest for patients with OCD; (ii) Feedback Events minus Rest for patients with OCD; (iii)
Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest for healthy controls; and (iv) Feedback
Events minus Rest for healthy controls. These average beta values for each ROI were
correlated with behavioural measures of stimulus-specific response selection (i.e., the Final
Block RT Change) and learning (i.e., Learning Slope) for each group separately.
Additionally, beta values were extracted for OCD patients from the rest model and the
experimental model described above to investigate whether baseline activity levels
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correlated with OCD symptoms. Specifically, the two DS and VS ROIs were correlated
with YBOCS-total, YBOCS-obsession, and YBOCS-compulsion scores, independently.

3.3 Results
3.3.1 Behavioural data
Demographic, affective, cognitive, and clinical data are presented in Table 3.1 and
behavioural data are presented in Table 3.2.

3.3.1.1

Demographic, affective, cognitive, and clinical data

The mean (SEM) ages of the patient and control groups were 26.07 (1.65) and 24.50 (0.68),
respectively. The mean (SEM) education levels of the patient and control groups were
16.93 (0.66) and 17.55 (0.45), respectively. There were no significant demographic
differences between OCD and control participants (Table 3.1) in demographic or cognitive
data. Participants with OCD scored significantly higher on Beck Depression Inventory II,
Beck Anxiety Inventory, and Oxford Happiness Questionnaire compared to controls, as
would be expected given the nature of OCD. YBOCS was administered to OCD patients
only. Again the YBOCS measures the presence and severity of obsessive compulsive
symptoms. The scale yields a total score as well as a sub-score for obsessions and
compulsions, although only the total score is interpreted clinically. The current OCD
cohort had a mean total score of 18 which suggests moderately severe OCD (Goodman,
Price, & Rasmussen, 1989). YBOCS total scores ranged from 8 (mild OCD) to 26 (severe
OCD), suggesting a wide range OCD severity (Goodman et al., 1989).
Table 3.1 Health and demographic information for participants in the OCD and
control groups.
Number of participants
Age
Education level

OCD
14
26.07 (1.65)
16.92 (0.65)

Control
16
24.50 (0.68)
17.54 (0.45)

p value
–
0.39
0.48

YBOCS – Total Score

18.00 (1.59)

–

–
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YBOCS–Obsession sub-score

9.71 (0.85)

–

–

YBOCS–Compulsion sub-score
BDI-II
BAI
SAS
ANART
Epworth Sleepiness Scale
Oxford Happiness score
BIS-11
MoCA

8.29 (1.08)
11.64 (2.54)
9.14 (1.44)
9.86 (1.25)
121.67 (1.85)
8.21 (1.30)
3.79 (0.17)
58.36 (2.64)
27.86 (0.49)

–
4.00 (0.95)
3.00 (0.89)
8.91 (0.96)
120.88 (1.45)
5.54 (0.67)
5.08 (0.14)
56.54 (3.75)
28.82 (0.40)

–
0.01*
0.002*
0.58
0.76
0.10
0.00002*
0.73
0.17

Values are presented as group means and standard error of the mean (SEM) in braces. ANART – National
Adult Reading Test IQ Estimation; MOCA – Montreal Cognitive Assessment total score out of 30; BDI-II– Beck
Depression Inventory II; BAI – Beck Anxiety Inventory; BIS-11 – Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; SAS – Starkstein
Apathy Scale; YBOCS – Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. *indicates statistical significance (p<0.05).

3.3.1.2

Measure of Decision making efficiency

Stimulus-response decision making was assessed using a difference score between the
mean RT of the first presentation of each of the stimuli that were associated with correct
responses of Block 5 and the mean RT of the second presentation of each of the stimuli
that were associated with correct responses of Block 4. As the participant progresses
through the blocks, associations become better learned and decision making requires less
and less deliberation, measured by progressively shorter RTs across blocks. Consequently,
intact decision making should result in a negative Final Block RT Change Score because
the mean RT in the first presentation of Block 5 should be faster than the mean RT in the
second presentation of Block 4. We found significantly less improvement in Block 5 RT
relative to Block 4 RT for OCD patients compared to controls (t=1.90, p=0.033; Figure
3.3A). In fact, the score was positive for OCD patients, meaning that they slowed down in
Block 5 relative to Block 4, whereas controls had the expected speeding up of RT,
characteristic of a decision that required lesser deliberation.
It is important to note that mean RT and accuracy in the final block did not differ
significantly between OCD patients and controls (Final Block Mean RT: t=0.53, p=0.701;
Final Block Mean Accuracy: t=0.76, p=0.226).

115

Table 3.2 Behavioural measures for patients with OCD and control participants.

OCD
Control

Final Block
Accuracy (%)
76.20
(5.74)
84.72
(3.72)

Final Block
Mean RT (ms)
1316.72
(138.10)
1251.05
(97.84)

Final Block RT
Change (ms)
153.74
(91.87)
-190.06
(123.16)

Slope of
Learning
0.085
(0.015)
0.132
(0.016)

Values are presented as group means and SEM in braces. Final Block RT Change is a difference score
between the mean RT of the first presentation of each of the stimuli that were associated with correct
responses of Block 5 and the mean RT of the second presentation of each of the stimuli that were
associated with correct responses of Block 4. Slope of Learning was calculated using the linear regression
function in Microsoft Excel (2011).

3.3.1.3

Measure of stimulus-response association learning

Efficiency of stimulus-response association learning was estimated using the slope of
accuracy change over five blocks of stimulus-response trials. Slope was calculated using
the linear regression function in Microsoft Excel (2011). An independent sample t-test on
slopes of learning was conducted between OCD and control participants. We found
significantly slower learning in patients with OCD compared to control participants
(t=2.53, p=0.008; Figure 3.3B).

Figure 3.3 Behavioural Data in Patients with OCD and Healthy Controls.
A) Final Block RT Change was our measure of decision making efficiency. It was calculated by subtracting
the mean RT for correct events of the first presentation of the stimuli in Block 5 from the mean RT for correct
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evens of the second presentation of the stimuli in Block 4. We found significantly less improvement in Block
5 RT relative to Block 4 RT for OCD patients compared to controls (t=1.90, p=0.033; Figure 3.3A). B) Slope
of learning served as a measurement of learning efficiency. To reiterate, slope was calculated using the block
accuracy scores over five blocks using the slope of the linear regression function (Microsoft Excel 2011).
Slope of learning was significantly slower in OCD patients compared to healthy controls. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean. * p<0.05.

3.3.2 FMRI data
Significant activations in contrasts of interest are presented in Tables 3.3-5 and Figures
3.4-6. Contrasts are reported at a significance level of p<0.05 FWE, unless otherwise
indicated.

3.3.2.1

Groups collapsed

Stimulus-Response Decision events: Significant activity arose in the right dorsal caudate in
the Stimulus-Response Decision relative to Rest contrast (peak coordinates: 12, 5, 2;
t=4.55, p=0.030 FWE).
Feedback learning events: Significant activity in the VS arose in the left ventral putamen
in the Feedback Events minus Rest contrast (peak coordinates: -30, -7, -1; t=4.42, p=0.048
FWE).
Table 3.3 Significant brain activations in contrasts of interest collapsed across Group
(OCD and control) reported in MNI space.
Contrast

Anatomical Area

SR minus Rest Right Dorsal Caudate
Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus
Left Insula
Right Insula
Right Primary Visual Cortex
Right Lateral Occipital
Complex
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus
Left Postcentral Gyrus
FB minus Rest Left Ventral Putamen
Right Cerebellum

Cluster
Size
2
1
2
2
2

t

pFWE

x, y, z

4.55
5.13
5.11
5.05
4.89

0.030
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.007

12, 5, 2
-48, -55, -13
-30, 20, -4
30, 23, -1
6, -82, -4

1
1
1

4.63
4.53
4.52

0.021
0.032
0.033

51, -49, -13
-33, 53, -1
-45, -28, 38

1
31

4.42
5.52

0.048
<0.001

-30, -7, -1
12, -49, -16
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Left Thalamus
Left Temporal Occipital
Fusiform Cortex
Right Pons
Right Midbrain

1

4.72

0.015

-15, -7, 8

1
1
1

4.68
4.56
4.56

0.018
0.028
0.028

-39, -58, -10
9, -31, -22
6, -28, -19

Cluster size is reported in voxels. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first
and highlighted in each contrast. N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.

3.3.2.2

OCD versus healthy controls

Stimulus-Response Decision events: Control minus OCD. Significant activity occurred in
the bilateral dorsal caudate nuclei (peak coordinates: 15, 2, 14; t=5.32, p=0.001 FWE, and
peak coordinates: -12, -1, 8; t=4.64, p=0.019 FWE; Figure 3.5A) in the control minus OCD
Stimulus-Response Decision events.

Figure 3.4 Significant activations in contrasts of interest comparing healthy controls and
patients with OCD.
Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons to allow for
visualization of activation in all contrasts. A) BOLD signal for healthy control minus OCD patients for StimulusResponse Decision Events minus Rest. Significant activity occurred in the bilateral dorsal caudate nuclei
(peak coordinates: 15, 2, 14; t=5.32, p=0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -12, -1, 8; t=4.64, p=0.019 FWE).
B) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus healthy controls for Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest.
No significant activity arose in the striatum. C) BOLD signal for healthy controls minus OCD patients for
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Feedback Events minus Rest. Significant activity arose in bilateral ventral putamina (peak coordinates: 30, 5,
-1; t=5.61, p<0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -27, 2, -1; t=5.05, p=0.004 FWE), as well as left dorsal
putamen (peak coordinates: -27, -1, 11; t=5.67, p<0.001 FWE). D) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus
healthy controls for Feedback Events minus Rest. No significant activity arose in the striatum. N.B. SR –
Stimulus-Response Decision Events and FB – Feedback Events in the figure.

Stimulus-Response Decision events: OCD minus control. No activity occurred in the
striatum at p<0.05 FWE, or even at the liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected when OCD
Stimulus-Response Decision events were contrasted with control events (Figure 3.5B).
Feedback events: control minus OCD. Significant activity arose in bilateral ventral
putamina (peak coordinates: 30, 5, -1; t=5.61, p<0.001 FWE, and peak coordinates: -27,
2, -1; t=5.05, p=0.004 FWE), as well as left dorsal putamen (peak coordinates: -27, -1, 11;
t=5.67, p<0.001 FWE) in the control minus OCD Feedback events contrast (Figure 3.5C).
Feedback events: OCD minus control. No activity occurred in the striatum at p<0.05 FWE,
or even at the liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected in the OCD minus control Feedback
events contrast (Figure 3.5D).
Table 3.4 Significant brain activations in patients with OCD versus healthy controls
in contrasts of interest reported in MNI space.
Contrast
SR Events
OCD minus
control

Anatomical Area
Left Lateral Occipital
Cortex
Right Cerebellum
Left Cerebellum

Control minus
Right Dorsal Caudate
OCD
Left Dorsal Caudate
Left Insular Cortex
Right Insular Cortex
Right Frontal Orbital
Cortex
Left Precentral Gyrus
Right Middle Frontal
Gyrus

Cluster
Size

t

pFWE

x, y, z

5

3.98

<0.001*

-36, -82, 8

16
11

3.97
3.62

<0.001*
<0.001*

3, -70, -10
-18, -52, -16

21

5.32

0.001

15, 2, 14

8
48
19

4.64
6.33
5.26

0.019
<0.001
0.001

-12, -1, 8
-30, 26, 5
33, 26, 2

9

4.97

0.005

42, 20, -7

9

4.93

0.006

-54, 5, 22

1

4.57

0.025

51, 23, 29
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FB Events
OCD minus
Right Cerebellum
control
Right Angular gyrus
Right Hippocampus
Right Middle Temporal
gyrus
Left Lateral Occipital
Cortex
Right Occipital Fusiform
gyrus
Left Cerebellum
Left Inferior Temporal
gyrus
Right Supramarginal gyrus
Right Amygdala
Right Inferior Temporal
gyrus
Left Superior Temporal
gyrus
Control minus
Right Ventral Putamen
OCD
Left Ventral Putamen
Left Dorsal Putamen
Left Lateral Occipital
Cortex
Right Lateral Occipital
Cortex
Right Occipital Pole
Left Postcentral gyrus
Left Supramarginal gyrus
Left Inferior Frontal gyrus
Left Inferior Temporal
gyrus
Left Supplementary Motor
Cortex
Right Inferior Temporal
gyrus

52

4.56

<0.001*

12, -46, -19

49
22

4.18
4.17

<0.001*
<0.001*

48, -46, 26
33, -25, -10

35

4.04

<0.001*

63, -43, 2

35

3.69

<0.001*

-48, -67, 8

6

3.67

<0.001*

39, -58, -7

7

3.55

<0.001*

-15, -55, -16

7

3.40

<0.001*

-39, -58, -1

1
1

3.18
3.16

0.001*
0.001*

51, -22, 32
27, -10, -13

1

3.15

0.001*

51, -19, -22

1

3.13

0.001*

-60, -22, -4

28

5.61

<0.001

30, 5, -1

**
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5.05
5.67

0.004
<0.001

-27, 2, -1
-27, -1, 11

56

5.81

<0.001

-42, -70, -4

5

5.17

0.002

-27, 5, 29

5
7
8
2

5.13
4.79
4.77
4.73

0.002
0.011
0.012
0.014

27, -91, -1
-57, -19, 26
-51, -31, 47
-54, 11, 5

2

4.67

0.018

-45, -49, -16

7

4.66

0.018

-3, 2, 56

2

4.50

0.034

45, -49, -13

Cluster size is reported in voxels. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first
and highlighted in each contrast. *Indicates a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected. **Cluster size unobtainable
as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster.
Feedback Events.

N.B. SR – Stimulus-Response Decision Events; FB –
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3.3.2.3

Rest-Only Model

Rest events control minus OCD: No activity in the striatum arose for the control minus
OCD Rest events contrast.

Figure 3.4 Significant activations in contrasts of interest involving Rest Events.
Activation maps are presented at a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons to allow for
visualization of activation in all contrasts. A) BOLD signal for healthy control minus OCD patients for Rest
Events. No activity arose in the striatum. B) BOLD signal for OCD patients minus healthy controls for Rest
Events. Significant activity arose in the right ventral putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 8, -7; t=3.62, p=0.001).

Rest events OCD minus control: No activity occurred at a threshold of p<0.05 FWE, but at
the more liberal threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected, activity arose in the right ventral
putamen (peak coordinates: 21, 8, -7; t=3.62, p=0.001).
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Table 3.5 Significant brain activations during Rest events in patients with OCD
versus healthy controls in contrasts of interest reported in MNI space.
Contrast

Anatomical Area

Rest events
OCD minus
Right Ventral Putamen
control
Left Central Operculum
Cortex
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Right Central Operculum
Cortex

Cluster
Size

t

pFWE

x, y, z

47

3.62

0.001*

21, 8, -7

54

4.85

<0.001*

-57, -4, 11

119

3.60

0.001*

0, 11, 62

46

3.38

0.001*

48, -10, 14

Control minus No suprathreshold
OCD
activations
Cluster size is reported in voxels. Coordinates are reported in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first
and highlighted in each contrast. *Indicates a threshold of p<0.001 uncorrected. N.B. SR – StimulusResponse Decision Events; FB – Feedback Events.

3.3.2.4

Brain-behaviour Correlations: OCD and controls separately

One right and left ROI encompassing the entirety of the VS and one right and left DS ROI
encompassing the entirety of the DS were employed. Beta values for the four ROIs were
extracted separately from Stimulus-Response Decision events, Feedback events, and Rest
events. BOLD signal in these ROIs was correlated with behavioural measures for OCD
patients and controls separately. We expected that baseline DS and VS neural activity
might correlate with disease severity given previous findings of DS hypoactivity an VS
hyperactivity in OCD. Therefore, we correlated measures of disease severity with beta
values extracted from DS and VS ROIs. Specifically, YBOCS total score and YBOCS
sub-scores of OCD patients were correlated with BOLD signal in these ROIs with beta
values extracted from the Rest-only model.

3.3.2.4.1

Striatum and decision making efficiency

Final Block RT Change scores were correlated with beta values from each of the two DS
and VS ROIs, separately for OCD patients and healthy controls. For control participants a
significantly negative correlation occurred between Final Block RT Change and beta
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values in the left DS ROI during Stimulus-response Decision Events minus Rest (r=-0.552,
t=1.99, p=0.033; Figure 3.7A), suggesting that those participants with greater activity in
the left DS had quicker RTs in the first stimulus presentation in Block 5 compared to the
second stimulus presentation in Block 4. No significant correlation arose in control
participants for our decision-making efficiency score and BOLD signal during Feedback
Events minus Rest. For OCD patients our decision-making efficiency score did not
correlate with neural activity during Stimulus-Response Decision or Feedback Events
minus Rest.

3.3.2.4.2

Striatum and learning from feedback

Learning slope was correlated with beta values from each of the VS and DS ROIs,
separately for OCD patients and controls. Looking at the control data, a significant,
positive correlation occurred between slope of learning and Feedback Event minus Rest
beta values extracted from the left VS ROI (r=0.542, t=1.93, p=0.037; Figure 3.7B). No
significant or trending correlations were present in the control participants` data relating
slope and BOLD signal during Stimulus-response Decision Events. For OCD patients,
learning slope, our measure of learning efficiency, did not correlate with neural activity
during either Feedback or Stimulus-Response Decision Events minus Rest.

Figure 3.5 Correlation between behavioural indices of decision making and learning
for control participants and beta values in striatal ROIs.
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A) Correlation between Final Block RT Change and beta values in left DS ROI in healthy controls
(r=-0.552, t=1.99, p=0.033). B) Correlation between Learning Slope and beta values of left VS ROI
in healthy controls. Beta values were significantly, positively correlated with slope of learning
(r=0.542, t=1.93, p=0.037).

3.3.2.4.3

Striatum and severity of OCD

Compulsion sub-score of the YBOCS significantly, negatively correlated with beta values
in both the left and right VS ROIs (Left VS ROI: r=-0.565, t=2.47, p=0.035, Figure 3.8A;
Right VS ROI: r=-0.604, t=2.73, p=0.022, Figure 3.8B). YBOCS total score trended
towards being negatively correlated with Left VS (r=-0.470, t=1.42, p=0.090) and Right
VS ROIs (r=-0.493, t=1.55, p=0.073). Obsession sub-scores did not correlate with beta
values in either Left VS (r=-0.160, t=0.22, p=0.584) and Right VS ROIs (r=-0.152, t=0.27,
p=0.604). OCD disease severity did not significantly correlate with either Left or Right
DS ROIs (Left DS ROI: Total YBOCS r=-0.046, t=0.16, p=0.876, Obsession sub-score
r=0.085, t=0.30, p=0.773, Compulsion sub-score r=-0.134, t=0.47, p=0.647; Right DS
ROI: Total YBOCS r=-0.164, t=0.58, p=0.575, Obsession sub-score r=-0.011, t=0.04,
p=0.971, Compulsion sub-score r=-0.233, t=0.83, p=0.424).
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Figure 3.6 Correlation between DS and VS ROIs and YBOCS-compulsion sub-scores
in patients with OCD.
A) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of left VS ROI in patients with OCD.
Beta values significantly, negatively correlated with YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score (r=-0.565, p=0.035). B)
Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of right VS ROI in patients with OCD.
Similarly, beta values significantly, negatively correlated with YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score (r=-0.604,
p=0.022). C) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of left DS ROI in patients
with OCD (r=-0.143, p=0.647). D) Correlation between YBOCS-Compulsion sub-score and beta values of
right DS ROI in patients with OCD (r=-0.233, p=0.424). No significant correlations arose comparing YBOCSCompulsion sub-score and DS ROIs in patients with OCD.
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3.4 Discussion
In the current investigation, OCD patients responded slower on the first presentation of
stimuli in the final block compared to the second stimuli presentation in the previous block,
compared to healthy controls who responded faster. This is evidence for poorer decision
making in OCD patients compared to controls. Additionally, we found that patients with
OCD learned the stimulus-response associations significantly slower compared to healthy
controls based on slope of learning.
Activity in DS correlated with Stimulus-Response Decision Events and not with Feedback
events, when stimulus-response associations are actually learned, in OCD patients and
controls participants combined. We also found that Final Block RT Change score (i.e. our
measure of decision making efficiency) negatively correlated with beta values in the left
DS ROI in healthy controls. Learning Slope (i.e. our measure of learning) did not correlate
with beta values in DS in controls or in patients with OCD. These results support a role
for DS in decision making and not learning, confirming our results in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo,
et al. (2014) and in Chapter 2.
In contrast, VS was recruited during Feedback Events for OCD patients and controls
combined. To reiterate, the Feedback event is when deterministic feedback is received and
learning takes place. Further, Learning Slope correlated significantly with beta values in
the left VS of healthy controls. These findings support the notion that VS mediates
stimulus-response learning.
These distinct cognitive roles for DS and VS were investigated in OCD patients relative to
healthy controls. Patients with OCD evidenced less efficient decision-making, with greater
deliberation and no speeding up of response selection decisions from Block 4 to the final
block of the experiment, relative to controls who showed significant reductions in RTs.
This was despite equal accuracy between controls and patients with OCD. Consistent with
these behavioural findings, DS was more strongly recruited during Stimulus-Response
Decision Events for controls compared to patients with OCD. Patients with OCD also
showed diminished learning, with a lower slope of stimulus-response association learning
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across blocks, compared to healthy controls. In keeping with this, VS activity was greater
during Feedback Events in healthy controls compared to OCD patients. OCD patients did
not evidence any significant correlations between our measures of decision-making versus
learning efficiency and DS or VS BOLD signal. These results strongly suggest diminished
decision making and learning in patients with OCD, related to deficits in task-relevant DS
and VS activation.
We investigated VS and DS signal in Rest Events in OCD patients and controls. Compared
to healthy controls, OCD patients evidenced significantly increased VS activity during Rest
Events (i.e., not related to a specific task). Baseline DS activity did not differ between
healthy controls and OCD patients. Further, we found that the compulsion sub-score of
the YBOCS negatively correlated with VS beta values extracted from Rest, suggesting that
this enhanced baseline VS activity was related to disease severity. Total YBOCS and
obsession and compulsion sub-score measures did not correlate with DS activity in patients
with OCD.

3.4.1 Cognitive functions mediated by the striatum
We independently assessed decision making and stimulus-response learning, using
behavioural measures and distinct fMRI events. We aimed to disentangle neural substrates
specifically mediating these different cognitive processes.
Our results are contrary to the large literature attributing feedback-based learning to DS
(Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Yin & Knowlton,
2006). A potential explanation for the long-standing association of DS with stimulusresponse association learning, despite increasing numbers of contradictory results (Atallah
et al., 2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008; Ohira et al., 2010; Reiss et al., 2005), relates
to the common confounding of

learning and decision-making processes (Jessup &

O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004). In behavioural studies, learning is generally
measured by the accuracy of stimulus-specific response selections that are provided as
evidence that learning has occurred. Poor performance therefore could be the result of
failing either to learn stimulus-response associations or to correctly select responses based
on these learned associations. In fMRI studies, a) enacting a response when presented with
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a stimulus, and b) learning from feedback, are typically treated as a single event with all
significantly-activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se (Dobryakova &
Tricomi, 2013; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; Poldrack et al., 1999). By separately assessing
response-selection decisions and learning, our approach aimed to resolve the discrepancy
between studies that involve DS in feedback-based learning (Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005;
O'Doherty et al., 2004) versus those in PD patients (Swainson et al., 2000; Vo et al., 2014),
and participants with DS lesions (Ell, Marchant, & Ivry, 2006; Exner et al., 2002) that
dispute the notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning.
Our findings integrate with a growing literature favouring a role for DS in decision making
rather than learning per se. In neuroimaging studies, DS activity consistently remains
significantly increased above baseline after sequences (Reiss et al., 2005), categorization
rules (Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, &
Anderson, 2010), stimulus–reward (Daw & Doya, 2006; Seger et al., 2010), and response–
reward associations (Ohira et al., 2010) are well-learned. Additionally, DS frequently
correlates with response selections, particularly when an element of deliberation is required
(N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017), even in contexts devoid of new
learning (Grahn et al., 2008), such as in the Stroop task (Ali et al., 2010), and in making
numeric magnitude judgments (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011). This activation profile is
inconsistent with a brain region mediating learning per se and is more in line with one that
underlies decisions.
Our results, in contrast suggest that VS mediates learning stimulus-response associations.
Replicating our previous findings (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), VS signal occurred
specifically during the Feedback Event and correlated with efficiency of learning assessed
with slope measure in healthy controls. This result fits with the larger literature implicating
VS in forms of implicit learning, such as reward (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Munte,
2010), stimulus-stimulus (P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011), sequence (Ghilardi et al., 2007),
motor sequence (Feigin et al., 2003), and category learning (Shohamy, Myers, Geghman,
Sage, & Gluck, 2006).
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3.4.2 OCD and the striatum
Structural and functional changes within the striatum in patients with OCD could be linked
to cognitive dysfunction as well as OCD symptomatology. Deficits in DS and VS could
lead to dysfunction in decision making, cognitive flexibility, and reward processing and
learning respectively.
Here, OCD patients evidenced poorer decision making coupled with decreased DS activity
compared to controls during decision events assessed with fMRI. These results align with
the larger literature showing that patients with OCD have diminished DS function in tasks
examining cognitive flexibility (Del Casale et al., 2011; Vriend et al., 2013), and response
inhibition (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen, Vriend, de Wit, & van den Heuvel, 2014).
As cognitive flexibility and response inhibition appear to be reduced in OCD patients, this
may be linked to the inability to choose naturally rewarding behaviours over compulsive
actions (Vriend et al., 2013). DS deficits in patients with OCD could underlie the poorer
cognitive flexibility and deficient response inhibition that lead to compulsive actions.
In the current study, learning was also poorer in patients with OCD related to decreased
VS activity during learning events assessed with fMRI.

Other studies have shown

diminished reversal learning (Remijnse, Nielen, van Balkom, & et al., 2006) and reward
learning (Nielen, den Boer, & Smid, 2009) in OCD patients compared to healthy controls.
Remijnse et al. (2006), ascribe impairments in task-switching and learning to striatal
deficiencies, which they purport as significant contributors to the neurological foundations
of ineffective behavioural adaptation to changing stimuli and cognitive inflexibility in
OCD patients. Compulsive behaviours are the manifestations of such neural impairments.
Obsessive-compulsive behaviours have been linked to hyperactivity in the VS at baseline
(Baxter et al., 1987; de Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel,
Avram, Sorg, Brandl, & Koch, 2018; Le Jeune et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch,
1997). Augmented baseline VS activity in patients with OCD impairs performance on VSmediated tasks and may play an integral role in OCD symptomatology.
A present model of OCD based on data discussed above suggests that obsessions and
compulsive behaviours might be linked to a disproportion between hyperactivity in the VS

129

and hypoactivity in the DS while processing incoming information. Dysfunctional reward
circuitry centred in the VS results in an inability to respond to natural rewards and instead
VS activation is modulated by stressful, obsession-related stimuli (Baxter et al., 1987; de
Vries et al., 2017; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Gursel et al., 2018; Le Jeune
et al., 2010; Perani et al., 1995; Rauch, 1997). Concurrent, hypoactivity in DS results in
deficits in cognitive flexibility and response inhibition. These impairments are related to
difficulty switching away from thinking of obsessions, and toward performing adaptive
actions over maladaptive compulsions (Del Casale et al., 2011; van Velzen et al., 2014;
Vriend et al., 2013). Our results are entirely supportive of these models. Further, we found
a strong negative association between between compulsion sub-score on the YBOCS and
bilateral beta values in VS ROIs at baseline. This suggests that patients with high baseline
VS activity, relative to other OCD patients, do not rate compulsive behaviours highly in
their OCD phenotype. There is evidence to suggest the reward system in OCD patients is
hijacked to regard OCD behaviours as rewarding, rather than natural rewards (i.e. food,
sex; Del Casale et al., 2011; Figee et al., 2011; Remijnse et al., 2006). This could be
explained by reports of hyperactive VS (i.e. integral structure in the reward system) at rest
(de Vries et al., 2017) and in response to symptom-provoking stimuli (Rauch et al., 1994),
compared to natural rewards, relative to controls (Remijnse et al., 2006). Patients with
exceptionally hyperactive VS at rest, compared to other patients with OCD, may not even
respond to OCD-related compulsive behaviours as rewarding and therefore these patients
may not perform them, or do not feel they are significant burdens in their OCD, as our data
suggests.

3.4.3 Conclusions
Our findings dispute the prevalent notion that DS mediates stimulus-response learning.
We showed that DS mediates response selections whereas VS underlies feedback-based
learning in PD patients and healthy age-matched controls. This study provides strong
support for the cognitive deficits that arise in OCD that might sustain compulsive behaviour
and obsessive thinking. Further, these cognitive deficits seem to implicate DS and VS
respectively. Finally, baseline VS hyperactivity relates to lower compulsions. We ascribe
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this to a decreased ability of VS to signal rewards due to its persistent elevated state, even
those rewards that arise due to performance of compulsions and temporary relief of anxiety.
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Chapter 4

4

Dorsal striatum mediates deliberate decision making, not
late-stage, stimulus-response learning
We investigated a controversy regarding the role of the dorsal striatum (DS) in deliberate
decision-making versus late-stage, stimulus–response learning to the point of
automatization. Participants learned to associate abstract images with right or left button
presses explicitly before strengthening these associations through stimulus–response trials
with (i.e., Session 1) and without (i.e., Session 2) feedback. In Session 1, trials were divided
into response-selection and feedback events to separately assess decision versus learning
processes. Session 3 evaluated stimulus–response automaticity using a location Stroop
task. DS activity correlated with response-selection and not feedback events in Phase 1
(i.e., Blocks 1–3), Session 1. Longer response times (RTs), lower accuracy, and greater
inter-trial variability characterized Phase 1, suggesting deliberation. DS activity
extinguished in Phase 2 (i.e., Blocks 4–12), Session 1, once RTs, response variability, and
accuracy stabilized, though stimulus–response automatization continued. This was
signaled by persisting improvements in RT and accuracy into Session 2. Distraction
between Sessions 1 and 2 briefly reintroduced response uncertainty, and correspondingly,
significant DS activity reappeared in Block 1 of Session 2 only. Once stimulus–response
associations were again re-familiarized and deliberation unnecessary, DS activation
disappeared for Blocks 2–8, Session 2. Interference from previously learned right or left
button responses with incongruent location judgments in a location Stroop task provided
evidence that automaticity of stimulus–specific button-press responses had developed by
the end of Session 2. These results suggest that DS mediates decision making and not latestage learning, reconciling two, independently evolving and well-supported literatures that
implicate DS in different cognitive functions.
A version of this chapter has been published in Human Brain Mapping: Hiebert, N. M.,
Owen, A. M., Seergobin, K. N., & MacDonald, P. A. (2017) Dorsal striatum mediates

140

deliberate decision making, not late-stage, stimulus-response learning. Hum Brain Mapp.
38(12):6133-6156. Doi: 10.1002/hbm.23817.

4.1 Introduction
The dorsal striatum (DS)—the bulk of the caudate nucleus and putamen—has long been
implicated in stimulus-response learning (Ashby, Ennis, & Spiering, 2007; Yin &
Knowlton, 2006). The DS is ascribed a role in both early, goal-directed learning (Brovelli,
Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2004) as well as late-stage
learning of stimulus-response associations to the point of automaticity (Ashby, Turner, &
Horvitz, 2010; Balleine, Liljeholm, & Ostlund, 2009). Challenging this notion, however,
learning is often preserved in patients (Exner, Koschack, & Irle, 2002; Nole M. Hiebert,
Seergobin, Vo, Ganjavi, & MacDonald, 2014; A. A. MacDonald, Seergobin, et al., 2013;
Vo et al., 2014) and in animals (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua, Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007) with
DS dysfunction. Features of standard stimulus-response learning methodology potentially
shed light on this controversy as detailed in the paragraphs below.

4.1.1 Disentangling Learning and Decisions Guided by Learning
Decision-making and learning processes are confounded in standard stimulus-response
learning methodologies (Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; McDonald & Hong, 2004). Trials
typically proceed as follows: a) a stimulus is presented and participants decide among a set
of responses, and b) feedback regarding accuracy is provided, shaping stimulus-response
associations. Learning is generally measured by the accuracy in selecting responses.
Consequently, failing either to acquire stimulus-response associations or to select accurate
responses based on these learned associations could lead to impaired performance in these
paradigms. In this way, in standard paradigms, evaluation of learning and decision making
is ambiguous. Further, in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, a)
selecting a response and enacting it, and b) learning from feedback regarding the
appropriateness of the response are typically treated as a single event with all significantly
activated brain regions ascribed a role in learning per se (Dobryakova & Tricomi, 2013;
Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; R. A. Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999).
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Accordingly, some brain regions that might underlie decision processes guided by learned
associations could erroneously be assigned a role in learning. Given that these processes
are temporally intertwined and functionally interdependent, distinguishing them is very
challenging, requiring novel experimental designs, and nuanced interpretations. Learning
and decision selection are entirely distinct processes phenomenologically, however.
Distinguishing neural substrates of these different operations is important, with
implications for understanding cognition in health and disease.
Recently, we investigated this issue in early, goal-directed learning using fMRI (Nole M.
Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014). Participants learned to associate abstract images with button
presses through deterministic feedback.

We modeled a) the phase during which

participants decided amongst options and selected responses separately from b) the stage
when participants learned about associations through feedback regarding the accuracy of
their choices. We found activation of DS—specifically the head of the caudate nucleus—
only during the decision enactment phase, not during the feedback phase when participants
learned the associations based on outcome information. Furthermore, DS activation during
the decision stage of our trials only occurred for trials arising later in the learning session,
when the slope of learning was shallower but when participants were beginning to have a
basis on which to make response selections, guided by associations that they had acquired
in the earliest trials. In contrast, activity in the ventral striatum (VS)—consisting of the
nucleus accumbens and most ventral parts of the caudate nucleus and putamen—correlated
with the feedback phase of our stimulus-response learning trials as has been shown by
others (R. Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007; Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, &
Ljungberg, 1992). Feedback-related VS activation was greatest in the earliest phase of
learning when the slope of behavioural change, indicative of stimulus-response association
learning, was steepest.

4.1.2 DS mediates Late-Stage Learning and Automaticity?
The findings of Hiebert et al., (2014b) were a) consistent with the view that DS mediates
decisions regarding response selection, and b) inconsistent with the contention that DS
mediates early, feedback-based learning, as has previously been prevalently claimed
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(Balleine et al., 2009; Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli et al., 2011; Brown & Stern,
2013; Foerde, Race, Verfaellie, & Shohamy, 2013; Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013; Hart,
Leung, & Balleine, 2013; O'Doherty et al., 2004). However, a role for DS in other forms
of learning that do not depend upon feedback or that occur during later stages of stimulusresponse association formation could not be ruled out. Indeed, in addition to claims that
the DS mediates early learning, the DS, particularly the body and tail of the caudate
nucleus, has also been implicated in later stages of learning, when stimulus-response
associations are strengthened through repeated experience to the point that they become
automatic (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie, Roeder, & Ashby, 2010).
A prominent theory of automaticity suggests that the role of the DS—specifically the body
and tail of the caudate nucleus—is to acquire associations and train cortical-cortical
connections between higher-order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie
et al., 2010). This model of automaticity is referred to as Subcortical Pathways Enable
Expertise Development (i.e., SPEED; Ashby et al., 2007). SPEED predicts that subcortical
regions mediate learning. The theory maintains that the head of the caudate nucleus
mediates early learning, and as the associations become more practiced, progressing toward
automaticity, more posterior regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the
caudate nucleus, underlie late-stage learning. Once automaticity has been achieved,
involvement of DS ceases, and stimulus-specific, automatic behaviours become mediated
by cortical regions (i.e., pre-motor, motor, and visual cortices; Ashby et al., 2007).
Balleine and O'Doherty (2010), however, go further contending that in addition to being
implicated in training stimulus-response habits, DS mediates and sustains habitual or
automatic responding even once these associations are well-entrenched (Balleine &
O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005; Tricomi, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2009).
Though several human studies of habit learning ascribe habit formation to DS (i.e., dorsal
putamen), closer examination reveals that the ventral, posterior putamen (e.g., peak
coordinates z = 0) is often the region preferentially activated during these pivotal learning
studies (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Tricomi et al., 2009; but see Wunderlich, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2012, implicating dorsal putamen). It is widely accepted that VS and DS are
functionally distinct (Atallah et al., 2007; P. A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; van der Meer
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& Redish, 2011). Indeed, others explicitly claim that posterior ventral putamen (i.e., VS)
mediates overlearning of motor responses (Jueptner, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, &
Passingham, 1997; Lehericy et al., 2005).
In a study implicating DS in the development of automatic behaviours, Helie et al. (2010)
investigated automatization of responses in a category learning paradigm that included over
10,000 trials, across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1,
4, 10, and 20. They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the
end of which high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%). In
subsequent sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas
cortical activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization even after extensive
training. Only neural activity correlating with stimulus-response events (i.e., the time
period from the onset of the stimulus to the button-press response) were examined. Given
the confounding of decision and learning processes in these methodologies and consistent
with our claim in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), DS activation at the time of response
selection and enactment could have arisen due to its involvement in decision-making
processes and not with association learning per se. Several other studies cited as support
for the SPEED model can be re-interpreted similarly to the findings of Helie et al. (2010),
concluding that DS activation arises not due to its role in learning but rather due to its role
in decision-making processes (R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005; Wu, Kansaku, & Hallett, 2004).
As with studies of early stimulus-response learning, most experiments investigating DS’s
role in late-stage learning combine and confound learning processes and stimulus-specific
response-selection processes (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2009).

4.1.3 DS mediates Decision Making?
Indeed, a re-interpretation of these early- and late-learning experiments, considering the
facts that decision making and stimulus-response association learning a) depend upon one
another to produce accurate performance, and b) are often merged in fMRI studies, could
integrate two divergent and extensive literatures regarding DS’s role in cognition.
Increasingly, DS is linked to response selection and decision making (Atallah et al., 2007;
Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2009; Jessup & O'Doherty, 2011; A. A. MacDonald et al.,
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2014). Decision making is defined as the process of representing and assigning values to
different response possibilities, then selecting and executing the most appropriate action
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). DS has particularly been ascribed a role in decision
making when decisions require a degree of reflection, when there is some ambiguity, and
when cognitive control or flexibility are required.

This process is referred to as

deliberation (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, & Price, 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011;
Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et
al., 2010; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, & MacDonald, 2015). In this way, DS is
implicated prominently in this literature in resisting habitual responding or attending to
more salient stimuli (Balleine et al., 2009; Benke, Delazer, Bartha, & Auer, 2003;
Cameron, Watanabe, Pari, & Munoz, 2010; R. Cools, 2006; Roshan Cools, Rogers, Barker,
& Robbins, 2010; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Rieger,
Gauggel, & Burmeister, 2003; Robertson et al., 2015), completely at odds with the
independently-evolving literature linking DS with stimulus-response learning and
automatization.
In categorization tasks, DS activity, assessed with neuroimaging, correlates with decision
accuracy when options need to be weighed but not once responses become so wellpracticed that reflection is unnecessary (Helie et al., 2010; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, &
Ashby, 2013).

Preferential DS activation is observed for ambiguous relative to

unambiguous decisions (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011;
Schouppe, Demanet, Boehler, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2014), supporting a role for DS
in the process of deliberation. Further, patients with DS dysfunction are less impaired than
healthy control participants at attending to more salient stimuli among distractors and
choosing more practiced responses among competing alternatives (Cameron et al., 2010;
R. Cools, Rogers, Barker, & Robbons, 2009; Hood et al., 2007), but they are more impaired
when they are required to select less salient stimuli or perform less automatic responses
relative to alternatives (Benke et al., 2003; Cameron et al., 2010; R. Cools, Altamirano, &
D'Esposito, 2006; R. Cools et al., 2009; Hood et al., 2007; Rieger et al., 2003; Thoma,
Koch, Heyder, Schwarz, & Daum, 2008), suggesting that DS’s role in decision making is
to promote deliberation and prevent poorly considered or impulsive choices. These claims
are at odds with prevalent theories ascribing a role for DS in automatization of responses
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and selection of habitual actions (Everitt & Robbins, 2005) and therefore requires direct
investigation to reconcile these contradictory contentions regarding DS’s role in cognition.

4.1.4 Current Study
Here, we critically tested the claim that DS mediates automatization of stimulus-specific
responses versus the notion that it underlies deliberation during action selection. We
investigated later-stage, stimulus-response learning, once performance accuracy was
greater than 90%. We estimated striatal brain activity using fMRI along with behaviour
during later-stage, stimulus-response learning. We further included an explicit measure of
whether stimulus-response associations achieved automaticity. We closely paralleled Nole
M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), but used fewer stimuli and only two responses, right or left
button presses. Further, we began with an explicit learning phase—a shortcut to late-stage
learning—during which all stimuli in the experiment were presented and assigned to either
the right or left button press. Subsequently, as in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014),
stimulus-response learning took place in an implicit, feedback-based manner (Session 1),
followed by further implicit strengthening of these associations through repeated stimulusresponse trials with feedback removed (Session 2). We investigated neural activity for
decision-making and feedback events separately in Session 1 and for decision-making
events only in Session 2. Between Sessions 1 and 2, we implemented a 20-minute
distractor task with the aim of 1) testing whether stimulus-response automaticity was
achieved by the end of Session 1, and 2) re-introducing an element of uncertainty and
deliberation for decisions in Block 1 of Session 2. The appearance of preferential bloodoxygenation-dependent (BOLD) signal in DS immediately following distraction therefore
could critically distinguish between notions that DS mediates the development of stimulusresponse association automaticity versus decisions requiring reflection. Finally, Session 3
consisted of a location Stroop task as a second, objective test of whether stimulus-specific
responses were automatized following Sessions 1 and 2. In this final session, participants
indicated the location, with right or left button presses, of stimuli that had previously been
paired with right or left button-press responses during learning Sessions 1 and 2 versus
novel stimuli.
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We also performed a second, supplemental experiment using a similar protocol to the one
summarized in the preceding paragraph, to further clarify our findings (See 2.6).
Experiment 2 differed from the Main Experiment in the following ways: 1) neural activity
was not estimated with fMRI, 2) an additional session of the modified location Stroop task
was also included immediately after Block 3 (i.e., Phase 1, explained below) in Session 1.

4.1.5 Predictions
If DS underlies the development of automaticity as suggested by SPEED, BOLD signal in
DS should persist for stimulus-specific responses until associations achieve automatic
status (i.e., throughout Session 1, and possibly in Session 2 depending on explicit measures
of automaticity). We included two measures of stimulus-response automaticity. At the
end of Session 1, we examined the effect of an intervening task on stimulus-response
performance and BOLD signal. If automaticity had developed prior to the end of Session
1, response time (RT), accuracy, and BOLD signal should be unchanged from Phase 2,
Session 1 and Session 2 despite an intervening distraction (See Ashby et al., 2010, for a
review). At the end of Session 2, we investigated facilitation and interference in a location
Stroop task, related to automaticity of previously-learned, stimulus-specific right and left
button presses. If automaticity had developed by the conclusion of Sessions 1 and/or 2, a)
faster RTs and/or reduced errors should occur when location button presses matched the
button press that had previously been associated with the stimulus in Sessions 1 and 2,
and/or b) slower RTs and/or increased errors should occur when location button presses
mismatched the button press that had previously been associated with the stimulus in
Sessions 1 and 2.
In contrast, if DS mediates deliberation in response selection, DS activity should be
maximal in very early phases of the Main Experiment when decision making requires
greater consideration, indexed by longer RTs, lower accuracy, and greater response
variability (Phase 1, Session 1). Response variability was measured by changes in standard
deviation of RTs (SD). Activity in DS should attenuate and disappear, even prior to
achievement of automatic responding, once responses become sufficiently well-learned
that deliberation is unnecessary (Phase 2, and Session 2), signaled by reduced RT,
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accuracy, and/or response variability. To further distinguish these views, following an
unrelated, intervening task, DS BOLD signal is expected to a) re-appear in the first block
when response deliberation would again be required (i.e., Block 1, Session 2) but b) quickly
attenuate due to savings when responses again became well-practiced (Blocks 2-8, Session
2).
Disputing the claim that DS underlies late-stage learning to the point of stimulus-response
automaticity using fMRI can only be accomplished by showing that DS BOLD signal is
dissociated from this process, attenuating before automaticity of stimulus-response
associations is actually achieved. In this way, this well-entrenched view about DS’s role
in behaviour can only be contested by accepting a null result. There is a, perhaps, justified
bias against publishing negative findings, in that with frequentist approaches, the
probabilities of Type II (i.e., falsely failing to reject the null hypothesis) and Type I errors
(i.e., falsely rejecting the null hypothesis) are asymmetric. Type I errors are set a clear
maximum, usually less than 0.05, whereas the former varies across studies in terms of its
magnitude and determinants (Dienes, 2014) not pre-determined by the experimenter.
However, this systematic publication bias contributes to extremely slow changes to the
status quo with the effect that once a claim is disseminated and relatively accepted, it
becomes nearly irrefutable, a process referred to as canonization (Nissen, Magidson, Gross,
& Bergstrom, 2016).

Findings at odds with prevailing views are considered less

publication-worthy and held to a far higher standard (Nissen et al., 2016). Computational
models, however, reveal that selective publication and omission of negative results does
not improve efficiency or accuracy of scientific inquiry, but does increase false
canonization (Nissen et al., 2016; van Assen, van Aert, Nuijten, & Wicherts, 2014). These
concerns notwithstanding, to critically test the contention that DS underlies late learning
versus deliberation in action selection and to increase confidence in our results, we have
introduced a number of manipulations (e.g., distraction separating Sessions 1 and 2) that
should predictably alter behaviour and DS BOLD signal in distinct ways to dissociate the
differing accounts of DS’s role in cognition. Further, in addition to frequentist statistical
approaches, we planned to investigate our effects using a Bayesian analysis that allows
directly contrasting the probability of the null and the alternative hypotheses in a
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symmetrical way, putting these hypotheses on an equal footing, and directly comparing the
relative fit of the two models (Dienes, 2014). This approach would allow us greater
confidence in our interpretation of null results if they arose, as we predicted.

4.2 Materials and Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Nineteen healthy, young, right-handed adults participated in this experiment (10 males, 9
females). Participants abusing prescription or illicit drugs, alcohol, or taking cognitiveenhancing medications including methylphenidate were excluded from participating in the
experiment. The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board of the University of Western
Ontario approved this study. All participants provided informed, written consent to the
approved protocol before beginning the experiment, according to the Declaration of
Helsinki (2013).

4.2.2 Procedures
At the outset, all participants explicitly learned to associate six abstract images with one of
two button-press responses prior to fMRI Sessions 1, 2, and 3. Images consisted of
characters taken from the invented Klingon alphabet (Figure 4.1). The six abstract images
appeared on the screen. Three were labelled “left button press” and the other three were
labelled “right button press”. Participants were given three minutes to memorize the label
given to the images as best they could.
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Figure 4.1 Abstract images presented in the experiment.
Learned images refer to the images that were studied and associated with a specific ‘right’ or ‘left’ buttonpress response at baseline, via deterministic feedback in Session 1, and in Session 2. In Session 3 (3A and
B in Experiment 2), these learned images created the conditions for the congruent and incongruent conditions
depending on their location of presentation. New images refer to the images presented only in Session 3 (i.e.,
3A in the Main Experiment and 3A and 3B in Experiment 2) that constituted the control condition.

Figure 4.2 depicts the experimental protocol of the Main Experiment. In Session 1, on
every trial, one of the six stimuli presented in the baseline learning session appeared in the
centre of the projection screen. Participants were asked to perform the button-press
response that had been assigned to the stimulus. For stimuli assigned to a left button press,
participants were instructed to press the left button on the button box with their index
finger. For stimuli assigned to the right button press, participants were asked to press the
right button on the button box with their middle finger. All responses were performed with
the right hand. Deterministic feedback regarding the accuracy of the response was then
provided (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) during a feedback event. Trials were organized into
four scanning runs, with each run consisting of three blocks of 18 trials, for a total of twelve
blocks and 216 trials. Each abstract image occurring three times in random order per block.
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At the end of the twelfth block, participants were given a score summarizing their overall
performance.

Figure 4.2 Experimental protocol.
A) In the Main Experiment, participants learned to associate six abstract images with either a ‘left’ or ‘right’
button press response explicitly in the block named Explicit. In Session 1, participants saw each image and
performed the learned response individually in the presence of feedback. Due to longer RTs, lower accuracy,
and increased response variability, the first three blocks (referred to as Phase 1) where analyzed separately
from Blocks 4-12 (i.e., Phase 2). After completing a distractor task for 20 minutes, participants performed
Session 2 where they practiced the learned responses to the images in the absence of feedback. We
expected response uncertainty to reappear in Block 1, Session 2 and we therefore analyzed it separately from
Blocks 2-8, Session 2. Session 3 served as an objective measure of automaticity and was performed after
Session 2 concluded. B) Experiment 2 followed the same protocol as the Main Experiment except that the
presence of automaticity was measured both after Phase 1, Session 1 and after Session 2 (Session 3A and
3B respectively). Areas in grey represent periods where response deliberation is expected and areas in black
denote the modified Stroop task (i.e., objective measure of automaticity).

Trials in Session 1 proceeded as follows: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection
screen for 700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was
presented in the centre of the projection screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank
screen appeared for a variable period of time sampled from an exponential distribution
(mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v) feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or
‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of
time sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms;
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maximum: 7000 ms). The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and inter-trial interval (ITI) were
jittered between the response and feedback, and between the offset of feedback and the
beginning of the subsequent trial, respectively, to create two fMRI events within each trial:
a) the stimulus-response event and b) the feedback event. The stimulus-response or
decision-making event included the presentation of the abstract image until the participant
made a button-press response. The feedback, or learning event included the presentation
of feedback. Rest events were also created and modelled as regressors and consisted of
ITIs only (Figure 4.3A).
Between Sessions 1 and 2, participants performed a 20-minute visual-spatial working
memory task as a distraction from the main task. The task consisted of prime and probe
pairs in which participants indicated, with a button press, whether an array of dots inside a
grid pattern was the same or different across the prime and probe trials. The distractor task
was included to re-introduce an element of uncertainty and deliberation in selecting
responses in the first block of Session 2.
In Session 2, on every trial, participants performed a right or left button press in response
to the image that appeared in the center of the screen. The images were the same six
Klingon characters presented at the start of the experiment and in Session 1. Participants
were asked to make the button-press responses that they had learned explicitly at the outset
of the experiment and through Session 1 in Session 2. No feedback was provided, to
preclude further feedback-based learning during Session 2. Participants performed eight
blocks of 18 trials each, spaced across two scanning runs, four blocks per run. In total,
Session 2 consisted of 144 trials. Trial parameters for Session 2 were otherwise identical
to those in Session 1 (Figure 4.3B).
In Session 3, the six images associated with left or right button-press responses explicitly
at the outset of the experiment and throughout Sessions 1 and 2 were presented along with
six new Klingon characters. Images were presented one at a time, in random order. These
images were presented either to the left or the right of centre, with a distance away from
centre equal to the width of the image. Participants responded to the location of the
stimulus with the left (i.e., index finger) or right (i.e., middle finger) button-press response.

152

No feedback was provided in this session. Participants performed 4 blocks of 36 trials each,
spaced across two scanning runs, two blocks per run. In total, Session 3 consisted of 144
trials and no feedback was provided. Trial parameters were similar to Sessions 1 and 2
(Figure 4.3C).

Figure 4.3 Example of a single trial in Sessions 1, 2, and 3 in the experiment.
A) Participants learned to associate six abstract images with either a ‘left’ or ‘right’ button-press response in
Session 1. The following is an example of a trial: (i) a cross appeared in the centre of the projection screen
for 700 ms; (ii) a blank screen occurred for 300 ms; (iii) an abstract image was presented in the centre of the
projection screen until a button-press response; (iv) a blank screen appeared for a variable period of time
sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms); (v)
feedback (i.e., ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’) appeared for 1000 ms; (vi) a blank screen appeared for a variable period
of time sampled from an exponential distribution (mean: 2500 ms; minimum: 525 ms; maximum: 7000 ms).
B) Participants recalled the responses to the learned images in the absence of feedback in Session 2. C)
Images appeared left or right of centre, at a distance equal to the width of the image away from centre, and
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participants indicated the location of the images with a left or right button-press response. Stimuli included
the six learned images presented at baseline and in Sessions 1 and 2 as well as six new images. Trials in
Sessions 2 and 3 were identical to Session 1 except that feedback was omitted in both and the images
appeared off centre in Session 3. * The inter-stimulus and inter-trial intervals (ISI and ITI, respectively) were
jittered between the response and feedback and between the offset of feedback and the beginning of the
subsequent trial to create two fMRI events within each trial: a) the stimulus-response event and b) the
feedback event for Session 1. In Sessions 2 and 3, the ITIs were jittered between the response and the
subsequent trial.

4.2.3 Behavioural Data Analysis
To examine changes in RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and
2, single-factor repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were run with block
(Session 1: 12 blocks; Session 2: 8 blocks) as the within-subject variable. RT was the time
between the onset of the abstract image and the button press by the participant measured
in milliseconds (ms). The number of correct “right” and “left” button-press responses
recorded after each block was our estimate of accuracy.
Three conditions―congruent, incongruent, and control―were created in Session 3. In the
congruent condition, an image appeared in a location that was consistent with the left or
right button-press response learned for that image at baseline and in Session 1, and
practiced in Session 2. In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that
was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline and in
Session 1, as well as practiced in Session 2. In the control condition, six new images that
were not previously presented in the experiment appeared to the left or right of centre.
Session 3 consisted of 48 congruent, 48 incongruent, and 48 control trials that occurred in
random order. All old and new stimuli appeared left and right of centre equally often. RTs
were measured from the onset of the image until the button-press response in ms. The
control condition provided a baseline measure of accuracy and latency for providing a
location response. Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs or error rates in the congruent
condition minus those in the control condition and interference was calculated as mean
RTs or error rates in the incongruent condition minus those in the control condition. Lastly,
congruent and incongruent trials together were contrasted with control trials to assess trials
that involved previously-learned stimuli that could distract from choosing location
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responses versus the condition in which there were no previously-learned stimulus-identity
responses to distract from location responses.
One sample t-tests were run on the facilitation and interference scores to assess if they were
significantly different from zero. These analyses provided an objective test of whether the
stimulus-response associations had been learned to the point that the responses were
automatic.

4.2.4 Imaging Acquisition
FMRI data were collected on a 3 Tesla Siemens Magnetom Prisma with Total Imaging
Matrix MRI at Robarts Research Institute at the University of Western Ontario. A scout
image for positioning the participant and a T1 for anatomical localization were first
obtained. Session 1 consisted of four runs of T2*-weighted functional acquisitions. Each
run consisted of three blocks of 18 trials. A distractor task (20 minutes) was administered
after Session 1. Session 2 consisted of two experimental runs. Each run comprised four
blocks of 18 trials. Session 3 was completed as the final session and consisted of two
experimental runs, with each run containing 2 blocks of 36 trials.

In each of the

experimental sessions, the repetition time was 2.5 s with one whole brain image consisting
of 43, 2.5 mm-thick slices. The field of view was oriented along the anterior and posterior
commissure with a matrix of 88 × 88 pixels, with an isotropic voxel size of 2.5 × 2.5 × 2.5
mm3. The echo time was 30 ms and the flip angle was 90°.

4.2.5 FMRI Data Analysis
Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB, MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States)
was used in conjunction with Statistical Parametric Mapping version 8 (SPM8; Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, United Kingdom) to complete fMRI
analysis. Images were slice-time corrected, reoriented for participant motion, spatially
normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, smoothed with
an 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel, and high-pass filtered (0.0078 Hz).
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Fixed effects analyses were used to model individual participant’s data in SPM8.
Regressors were created by convolving onsets and durations of stimulus-response,
feedback, and rest (i.e., the ITI) events with the canonical hemodynamic response function.
The stimulus-response event was defined as the time from onset of the Klingon character
until the participant made a button-press response. The feedback event was defined as the
duration of feedback (i.e., “Correct” or “Incorrect”) presentation (i.e., 1000 ms from onset
to offset). The rest period modelled was the time between the offset of the feedback until
the fixation point of the subsequent trial (i.e., the ITI). A general linear model (GLM) was
created for Session 1 events and included regressors for stimulus-response, feedback, and
rest events for Session 1 and investigated regional BOLD activity associated with these
events. There were twelve regressors for each of the three events, corresponding to each
of the twelve blocks in Session 1. Six rigid-body realignment parameters were entered as
nuisance regressors to minimize the effect of head motion. A similar model was created
for stimulus-response and rest events for Session 2. There were a total of 16 regressors,
two per block, eight of which corresponded to stimulus-response events and the other eight
for rest events. Motion regressors were also included in the Session 2 GLM.
To investigate learning versus deliberation-related brain activity, contrasts at the group
level were created, examining activity early and late in Session 1 for both stimulusresponse and feedback events. Given the significant decreases in RT, SD of RTs, and
significant increases in accuracy in Session 1 across the first three blocks, that subsequently
levelled off (See Figure 4.4A), Blocks 1-3 were assigned early status, referred to as Phase
1, and Blocks 4-12 were considered late, referred to as Phase 2. Similarly, for Session 2,
we investigated Block 1 and Blocks 2-8 separately, with the expectation that a 20-minute
distractor task might re-introduce an element of consideration in stimulus-response
selection but only for the earliest block due to savings and substantial previous experience
with the stimulus-response pairs.
For Session 3, regressors were created convolving onsets and durations of congruent,
incongruent, and control trials. At the group level, activation correlating with facilitation
and interference was investigated by contrasting activation of congruent with control trials
for facilitation and incongruent with control trials for interference.
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Peaks within the striatum were reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 cluster-corrected
using false discovery rate (FDR) correction unless otherwise indicated. Striatal regions
were defined using the Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library
version 5.0 (FSL v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom). VS and DS
are not distinct anatomical structures, which creates difficulty when attempting to separate
them in an fMRI context. In a review, Postuma and Dagher (2006) define VS as z ≤ 2,
which we employed. Here, DS refers to portions of the caudate nucleus and putamen at a
level of z > 2 in MNI space. VS was defined as the nucleus accumbens, and the caudate
nucleus and putamen at a level of z ≤ 2 in MNI space. All cortical regions were defined
using the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas in the FMRIB Software Library version 5.0 (FSL
v5.0; Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, United Kingdom). All x, y, z coordinates are
reported in MNI space.
The contrasts of interest for Sessions 1, 2, and 3 were as follows: (i) stimulus-response
events versus rest in Phase 1 of Session 1; (ii) feedback events versus rest in Phase 1 of
Session 1; (iii) stimulus-response versus feedback events in Phase 1 of Session 1; (iv)
stimulus-response events versus rest in Phase 2 of Session 1; (v) feedback events versus
rest in Phase 2 of Session 1; (vi) stimulus response versus feedback events in Phase 2 of
Session 1; (vii) stimulus-response events of Phase 1 versus stimulus-response events of
Blocks 4, 5, and 6, Blocks 7, 8, and 9, and Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session 1; (viii)
stimulus-response events in Block 1 of Session 2 versus rest; (x) stimulus-response events
for Blocks 2-8 versus rest; (xi) stimulus-response events for Block 1 versus Block 8 of
Session 2; (xii) facilitation in Session 3; (xiii) interference in Session 3; and (xiv) congruent
and incongruent versus control trials in Session 3. Phase 1 refers to Blocks 1-3 in Session
1 and Phase 2 refers to Blocks 4-12 in Session 1, based on behavioural data patterns
presented below.

4.2.6 Bayesian Analysis
Bayesian analyses were performed. Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted using
the average beta values extracted in each block of Sessions 1 and 2, and for all contrasts of
conditions (i.e., congruent, incongruent and control) in Session 3, using a bilateral dorsal
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caudate nucleus ROI. The dorsal caudate nucleus anatomical ROI was created using the
Automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), and WFU PickAtlas
(Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) in conjunction with MarsBaR (Brett, Anton,
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). The ROI included left and right dorsal caudate nucleus at a
level of z > 2 mm in MNI space. With a test value of zero, the Bayesian analysis examined
whether the extracted beta values were significantly greater than zero using the Bayes’
factor of three, previously indicated to be the Bayesian corollary of p < 0.05 in frequentist
hypothesis testing (Dienes, 2014). If the Bayes’ factor of the average beta values is less
than three, it strongly supports the null hypothesis, that the activation level is not greater
than zero.

4.3 Results
4.3.1 Demographic Data
Participants had a mean (standard error measure; SEM) age and duration of education of
23.56 (0.83) and 16.63 (0.46) years, respectively. One participant was excluded from
analysis due to excessive head motion while in the scanner, whereas another was
excluded for falling asleep in the scanner. Two participants were subsequently excluded
from Session 3 only, due to a misinterpretation of the task instructions. 18 participants
were included in the analysis of Session 1 and 2, and 16 participants were included in the
Session 3 analysis.

4.3.2 Behavioural Data
RT was measured as the time between the onset of the abstract image and a button-press
response by the participant in ms. The number of correct “left” and “right” button-press
responses recorded after each block provided our measure of accuracy. Behavioural results
are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, and Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
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4.3.2.1

Session 1

The mean block RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across Session 1 are shown in
Figure 4.4A-C respectively. Mauchly’s test was significant, indicating the assumption of
sphericity was violated (p < 0.001). Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using
the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon for the RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy singlefactor repeated measures ANOVAs.
Table 4.1 Significant pairwise comparisons for RT, SD, and accuracy differences by
block in Session 1.
Block A

Block B

RT
t stat

1

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
5
7
9
10
5
9
6
12
9
9
9
10
12
12
12

3.73
4.07
4.07
4.07
4.07
4.07
4.07
4.07
3.39
2.75
3.54
>4.07
4.07
4.07
3.12
>4.07
4.07
2.71
4.07
2.82
>4.07
3.06
3.06
>4.07
2.28
2.75
3.54
3.54
2.25
3.73
2.66
3.73
3.54
3.00

2

3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

p value

SD
t stat

p value

Accuracy
t stat
p value

0.002
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.004
0.015
0.003
<0.001
0.001
0.001
0.007
<0.001
0.001
0.016
0.001
0.013
<0.001
0.008
0.008
<0.001
0.038
0.015
0.003
0.003
0.040
0.002
0.018
0.002
0.003
0.009

3.43
4.32
4.09
4.39
3.45
3.90
4.26
5.28
4.76
4.35
2.70
3.59
3.36
3.67
2.73
3.17
3.53
4.56
4.03
3.62
-

0.005
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.002
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
0.020
0.004
0.006
0.003
0.020
0.009
0.004
<0.001
0.002
0.004
-

3.06
3.39
3.39
3.39
3.39
2.75
3.20
>4.07
2.95
-

0.008
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.015
0.006
<0.001
0.010
-
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Only significant (p < 0.05) comparisons are reported. The left column labelled Block A lists the blocks that
differed significantly from blocks listed in column Block B. RT – response time, SD – standard deviation.

RTs were examined and revealed a main effect of block, F(3, 95) = 9.34, MSE = 63567.54,
p < 0.001. Deconstructing this effect using pairwise comparisons revealed significant RT
differences between Blocks 1 – 11 versus other subsequent blocks (see Table 4.1 and
Figure 4.4A for specific significant comparisons). No differences arose between Block 12
and other blocks. Mean RTs decreased from 867 ms in Block 1 to 749 ms in Block 12.
SD of RTs across blocks, within patients, were investigated, and revealed a main effect of
block F(3, 62) = 5.07, MSE = 11919, p < 0.001. Significant SD differences between blocks
were examined using pairwise comparisons and revealed significant differences between
Blocks 1 – 3 versus other subsequent blocks (See Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4B for specific
significant comparisons). No significant differences arose between Blocks 4-12 and other
subsequent blocks. Mean SD decreased from 298 ms in Block 1 to 143 ms in Block 12.
The single factor repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed a significant main
effect of Block, F(4, 68) = 3.03, MSE = 33.07, p = 0.025. This was explored further using
pairwise comparisons (results presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4C).

Significant

differences existed between Blocks 1 and 2 versus other subsequent blocks in Session 1.
No significant differences arose between blocks later than 2 with one another. The average
Block 1 score was 95.01%, which increased to 98.54% in Block 12.
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Figure 4.4 Mean response times, standard deviations, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and
2.
A) Mean response times (ms) in each block in Session 1. B) Mean standard deviations (ms) calculated using
response times in each block in Session 1. C) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 1. D)
Mean response time (ms) in each block in Session 2. E) Mean standard deviations (ms) calculated using
response times in each block in Session 2. F) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 2. Error
bars represent standard error of the mean. Response time was measured from the onset of the abstract
image to the button-press response made by the participant. Response accuracy is a percentage measure
of the number of correct button-press responses in a block relative to total number of trials in the block.
Significant differences (p < 0.05) are indicated with an asterisk (*) and numbers listed next to the asterisk
indicate the blocks from which each block differs significantly.
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4.3.2.2

Session 2

Mean RT in Block 1, Session 2 was significantly faster than the last block of Session 1 (t
= 1.86, p = 0.044). Accuracy in Block 1, Session 2 was not significantly different from
accuracy in the last block of Session 1 (t = 0.18, p = 0.429). Mean block RT, SD of RTs
across blocks, and accuracy across Session 2 are presented in Figures 4.4D– F,
respectively. As in Session 1, single factor repeated measures ANOVAs were run to
investigate differences across Session 2. There were no significant differences across
blocks for RT (F < 1), SD (F < 1), or response accuracy (F < 1) across Session 2.

4.3.2.3

Session 3

Data from two participants were excluded from analysis in Session 3 due to reported
misinterpretation of the instructions of the task. The error rate in the remaining 17
participants was low (average incorrect responses: 0.74%). Table 4.2 presents the mean
RTs and error rates in each of the congruent, incongruent, and control conditions.
Table 4.2 Mean response times and error rates for the congruent, incongruent, and
control conditions in Session 3.
Condition

Response Time (ms)

Error Rate (%)

Congruent
Incongruent
Control

378.66 (17.44)
387.45 (20.66)
377.84 (18.17)

0.73 (0.17)
1.34 (0.39)
0.98 (0.50)

Mean (SEM) response times (ms) and error rates (%) are presented. In the congruent condition, an image
appeared in a location that was consistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline, in
Session 1, and practiced in Session 2. In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that
was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned at baseline, in Session 1, and practiced
in Session 2. In the control condition, six new images that were not previously presented in the experiment
appeared to the left or right of centre.

Paired t-tests were performed on error rates between congruent and control, and
incongruent and control. One sample t-tests were performed on average RT facilitation
(i.e., congruent – control), and interference (i.e., incongruent – control; Figure 4.6). There
were significantly more errors in incongruent compared to control (t = 2.06, p = 0.029)
conditions. In addition, RT interference compared to zero trended towards significance (t
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= 1.37, p = 0.095). However, facilitation (t = -1.23, p = 0.881) scores did not differ
significantly from zero (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Mean facilitation and interference scores in Session 3.
Mean (SEM) facilitation, interference, and incongruent minus congruent difference scores are presented.
Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent minus control condition and interference was
calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent minus control condition. The incongruent minus congruent contrast
was also completed. Again, in the congruent condition stimuli were presented in the location that was
consistent with the learned left or right button-press responses in earlier sessions. On incongruent trials,
stimuli were presented in the location that was inconsistent with the learned left or right button-press responses
in earlier sessions. The control condition consisted of new images that the participant had not previously
associated with a right or left button-press response. *p<0.05, wp<0.1

4.3.3 FMRI Data
Significant activations are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 FDR corrected unless
otherwise stated using SPM5 (Table 4.3-5). In all sessions, error rates were low and
therefore only correct responses were examined at the group level. Session 1 contrasts are
reported in Table 4.3, Session 2 contrasts are stated in Table 4.4, and Session 3 contrasts
appear in Table 2.5. All coordinates (x, y, z) are reported in MNI space. Only significant
striatal activations are reported in the text below. Regions of significant activation outside
of the striatum are presented in Tables 4.3-5. FMRI contrasts of interest are displayed in
Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
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4.3.3.1

Session 1

Session 1 was divided into two phases of learning based on behavioural performance.
Phase 1 included Blocks 1-3, whereas Phase 2 was comprised of Blocks 4-12. During
Phase 1, RTs were longer and accuracy was slightly lower, with greater across-trial
variability in these measures than in Phase 2, reflecting response deliberation. During
Phase 2, RTs and accuracy had stabilized, indicating that the stimulus-response
associations were well-learned and required less consideration at this stage. Session 1
contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Significant brain activations in Session 1 contrasts of interest reported in
MNI space.
Contrast

Anatomical Area

Cluster
Size

t

q

x, y, z

Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Right dorsal caudate nucleus
Right occipital fusiform gyrus
Left occipital pole
Left postcentral gyrus
No suprathreshold activations
Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Right dorsal caudate nucleus
Right occipital pole
Right inferior frontal gyrus
Left
juxtapositional
lobule
cortex
Left middle frontal gyrus

1108
*
5836
239
139

6.37
5.54
7.67
5.76
3.93

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.006
0.028

-18, -1, 25
21, -4, 25
48, -64, -20
0, -97, 16
-45, -37, 61

152
*
207
72
23

5.29
3.59
6.34
4.35
5.33

0.003
0.028
0.001
0.026
0.020

-15, 11, 25
18, -19, 25
3, -91, 22
54, 17, -2
-6, -1, 58

23

5.29

0.020

-30, -4, 52

Left ventral putamen
Right lateral occipital complex
Right cerebellum
Left cerebellum
No suprathreshold activations
Right ventral putamen
Left supramarginal gyrus
Left lateral occipital cortex
Right insular cortex
Right cuneal cortex
Right supramarginal gyrus
Right middle frontal gyrus
Left frontal pole
Right middle temporal gyrus
No suprathreshold activations

67
79
208
214

3.58
4.59
4.37
4.26

<0.001
0.022
0.001
0.001

-24, 2, -10
51, -64, -14
33, -52, -29
-39, -61, -23

*
1388
346
560
732
251
137
115
332

4.54
5.28
5.10
4.96
4.68
4.56
4.55
4.48
4.27

0.017
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.004
0.007
<0.001

24, 8, -11
-60, -31, 46
-48, -70, -14
39, -1, -2
0, -79, 25
60, -31, 40
36, 35, 43
-42, 44, 28
51, -52, -2

Session 1: Phase 1
SR minus rest

FB minus rest
SR minus FB

FB minus SR

Session 1: Phase 2
SR minus rest

FB minus rest
SR minus FB

FB minus SR
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Session 1: Phase 1 versus Phase 2 for SR events
Phase 1 minus Blocks 4-6
Blocks 4-6 minus Phase 1

Phase 1 minus Blocks 7-9

Blocks 7-9 minus Phase 1
Phase 1 minus Blocks 1012
Blocks 10-12 minus Phase
1

No suprathreshold activations
Left cingulate gyrus
Right parietal operculum
cortex
Left insular cortex
Left parietal operculum cortex
Right cingulate gyrus
Right precuneous cortex
Left intracalcarine cortex
Right middle frontal gyrus
Right dorsal caudate nucleus
Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Left precuneous cortex
Right frontal medial cortex
No suprathreshold activations
Right dorsal caudate nucleus
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1519

5.08
4.43

0.013
<0.001

-15, -28, 40
57, -31, 31

855
355
502
191
890
113
267
*
7451
196

4.40
4.25
4.24
4.10
4.01
3.88
3.69
3.65
5.10
4.57

<0.001
0.001
<0.001
0.008
<0.001
0.035
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.016

-30, 29, 7
-51, -40, 22
9, 14, 34
9, -43, 49
-9, -64, 13
27, 35, 28
21, 19, 26
-18, 2, 26
-9, -64, 16
6, 35, -14

113

4.25

0.013

18, 26, 13

Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Right lateral occipital cortex
Left precentral gyrus

*
969
2454

4.18
5.58
5.99

0.004
<0.001
<0.001

-12, -1, 25
45, -70, -20
-30, -7, 52

Left lateral occipital cortex
Left thalamus
Right frontal medial cortex
Left planum temporale

1539
218
151
142

4.72
4.62
4.21
3.86

<0.001
0.005
0.016
0.019

-51, -73, 19
-3, -19, 1
3, 38, -14
-33, -31, 16

Cluster size is reported in voxels. Q values are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 corrected for false
discovery rate (FDR) at the cluster-level. T values are reported at the voxel level. Coordinates are reported
in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast. SR – stimulus-response
events; FB – feedback events. *Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster, q
value reported is FDR corrected at the voxel level.

Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 1, Session 1.

In Phase 1, significant activation

occurred in the left (peak coordinates: -18, -1, 25; t = 6.37; q < 0.001), and right (peak
coordinates: 21, -4, 25; t = 5.54; q < 0.001) dorsal caudate nucleus contrasting stimulusresponse events with rest periods (Figure 4.6A). Significant activation also occurred in the
left (peak coordinates: -15, -1, 25; t = 5.29; q = 0.003) and right (peak coordinates: 18, 19, 25; t = 3.59; q = 0.028) dorsal caudate nucleus contrasting stimulus-response minus
feedback events.
Receiving feedback: Phase 1, Session 1. No significant striatal activations arose for
feedback events minus rest or stimulus-response events.
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Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 2, Session 1. Significant activation occurred in the left
ventral putamen (peak coordinates: -24, 2, -10; t = 3.58; q < 0.001) for Phase 2 stimulusresponse events minus rest (Figure 4.6B). In addition, significant activation occurred in
the right ventral putamen for stimulus-response events minus feedback events (peak
coordinates: 24, 8, -11; t = 4.54; q = 0.017). To further explore Phase 2, stimulus-response
events were compared to rest at a more liberal criterion of p < 0.005 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons with a cluster threshold of 10 contiguous voxels. Even using this
liberal criterion, no peaks in the DS were revealed. Some activation related to the peak in
the left ventral putamen extended dorsally into DS but only at this lessened criterion (peak
coordinates: -27, 5, -7; t = 3.70; p < 0.001).
Receiving feedback: Phase 2, Session 1. No significant activation occurred during Phase
2 for feedback events minus rest, or feedback minus stimulus-response events.
Stimulus-response decisions: Phase 1 versus Phase 2. Given that Phase 1 consisted of the
first three blocks and Phase 2 was composed of the last nine blocks (Block 4-12), contrasts
were made between Phase 1 and Phase 2, grouped into three consecutive blocks, to create
balanced contrasts. No significant striatal activations occurred in the Phase 1 minus Blocks
4, 5, and 6 contrast, or the reverse contrast. Significant activation arose in the left and right
dorsal caudate nucleus (peak coordinates: -18, 2, 26; t = 3.65; q < 0.001, and peak
coordinates: 21, -19, 26; t = 3.69; q < 0.001, respectively), for Phase 1 minus Blocks 7, 8,
9, and for Phase 1 minus Blocks 10, 11, and 12 (peak coordinates: -12, -1, 25; t = 4.18; q
= 0.004, and peak coordinates: 18, 26, 13; t = 4.25; q = 0.013, respectively; Figure 4.6C)
contrasts. No significant striatal activation occurred during the reverse contrasts (Figure
4.6D).

166

Figure 4.6 Significant activations in contrasts of interest in Session 1 Phases 1 (i.e., Blocks
1-3) and 2 (i.e., Blocks 4-12): SR events.
The figure shows significant activation at a threshold of q < 0.05 corrected for false discovery rate (FDR). In
each contrast of interest, horizontal slices are presented ranging from z= -5 to z = 25, every 5 mm. A) BOLD
signal for stimulus-response minus rest events in Phase 1 of Session 1. B) BOLD signal for stimulus-response
minus rest events in Phase 2 of Session 1. C) BOLD signal for Phase 1 minus Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session
1 stimulus-response events. D) BOLD signal for Blocks 10, 11, and 12 of Session 1 minus Phase 1 stimulusresponse events. SR – stimulus-response events.
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4.3.3.2

Session 2

Session 2 contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Significant brain activations in Session 2 contrasts of interest reported in
MNI space.
Contrast

Anatomical Area

Cluster
Size

t

q

x, y, z

Block 1 minus rest

Right dorsal caudate nucleus
Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Right ventral putamen
Left ventral putamen
Right cerebellum
Right dorsal caudate nucleus
Left dorsal caudate nucleus
Right cerebellum
Left thalamus
Left temporal occipital fusiform
cortex
Right superior temporal gyrus
Right occipital pole
Left postcentral gyrus
No suprathreshold activations

42
85
151
*
54
*
23
293
160
173

3.98
4.08
4.36
4.32
5.31
3.98
4.26
5.17
4.65
4.62

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.013
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

15, 1, 26
-18, -4, 23
24, 14, 2
-27, 8, -1
-45, -52, -32
18, -4, 23
-18, -4, 23
27, -40, -32
-6, -1, 1
-39, -58, -23

67
57
35

4.28
4.21
4.01

0.009
0.014
0.047

42, -34, 4
15, -100, 10
-30, -19, 37

Block 2-8 minus rest
Block 1 minus Block 8

Block 8 minus Block 1

Cluster size is reported in voxels. Q values are reported at a significance level of q < 0.05 corrected for false
discovery rate (FDR) at the cluster-level. T values are reported at the voxel level. Coordinates are reported
in MNI space. Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast. SR – stimulus-response
events; FB – feedback events. *Cluster size unobtainable as peak coordinates are within a larger cluster, q
value reported is FDR corrected at the voxel level.

Stimulus-response decisions: Block 1, Session 2. Significant activation arose in the left
(peak coordinates: -18, -4, 23; t = 4.08; q < 0.001), and right (peak coordinates: 15, 1, 26;
t = 3.98; q < 0.001) dorsal caudate nucleus, as well as left (peak coordinates: -27, 8, -1; t
= 4.32; q < 0.001) and right (peak coordinates: 24, 14, 2; t = 4.36; q < 0.001) ventral
putamen, when Block 1 decision events were contrasted with rest periods (Figure 4.7A).
No significant striatal activation arose for each of Blocks 2-8 when compared with rest
events at q < 0.05 FDR or even using a more liberal criterion of p < 0.005 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons. Significant activation in left and right dorsal caudate nucleus arose
when stimulus response events in Block 1 were contrasted with those in Block 8 of Session
2 (peak coordinates: -18, -4, 23; t = 4.26; q < 0.001 and peak coordinates: 18, -4, 23; t =
3.98; q < 0.001, respectively; Figure 4.7B and C).
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Figure 4.7 Significant activations in contrasts of interest in Session 2.
The figure shows significant activation at a threshold of q < 0.05 corrected for false discovery rate (FDR). In
each contrast of interest, horizontal slices are presented ranging from z= -5 to z = 25, every 5 mm. A) BOLD
signal for stimulus-response events of Block 1 of Session 2 minus rest. B) BOLD signal for stimulus-response
events of Block 1 minus Block 8 of Session 2. C) BOLD signal of stimulus-response events of Blocks 8 minus
Blocks 1 of Session 2. SR – stimulus-response events.

4.3.3.3

Session 3

Session 3 contrasts of interest are reported in Table 4.5.
Localization responses: There were no significant activations in any striatal regions for
contrasts of facilitation (i.e., congruent minus control trials), interference (i.e., incongruent
minus control trials), or incongruent and congruent vs. control trials at an FDR corrected
threshold of q < 0.05. At a less stringent threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected, however,
contrasting incongruent and congruent trials (i.e., conditions in which suppression of
previously-learned stimulus-identity responses were required

in favour of the less-

practiced location responses) with control trials (i.e., condition in which there were no
previously-learned stimulus-identity responses to distract from location responses), a 271
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voxel cluster in left dorsal putamen extending into dorsal caudate nucleus appeared (peak
coordinates: -18, -13, 14; t = 2.86; p < 0.003).
Table 4.5 Significant brain activations in Session 3 contrasts of interest reported in
MNI space.
Contrast

Anatomical
Area

Facilitation (Congruent minus Control)
Control minus Congruent
Interference (Incongruent minus Control)
Control minus Incongruent
Incongruent minus Congruent
Congruent minus Incongruent
Congruent and Incongruent minus Control

No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
No suprathreshold activations
Left dorsal
271
putamen
No suprathreshold activations

Control minus Congruent and Incongruent

Cluster
Size

t

p

x, y, z

2.86

0.003

-18, -13, 14

Cluster size is reported in voxels. P values are reported at a significance level of p < 0.005 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons. T values are reported at the voxel level. Coordinates are reported in MNI space.
Striatal regions are presented first and highlighted in each contrast. Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs
in the congruent minus control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent
minus control condition.

4.3.3.4

Bayesian Analysis

Beta values in the bilateral dorsal caudate nucleus ROI were extracted for stimulusresponse events separately for Sessions 1, 2, and 3. These values were used in the Bayesian
analysis. To rule out a role for DS in late stimulus-response learning, DS BOLD signal
was predicted to attenuate, despite behavioural signs of ongoing late-stage learning, during
Phase 2, Session 1, and Blocks 2-8, Session 2. Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were
conducted on the beta values extracted from the dorsal caudate nucleus ROIs in these
sessions. In this Bayesian analysis, a Bayes’ factor of less than 3 is considered to
significantly support the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2014) that DS activation was not
correlated with stimulus-response events.
Session 1 Bayes’ factors: Bayes’ factor one-sample t-tests were conducted separately on
the average beta values for each block in Session 1. As supported in the whole brain
analysis, Bayes’ factors in Blocks 1-4 significantly supported the alternative hypothesis
that activation in DS in these blocks is significantly greater than zero. Blocks 5-12,
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however, all had a Bayes’ factor of less than 3, indicating that the beta values in DS are not
greater than zero, strongly supporting the null hypothesis. That is, in Session 1, DS appears
to mediate response-selection responses in Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3), with values ranging
from 7.2-15.4, as well as in Block 4, with a Bayes’ factor of 8.5. These results strongly
support the alternative hypothesis. For all subsequent blocks in Session 1, Bayes’ factors
were well below the cut-off of 3, with a mean Bayes’ factor of 1.12 (0.09) in all blocks but
one. In Block 10 only, an isolated finding, the DS Bayes’ factor trended toward being
greater than zero (BF10 = 2.78). Entirely, consistent with the frequency-based statistical
analyses, our Bayesian analysis of these data strongly support the view that DS BOLD
signal preferentially arises during blocks when response deliberation is expected based on
serial order positions, and confirmed by RT, accuracy, and the variability of behaviour
across trials.
Session 2 Bayes’ factors: A similar Bayesian analysis was conducted on each of the eight
average block beta values extracted from the DS ROI. Supporting the Session 2, whole
brain analysis, only the first block was trending towards being significantly greater than
zero (BF10 = 2.61). Blocks 2-8 had Bayes’ factors of less than 1, with a mean Bayes’ factor
of 0.20 (0.01), strongly supporting the null hypothesis, that the average DS beta values are
not significantly greater than zero. That is, DS is neither mediating learning or responding
in these later sessions when responses were relatively effortless and therefore required less
reflection.
Session 3 Bayes’ factors: Similarly to the above Bayesian analyses for Sessions 1 and 2,
beta values were extracted from the bilateral DS ROIs for each of the congruent,
incongruent, and control regressors. Bayes’ factor, one-sample t-tests were conducted on
facilitation (i.e., congruent minus control trials) and interference (i.e., incongruent minus
control trials) scores. All scores had a Bayes’ factor of less than 1.5 indicating that for
facilitation (BF10 = 1.30), interference (BF10 = 0.46), as well as for the sum of congruent
and incongruent minus control (BF10 = 0.62), DS activity beta values are not significantly
greater than zero using this analysis.
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4.4 Discussion
Examining late-stage stimulus-response learning, we found that DS activity—specifically
the body of dorsal caudate nucleus—correlated with deliberate decision-making rather than
feedback events, replicating our main finding in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014). We
divided Session 1 into Phases 1 and 2, guided by the serial order of blocks and based on
behavioural data. We examined Phases 1 versus 2 of Session 1, and Block 1 versus 2-8 of
Session 2 separately because the concepts that DS mediates a) learning stimulus-response
associations to the point of automaticity versus b) deliberate response selections, predict
different patterns of DS engagement during earlier versus later trials of Session 1 and in
the initial block of Session 2 compared to later blocks.
Significant DS activity occurred during stimulus-response events in Phase 1, Session 1, but
not Phase 2, Session 1. These findings held whether stimulus-response events in Phase 1
and 2 were contrasted with rest periods, with feedback periods, or with one another. This
is important because stimulus-response automaticity had not been achieved at the end of
Session 1, attested to by improved RT and differences in BOLD signal across Phase 2,
Session 1 to Session 2.

Further, pairwise comparisons across blocks in Session 1,

continued to reveal small but significant differences in RT throughout, though SD and
accuracy had plateaued. Evidence that stimulus-response automaticity was achieved only
occurred by the end of Session 2, given a) increased errors in the incongruent relative to
the control conditions, b) a trend toward significant interference (i.e., incongruent minus
control) in terms of RT data, and c) significant DS activation (i.e., dorsal putamen
extending into dorsal caudate nucleus), in a location-based Stroop task in Session 3. If DS
mediates learning to the point of automaticity, DS activation should persist until this
process is complete. DS BOLD signal dropped out well before this point, demonstrating
dissociation between DS BOLD signal and the progression of stimulus-response
association automatization. DS activation was significantly greater for stimulus-response
events in Phase 1, Session 1, relative to Phase 2, Session 1 (i.e., Blocks 7-9; 10-12). The
correspondence of DS activity with stimulus-response decisions in Phase 1, when longer
RTs, lower accuracy, and greater trial-by-trial variability (i.e., SD) occurred, relative to
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when more stable responding occurred in Phase 2, was entirely in keeping with its proposed
role in deliberate decision making.
A main aim of Session 2, and the 20-minute distractor task that occurred prior to it, was to
create situations in which predictions regarding DS activation levels would differ for the
competing accounts of DS’s role in cognitive function. Further, Session 2 was designed to
evaluate whether automaticity had been achieved by the end of Session 1. This would be
suggested by an absence of change in a) behaviour (i.e., RT, SD, or accuracy) and b) BOLD
signal from Phase 2, Session 1 to Session 2, despite an intervening period of distraction.
As detailed above, this was not the case. Further, the distractor period was intended to reintroduce some uncertainty and hence deliberation in response-selection decisions. If DS
mediates deliberate response selections, generating uncertainty was expected to cause an
increase or re-engagement of DS activity initially in Session 2 (i.e., in Block 1), until
participants re-familiarized themselves once more with stimulus-specific responses.
Supporting the view that DS mediates deliberate, response decisions, DS BOLD signal reemerged and correlated with stimulus-response events in Block 1 of Session 2 only. This
block occurred immediately following a 20-minute, unrelated distractor task. DS BOLD
signal did not correlate preferentially with stimulus-response decisions in Blocks 2-8 of
Session 2 compared to rest. Further, significantly greater DS BOLD signal resulted
comparing Block 1, immediately following distraction, to Block 8, at the end of Session 2.
Using fMRI in healthy controls, we can only contradict the entrenched view that DS
mediates development of stimulus-response automaticity by demonstrating absence of DS
BOLD signal despite behavioural evidence that stimulus-response automatization
remained in progress (i.e., a null result). That is, this claim would be challenged by
dissociating neural signal in DS and behavioural signs of learning. There is a, perhaps,
justified bias against publishing null effects. Null effects can have multiple interpretations
including the possibility that a true difference was not detected due to insensitivity of
measures or related to lack of statistical power (i.e., Type II error). Further with frequentist
approaches, the null and the alternative hypotheses are set up to be asymmetric with
investigator control of the maximum error allowable for supporting the alternative
hypothesis whereas the error associated Type II errors varies in each study based on
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experimental features and power (Dienes, 2014). The application of Bayesian analysis can
reduce pitfalls in dealing with negative results and interpreting null effects. Bayesian
analysis treats null and alternative hypotheses symmetrically, using the data themselves to
determine the relative fit to the respective models. In this way, the statistical obstacles and
validity of accepting versus rejecting the null hypotheses are equated with Bayesian
analysis (Dienes, 2014).
We performed Bayesian analysis on average block beta values extracted from bilateral DS,
specifically the dorsal caudate nucleus ROIs.

These ROIs were defined using the

anatomical boundaries of the caudate nucleus above z = 2 mm. There was significant
support for dorsal caudate nucleus BOLD greater than zero in Phase 1, Session 1, as well
as in in Block 4 (i.e., the first block of Phase 2), Session 1. Bayesian analysis significantly
supported accepting the null hypothesis that activation of DS activation was not greater
than zero in all blocks save Block 4 of Phase 2, Session 1. Frequency-based analyses
revealed significant re-emergence of dorsal caudate nucleus activation in Block 1, Session
2. The Bayes’ Factor only trended toward significance for Block 1, Session 2 (i.e., 2.61
with significance threshold set at 3), not fully supporting the alternative hypothesis. It is
notable, however, that the mean Bayes’ factors for all other blocks in Session 2 (i.e., Blocks
2-8) was 0.20. This pattern of results is entirely incompatible with the view that DS
mediates late-learning to the point of automaticity and wholly supports the notion that DS
underlies decisions that still require reflection

4.4.1 Supplemental Experiment 2
Based on improved RT and differences in BOLD signal from Phase 2, Session 1 to Session
2, automaticity was not achieved at the end of Session 1 let alone at the end of Phase 1,
Session 1. Nonetheless, DS signal had dropped out by Phase 2 (i.e., across Blocks 5-12),
Session 1. Significant DS BOLD signal was noted only in Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3, and
Block 4, the latter was only revealed using Bayesian analyses), Session 1 when RT, error
rates, and mean block SDs were high, suggesting deliberation. Preferential DS BOLD
signal also occurred in Block 1, Session 2, following a 20-minute distractor task aimed at
re-introducing uncertainty and some consideration of response selection decisions. Phase
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1, Session 1 constituted only 9 presentations of each stimulus, which referring to the larger
literature would be insufficient to support the development of automatic stimulus-specific
responding (Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Helie et al., 2010; C. M. MacLeod &
Dunbar, 1988; Myers et al., 2003; R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977;
Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wachter, Lungu, Liu, Willingham, & Ashe, 2009).
Nonetheless, to be entirely certain of our interpretations of the Main Experiment, we
conducted Experiment 2 (Methods and Results presented in (2.6.1). In this behavioural
experiment, we included a location Stroop task immediately after Phase 1, Session 1 (i.e.,
Session 3A) as well as at the end of Session 2 (i.e., Session 3B), to directly rule out the
possibility that stimulus-response automaticity had been achieved after Phase 1.
Performance in Sessions 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 entirely replicated behavioural findings
in our Main Experiment (i.e., compare Figures 2.5 and Figure 2.9). Significant interference
in location responses using RT or accuracy did not occur in the incongruent relative to the
control condition in Session 3A. Similarly, there was not significant RT or accuracy
facilitation in the congruent relative to the control condition in Session 3A. Consequently,
there was no evidence that stimulus-specific responses had achieved automatic status at the
conclusion of Phase 1, Session 1, based on performance of a modified location Stroop task
in Session 3A. There was a trend toward slower RTs in Block 1, Session 2, relative to
Block 12, Session 1, replicating the finding in our Main Experiment that stimulus-response
automaticity was not achieved by the end of Session 1.
In contrast, significant interference in terms of RT occurred during Session 3B, after
stimulus-response associations had been trained in Session 1 (i.e., twelve blocks), and
Session 2 (i.e., eight blocks), for incongruent relative to control trials. This suggests that
stimulus-response automaticity was achieved by the end of Session 2, entirely consistent
with our findings in the Main Experiment.
The results in Experiment 2, inform our interpretation of the fMRI findings in the Main
Experiment. Taken together, the results favour the view that DS activation correlated with
stimulus-response events in Phase 1, Session 1, when an element of deliberation remained,
because this region has a role in decision making, as has been suggested by others as well
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(Ali et al., 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al.,
2011; Ohira et al., 2010)

4.4.2 Summary
Automaticity is variously defined as reflecting stimulus-specific responses that a) persist
even when feedback is omitted or is reversed, generalizing across situations (Myers et al.,
2003; Shohamy & Wagner, 2008), b) are unaffected by distracting information or tasks
(Foerde et al., 2006), and c) interfere with enacting new incongruent responses (C. M.
MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). DS has been implicated in the development of automatic
stimulus-specific responses (Ashby et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2009; Yin & Knowlton,
2006). DS has also been ascribed a role in decision making when deliberation is required
(Ali et al., 2010; R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito,
2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et al., 2010; Robertson et al., 2015). Our results
refute a role for DS in late-stage, stimulus-response learning and automatization, and rather
are entirely consistent with the view that DS mediates deliberate decision making.
In this experiment, significant DS activity— particularly the body region of the dorsal
caudate nucleus— occurred only during stimulus-response, and not feedback events,
replicating our main finding in Hiebert et al., (2014b) suggesting that DS mediates response
decisions and not learning from feedback. Further supporting a role for DS in mediating
decisions, DS was significant in Phase 1, Session 1, when longer RTs, lower accuracy, and
greater trial-by-trial variability suggested a degree of indecision and hence deliberation was
required. Session 2 was performed following a 20-minute distractor task that aimed to reintroduce some uncertainty in response-selection decisions. This provided a further test of
the hypothesis that DS mediates decision making when choosing among response
alternatives demands some contemplation of options. As we had predicted, we observed a
transient re-emergence of DS activation, correlating with the decision-making events in
Block 1, Session 2, immediately following distraction. In contrast, during Phase 2, Session
1, and Blocks 2-8 of Session 2, stimulus-response decisions did not correlate significantly
with DS BOLD signal. Further, Bayesian analysis supported these null results in all but
Block 4 (i.e., the first block) of Phase 2, Session 1. In our Main Experiment, stimulus-
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response automaticity had not been achieved at the conclusion of Session 1 based on the
evidence that RTs and BOLD signal differed from Block 12, Session 1 and Block 1,
Session 2 and the additional finding that pairwise t-tests of RT for individual blocks across
Session 1 continued to shorten slightly across blocks. Stimulus-response associations were
over-learned to the point of automaticity at the conclusion of Session 2, supported by the
finding that stimulus-response associations learned in Session 1 and reinforced in Session
2 facilitated congruent and interfered with incongruent location responses in a modified
location Stroop task. In Experiment 2, we sought direct evidence that Phase 1, Session 1
was not sufficient to promote development of stimulus-response automaticity, using our
location Stroop task (See 2.6). Experiment 2 revealed that stimulus-response automaticity
was not achieved following Blocks 1-3, Session 1 (i.e., Phase 1) after only 9 presentations
of each stimulus. The fact that DS activation attenuated after Phase 1, Session 1, before
automaticity was achieved, in the Main Experiment is therefore wholly inconsistent with
the contention that DS mediates late-stage, stimulus-response learning to the point of
automaticity (Ashby et al., 2007; Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).
There was a clear dissociation between DS BOLD signal and behavioural evidence of latestage, stimulus-response association automatization.
In contrasts where DS activation emerged significantly, cortical regions previously
implicated in decision making and categorization judgments were also revealed. These
included occipital regions of the fusiform gyrus that have been implicated in decision
making, specifically in motor planning and execution (Tosoni, Guidotti, Del Gratta,
Committeri, & Sestieri, 2016), as well as the occipital pole and lateral occipital cortex that
are both implicated in object recognition (Vernon, Gouws, Lawrence, Wade, & Morland,
2016). Object recognition is a required step toward enacting stimulus-specific response
selections. The right inferior frontal gyrus has been shown to implement and reprogramme
action plans (Stock, Steenbergen, Colzato, & Beste, 2016). Many of the brain regions that
were significantly activated along with DS during response-selection events are
reciprocally connected with the dorsal caudate nucleus, the body specifically, such as the
precentral, postcentral, inferior, and fusiform gyri (Robinson et al., 2012; Tziortzi et al.,
2014). These results highlight the fact that, whereas the DS does not function in isolation,
it plays a key, central role in performing response-related decisions.
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4.4.3 DS in Stimulus-Response Learning versus Decision Making
The claim that DS mediates learning is well-entrenched (Ashby et al., 2007; Ashby et al.,
2010; Balleine et al., 2009; Brovelli et al., 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Yin & Knowlton,
2006). Challenges to this notion are accruing, however (Atallah et al., 2007; Exner et al.,
2002; A. A. MacDonald, Monchi, et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014). In a previous experiment,
we investigated DS’s role in early stimulus-response learning. We found that DS activity,
particularly the head of dorsal caudate nucleus, correlated with stimulus-response decisions
and enactment, not with feedback processing, the point at which early, stimulus-response
associations are learned (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014). In that experiment, DS activity
did not correlate with response decisions in the first half of our session, before response
tendencies had developed. DS activity emerged and correlated significantly with stimulusresponse decisions in later stages of stimulus-response learning. At these later stages when
DS activity correlated with stimulus-response events, the learning curve was shallower and
therefore DS did not seem to be tracking learning behaviour per se. Further, and quite
convincing that DS does not mediate early, stimulus-response learning via feedback, DS
preferentially correlated with stimulus-response decision events in Session 2, when
feedback was omitted and hence further feedback-based learning was precluded. In
Session 2, however, decision accuracy remained imperfect (i.e., mean 92%), and RTs (i.e.,
mean 696 ms) suggested some deliberation was required. That is, DS activity arose when
stimulus-specific responses were not overlearned and still required a degree of deliberation
in this session of our previous experiment. We argued that DS is erroneously implicated
in stimulus-response learning because it mediates aspects of decision making, and most
stimulus-response learning studies combine decision and learning processes.

This

confound exists at the behavioural level in that expression of learning typically depends
upon intact decision-making abilities.

In neuroimaging studies, neural activation

associated with learning and decision processes are frequently merged into a single
learning event. Though our previous finding seriously challenged the premise that DS
mediates early stimulus-response learning, we could not comment on the DS’s role in latestage learning, particularly in stimulus-response automaticity that occurs through repeated
experience of stimulus-response associations and does not necessarily depend upon
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feedback. The view that DS mediates late learning is also prevalent (Ashby et al., 2010;
Balleine et al., 2009; Ruge & Wolfensteller, 2013; Tricomi et al., 2009) and this served as
the impetus for the Main Experiment.
Extending our previous investigation (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), here we examined
DS’s role in late-stage learning versus decision making.

Our results were entirely

consistent with the view that DS mediates decisions when a degree of deliberation is
required (Session 1, Phase 1; Session 2, Block 1), consistent with our previous conclusions
regarding DS’s role in an early-learning experiment (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014).
That DS activity attenuated before automaticity had been achieved is inconsistent with the
view that it mediates late-stage stimulus-response learning (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010;
Helie et al., 2010; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014;
Soto et al., 2013; Voorn, Vanderschuren, Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004; Yin
& Knowlton, 2006). If the role of DS is to learn stimulus-response associations and to train
cortical-cortical connections to the point of automaticity, DS activity should have persisted
into Session 2, given that this learning process had not reached completion based on
differences in RT and BOLD signal from Session 1 to Session 2 (Ashby, et al., 2007). The
current results are therefore at odds with the SPEED model ascribing DS a role in mediating
automaticity (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010) as well as with the theory that DS not
only mediates stimulus-response habit learning but also underlies responding that is
habitual (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2005).
The finding that DS activity for stimulus-response events attenuates prior to the
development of automatic responding has been shown convincingly by others as well (Wu,
et al., 2004; Waldschmidt and Ashby, 2011; Soto et al., 2013). de Wit, Barker, Dickinson,
and Cools (2011) used an instrumental conflict task, where participants first learned simple
biconditional associations in a goal-directed or habit fashion, and later performed decisions
where select outcomes were devalued. Patients with PD, tested in the OFF or ON
dopaminergic medication states, scored similarly to controls in the outcome-devalued stage
of the experiment with respect to both the goal-directed and habit learned associations. In
PD, DS is significantly dopamine depleted and hence DS functions a significantly impaired
in the off state and are improved by dopaminergic therapy. These findings, therefore
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suggest that DS does not mediate the development of automaticity, or interestingly even
goal-directed learning in this task (de Wit et al., 2011).
More consistent with our current results, as well as with our previous findings (Nole M.
Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014), DS seems to be implicated in decision making only once
stimulus-response tendencies begin to develop, when a degree of deliberation remains, but
before responses are enacted with little reflection or automatically (Figure 2.7). These
results integrate with a growing literature linking DS to decision making (Atallah et al.,
2007; Grahn, Parkinson, & Owen, 2008), particularly the body of the caudate nucleus. as
we have shown here, (Cincotta & Seger, 2007; Little, Shin, Sisco, & Thulborn, 2006;
Seger, Peterson, Cincotta, Lopez-Paniagua, & Anderson, 2010), and especially when
deliberation, as well as cognitive control or flexibility processes are required (R. Cools &
D'Esposito, 2011; Robertson et al., 2015). In neuroimaging studies, DS activity correlates
with degree of category (Daniel et al., 2010), response-reward (Ohira et al., 2010), and
stimulus-response (Ali et al., 2010; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011) uncertainty. Further,
investigations in patients with DS lesions and in PD patients reveal more significant
impairments for decisions requiring greater deliberation and in some cases superior
performance relative to healthy controls for choosing more automatic responses (Benke et
al., 2003; Cameron et al., 2010; R. Cools et al., 2006; Roshan Cools et al., 2010; Hood et
al., 2007; P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Thoma et al., 2008). Finally, in neuroimaging
studies that utilize the Stroop task, a robust paradigm that examines cognitive control (C.
M. MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000) resolving response conflict and inhibiting pre-potent
responses in the incongruent condition frequently implicate DS (Ali et al., 2010; Coderre
& van Heuven, 2013; Robertson et al., 2015). These findings are at odds with any theory
that ascribes a role to DS in habit learning or habitual responding.

4.4.4 Role of the Striatum in Stimulus-Response Learning and Decision
Making
Figure 4.8 presents our theorized patterns of DS and VS engagement for stimulus-response
versus feedback events separately, following the course from early- to late-stage learning
and decision making, based on our previous (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) and current
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results. In Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), stimulus-response learning in Session 1 was
divided in half. The first half revealed a much steeper slope of stimulus-response learning
via feedback than the second. The average percent accuracy achieved after the first half of
Session 1 in Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) was 57%. The average percent accuracy at
the end of the second half of Session 1 (i.e., final learning score) was 93%. In the Main
Experiment, after a period of explicit study of stimulus-response associations, the percent
accuracy of the first block of trials in Session 1 was 94%. Session 1 of the current study
was divided into Phases 1 (Blocks 1-3) and 2 (Blocks 4-12) based on behavioural patterns
of accuracy, RT, and inter-trial variability. The average percent accuracy and RT achieved
at the end of Phase 1 were 97% and 746 ms and at the end of Phase 2 were 98% and 694
ms, respectively.
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Figure 4.8 Roles of Ds and VS in early and late stimulus-response learning as supported
by our findings in N. M. Hiebert et al. (2014) and the Main Experiment of the current study.
Graphs presented above illustrate preferential patterns of DS and VS activation for stimulus-response events
versus feedback separately, following the course of learning from early to late stage. This is not actual data
and the amplitude and shape of curves reflect our theoretical interpretations of our results. We present
Session 1, of Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), divided in half. Average percent accuracy achieved after the
first half of Session 1 was 57%. The average percent accuracy for Session 1 final learning, was 93%. For
the current study, percent accuracy for Block 1, Session 1 was 94%. Session 1 was divided into Phase 1
(Blocks 1-3) and 2 (Blocks 4-12). The average percent accuracy achieved at the end of Phase 1 was 97%
and at the end of Phase 2 was 98%. A) Activation patterns during feedback events. VS activity was noted
significantly only in the first half of Session 1 (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) VS was not significantly
engaged during the feedback events in the Main Experiment. B) Activation patterns during stimulusresponse events. DS activity was noted significantly only during the second half of Session 1 and Session
2 (Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014) when stimulus-response associations were learned but still required
deliberation. In the Main Experiment, DS was only significant in Phase 1, Session 1 when response selections
were learned but still required deliberation based on accuracy and RT. Preferential DS activity was not noted

182

relative to rest, feedback, or Phase 1 stimulus-response events, for stimulus-response events during Phase 2
of Session 1 and for the bulk of Session 2.

DS was preferentially engaged during stimulus-response events in both experiments
(Figure 4.8B). DS activity peaked towards the end of the learning phase in Nole M.
Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014) when stimulus-response associations were beginning to form but
when response selections were still somewhat uncertain (i.e., > 57% accuracy). In the
current study, DS activity occurred early once response selections were learned but still
required deliberation based on accuracy and RT (i.e., < 97% accuracy). DS activity did
not correlate preferentially with stimulus-response events during Phase 2 of Session 1 of
the Main Experiment in which accuracy was above 97% and RTs were quite short. We
conceptualize that responses during Phase 2 of Session 1 required much less consideration
though they had not yet achieved automaticity based on our objective measures. These
results together suggest that DS neither mediates early, feedback-based learning, nor latestage stimulus-response automaticity. Instead, these results integrate with a growing
literature implicating DS in decision making (Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn et al., 2008),
particularly when deliberation is required (R. Cools & D'Esposito, 2011).
In contrast, VS was preferentially engaged during feedback events (Figure 4.8A) in Nole
M. Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), peaking in the first half of Session 1, when the slope of
learning was steepest. VS BOLD signal for feedback events was not significantly different
relative to rest or stimulus-response events in the second half of Session 1 in Nole M.
Hiebert, Vo, et al. (2014), when slope of behavioural change indicated that learning had
decreased. Consistent with this pattern, VS was not significantly engaged during the
feedback events in Session 1 of the current study, which focused on late learning. Early
stimulus-response association learning had already occurred prior even to Block 1, Session
1 in the Main Experiment, due to an explicit learning session that preceded the fMRI
portion of this study, intended as a short-cut to later learning, making feedback much less
informative. Our results integrate with an emerging literature suggesting that VS mediates
many forms of initial/early learning both with and without the provision of feedback,
including reward learning (Camara, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Munte, 2008; A. A.
MacDonald, Monchi, et al., 2013), stimulus-stimulus learning (P. A. MacDonald et al.,
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2011), motor learning (Feigin et al., 2003), sequence learning (Ghilardi et al., 2007),
category learning (Hampshire et al., 2016; Shohamy, Myers, Geghman, Sage, & Gluck,
2006), and list learning (A. A. MacDonald, Seergobin, et al., 2013).

4.4.5 Conclusions
The striatum is increasingly implicated in cognitive functions (P. A. MacDonald, Ganjavi,
Collins, Evans, & Karama, 2014). We found that DS activity correlates only with decisions
and response selections requiring deliberation but not with late-stage, stimulus-response
association learning.

Our results challenge the notion that the DS underlies the

development of automaticity, integrating rather with a growing literature suggesting that
DS—particularly the caudate nucleus—mediates decision making (Cincotta & Seger,
2007; Little et al., 2006; Seger et al., 2010) when an element of deliberation is required
(Atallah et al., 2007; Grahn et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert, Vo, et al., 2014; Jessup &
O'Doherty, 2011; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; McDonald & Hong, 2004; Postle &
D'Esposito, 1999; Smittenaar et al., 2012).
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4.6 Supplemental Material: Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to objectively measure whether stimulus-response
automaticity could be achieved following Phase 1 of Session 1, using our modified location
Stroop task, which was shown to be a sensitive measure of stimulus-response automaticity
in Session 3 of the Main Experiment. The experimental protocol was identical to the Main
Experiment, except that no fMRI measures were acquired and automaticity was assessed
immediately after Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3) of Session 1 as well as at the end of Session 2
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using a modified Stroop task. In Experiment 2, we refer to this new block of locationStroop trials as Session 3A and the block of location-Stroop trials occurring after Sessions
1 (i.e., 12 blocks) and 2 (i.e., 8 blocks) as Session 3B.

4.6.1 Materials and Methods
4.6.1.1

Participants

Fifteen healthy, young adults participated in this experiment (5 males, 10 females).
Subjects had a mean (SEM) age and level of education of 22.47 (0.50) and 16.33 (0.42)
years, respectively. Participants abusing prescription or illicit drugs, alcohol, or taking
cognitive-enhancing medications including methylphenidate were excluded from
participating in the experiment. The Health Sciences Research Ethics Board of the
University of Western Ontario approved this study. All participants provided informed,
written consent, according to the Declaration of Helsinki (2013).

4.6.1.2

Procedures

Experiment 2 was identical to the Main Experiment in nearly every respect.

All

participants first learned explicitly to associate six abstract images with one of two buttonpress responses prior to learning the associations implicitly in the presence (i.e., Session 1)
and absence (i.e., Session 2) of feedback. There was again a 20-minute distractor task
performed between Sessions 1 and 2. Session 3B was the final session in the experiment
and was identical to Session 3 in the Main Experiment. The stimuli, responses, trial
number, and trial parameters were identical to what was described previously. The only
difference in Experiment 2 was that following Phase 1 (i.e., Blocks 1-3), Session 1 and
before Phase 2 (i.e., Blocks 4-12), Session 1, participants performed Session 3A, a
modified Stroop task identical in all respects to Session 3 of the Main Experiment (See
Figure 4.2A and B).
All sessions of Experiment 2 were performed using a 14.0′′ widescreen laptop (Lenovo
T420; Lenovo, Morrisville, North Carolina, USA) running a resolution of 1600 × 900 on
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the Windows 7 operating system. The screen was placed at a distance of 50 cm in front of
the participant and angled for optimal viewing.

4.6.1.3

Behavioural Data Analysis

An identical set of analyses was conducted on the Session 1 and 2 behavioural data. To
reiterate, changes in mean block RT, SD of RTs across blocks, and accuracy across
Sessions 1 and 2 were analyzed using single-factor repeated measures ANOVAs with block
(Session 1: 12 blocks; Session 2: 8 blocks) as the within-subject variable. RT was the time
between the onset of the abstract image and the button press by the participant measured
in ms. The number of correct “right” and “left” button-press responses recorded after each
block was our estimate of accuracy. In addition, t-tests were run on RT and accuracy data
obtained in the last block of Session 1 and the first block of Session 2 to assess forgetting
during the distraction period.
Three conditions―congruent, incongruent, and control―were again created in Sessions
3A and B. Matching the Main Experiment, Sessions 3A and 3B each consisted of 48
congruent, 48 incongruent, and 48 control trials that occurred in random order. All old and
new stimuli appeared equally often left and right of centre. RTs were measured from the
onset of the image until the button-press response in ms. The control condition provided a
baseline measure of accuracy and latency for providing a location response. As in the Main
Experiment, facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent condition minus
those in the control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the
incongruent condition minus those in the control condition. The incongruent minus
congruent contrast was also completed to examine differences between incongruent and
congruent trials. One sample t-tests were run on facilitation and interference scores to
assess if they were significantly different from zero. Paired t-tests were performed on error
rates between congruent and control trials, and incongruent and control trials. Scores were
assessed separately in Session 3A and Session 3B to investigate whether the stimulusresponse associations had been learned to the point that they were automatic after Phase 1
of Session 1 (i.e., Session 3A) or after completing both Sessions 1 and 2 (i.e., Session 3B).
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4.6.2 Results
4.6.2.1

Behavioural Results

Behavioural results for Sessions 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 are presented in Table 4.6 and
Figure 4.9. Results of Session 3 are presented in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.10.

4.6.2.1.1

Session 1

Results for Session 1 are shown with Phases 1 and 2 combined to illustrate the overall
trends in RT, SD, and accuracy. The mean RT, SD, and accuracy across Session 1 are
shown in Figure 4.9A – C respectively. Mauchly’s test was significant, indicating the
assumption of sphericity was violated (p < 0.001). Therefore, degrees of freedom were
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon for RT, SD, and accuracy single-factor
repeated measures ANOVAs.
Table 4.6 Significant pairwise comparisons for RT, SD, and accuracy differences by
block in Session 1 of Experiment 2.
Block A

Block B

RT
t stat

p value

SD
t stat

p value

Accuracy
t stat
p value

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
4
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
4
5
8
9
10

3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
3.79
2.74
3.09
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
>3.79
1.85
1.79
2.19
2.98
2.26

0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
0.008
0.004
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.043
0.047
0.023
0.005
0.020

3.57
5.12
4.97
4.88
4.61
5.00
5.82
6.34
5.47
6.37
5.42
2.77
2.79
-

0.004
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.018
0.017
-

2.01
2.62
2.10
1.94
2.62
2.35
1.93
2.62
1.98
-

2

3

0.032
0.010
0.027
0.036
0.010
0.017
0.037
0.010
0.034
-
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4
7
8

11
12
11
12
11
12
9
11

>3.79
3.79
3.23
2.32
2.12
1.92
1.77
2.01

<0.001
0.001
0.003
0.018
0.026
0.038
0.049
0.032

-

-

1.99
-

0.033
-

Only significant (p < 0.05) comparisons are reported. The left column labelled Block A lists the blocks that
differ significantly from blocks listed in Block B. RT – response time, SD – standard deviation.

RTs were examined and revealed a main effect of block, F(3, 47) = 19.94, MSE = 34593.50,
p < 0.001. Deconstructing this effect using pairwise comparisons revealed significant RT
differences between Blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 versus other subsequent blocks (see Table
4.6 and Figure 4.9A for specific significant comparisons). No significant differences arose
between Block 5, and 9-12 and other subsequent blocks. Mean RTs decreased from 1100
ms in Block 1 to 679 ms in Block 12.
For SDs of RTs across blocks, a main effect of block was revealed, F(3, 36) = 5.72, MSE =
45301, p < 0.001 with significant differences between Blocks 1 and 2 versus later blocks
(See Table 4.6 and Figure 4.9B). Mean SDs decreased from 372 ms in Block 1 to 167 in
Block 12.
The single factor repeated measures ANOVA for accuracy revealed a significant main
effect of Block, F(4, 54) = 2.96, MSE = 37.36, p = 0.029. This was explored further using
pairwise comparisons (results presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.9C).

Significant

differences existed between Blocks 1 and 4 versus other subsequent blocks in Session 1.
No significant differences arose between blocks later than 4 with one another. The average
Block 1 score was 93.70%, which increased to 98.15% in Block 12.
There was a trend in the RTs in the last block of Session 1 relative to those in the first block
of Session 2 (t = 1.36, p = 0.097), with slower responding in Block 1, Session 2 than in
Block 12, Session 1. This replicates our finding that stimulus-response automaticity had
not been achieved at the end of Session 1 in the Main Experiment. Accuracy in the last
block of Session 1 was not significantly different from accuracy in the first block of Session
2 (t = -0.76, p = 0.77).
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Figure 4.9 Mean response times, standard deviations, and accuracy across Sessions 1 and
2 of Experiment 2.
A) Mean response times (ms) in each block in Session 1. B) Mean standard deviation (ms) in each block in
Session 1. C) Mean response accuracy (%) in each block in Session 1. Session 1 was completed as two
separate phases but are presented continuously to illustrate the changes in RT and accuracy. Phase 1
consisted of Blocks 1-3 and Phase 2 was composed of Blocks 4-12. D) Mean response time (ms) in each
block in Session 2. E) Mean standard deviation (ms) in each block in Session 2. F) Mean response accuracy
(%) in each block in Session 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Response time was
measured from the onset of the abstract image to the button-press response made by the participant.
Response accuracy is a percentage measure of the number of correct button-press responses in a block
relative to total number of trials in the block. Significant differences (p < 0.05) are indicated with an asterisk
(*) and numbers listed next to the asterisk indicate the blocks from which each block differs significantly.

4.6.2.1.2

Session 2

Mean RT, SD, and accuracy across Session 2 are presented in Table 4.6 and Figures 4.9D–
F, respectively. As in Session 1, single factor repeated measures ANOVAs were run to
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investigate differences across Session 2. There were no significant differences across
blocks for RT (F < 1), SD (F < 1), or response accuracy (F < 1).

4.6.2.1.3

Sessions 3A and B

Results for Sessions 3A and B are presented in Figure 4.10 and Table 4.8. To reiterate,
Session 3A was completed immediately after Phase 1, Session 1 to investigate whether
automatic responses had developed following Blocks 1-3, Session 1. The error rate was
3.29%. Table 4.8 presents the mean RTs and error rates in each the congruent, incongruent,
and control conditions.
Table 4.8 Mean response times and error rates for the congruent, incongruent, and
control conditions in Sessions 3A and B in Experiment 2.
Condition

Congruent
Incongruent
Control

Session 3A
Response Time
(ms)
409.45 (25.07)
403.02 (26.05)
424.13 (32.54)

Session 3B
Error Rate (%)
3.19 (0.45)
3.75 (0.77)
2.92 (0.34)

Response Time
(ms)
393.44 (19.48)
402.37 (20.79)
390.13 (18.87)

Error Rate (%)
0.28 (0.28)
0.28 (0.19)
0.00 (0.00)

Mean (SEM) response times (ms) and error rates (%) are presented separately for Session 3A and B. Session
3A was completed immediately after Phase 1 of Session 1. Session 3B occurred after Session 2 was
completed. In the congruent condition, an image appeared in a location that was consistent with the learned
left or right button-press response. In the incongruent condition, a stimulus appeared in a location that was
inconsistent with the learned left or right button-press response. In the control condition, six new images that
were not previously presented in the experiment appeared to the left or right of centre.

Paired t-tests were performed on error rates between congruent and control, and
incongruent and control, trials. One sample t-tests were performed on average facilitation
and interference difference scores (Figure 2.10A). There were no significant differences
in terms of errors between congruent and control (t = -0.163, p = 0.563), and incongruent
and control (t = -0.143, p = 0.612). Facilitation (t = -1.66, p = 0.119) scores did not differ
significantly from zero in terms of RTs. The incongruent minus control difference score
was significant (t = -2.65, p = 0.019). However, the mean interference score was -21.11
ms indicating faster responding for familiar yet incongruent items relative to novel control
symbols (Figure 4.10A).
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Session 3B was completed after 12 blocks of trials in Session 1 and eight blocks of trials
in Session 2. The error rate was low and similar to Session 3 of the Main Experiment
(average incorrect responses: 0.19%). Table 2.7 presents the mean RTs and error rates in
each the congruent, incongruent, and control conditions of Session 3B. Paired t-tests were
performed on error rates between congruent and control, and incongruent and control trials.
There were no significant differences in terms of errors between congruent and control (t
= 1.00, p = 0.334), and incongruent and control (t = 1.47, p = 0.164). One sample t-tests
were performed on average facilitation and interference difference scores based on RT, as
had been completed previously (Figure 2.10B). Significant interference (t = 3.00, p =
0.010) occurred. Facilitation scores (i.e., congruent-control) did not differ significantly
from zero (t = 0.93, p = 0.368).

Figure 4.10 Mean facilitation and interference difference scores in Sessions 3A and B of
Experiment 2.
A) Mean (SEM) facilitation and interference difference scores for Session 3A. B) Mean (SEM) facilitation and
interference difference scores for Session 3B. Session 3A was completed immediately following Phase 1 of
Session 1 and Session 3B occurred after Session 2. Facilitation was calculated as mean RTs in the congruent
minus control condition and interference was calculated as mean RTs in the incongruent minus control
condition. Again, in the congruent condition stimuli were presented in the location that was consistent with
the learned left or right button-press response learned in earlier sessions. On incongruent trials, stimuli were
presented in the location that was inconsistent with the left or right button-press response learned in earlier
sessions. The control condition consisted of new images that the participant had not previously associated
with a right or left button-press response. *p<0.05.
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Chapter 5

5

General Discussion
In three separate experiments, using fMRI, we investigated the role of the striatum in both
early and late stimulus-response learning in patients with PD, patients with OCD, and in
healthy participants. In Chapter 2, in patients with PD, we found that dopaminergic therapy
improved response accuracy related to enhanced DS BOLD signal. In contrast, exogenous
dopamine decreased the efficiency of stimulus-response learning, with corresponding
attenuation of VS activity. These results support the contention that DS mediates decision
making and not early, stimulus-response learning whereas VTA-innervated VS supports
stimulus-response association learning. Combining PD, fMRI, and dopaminergic therapy
that induces changes in a) behaviour and b) correspondingly in BOLD signal, allows
greater confidence in suggesting that dopamine-mediated neural changes produce
behavioural improvements and impairments. In Chapter 3, patients with OCD evidenced
impaired stimulus-specific response decisions and stimulus-response learning efficiency.
Correspondingly, task-relevant DS activity during Stimulus-Response Decision Events and
VS activity in Feedback Events were reduced. Lastly in Chapter 4, we demonstrated that
DS does not mediate late-stage habit learning toward automaticity but rather underlies
deliberative response selections.

5.1 The role of DS in stimulus-response learning
There exists a rift in the literature regarding DS’ role in learning versus decision-making.
There is a large literature implicating DS as a learning region, mediating both early, goaldirected learning as well as habit formation (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Fouragnan,
Retzler, & Philiastides, 2018; Hart, Leung, & Balleine, 2013; Salmi, Nyberg, & Laine,
2018). On the other side of the chasm, there is a competing literature supporting a role in
decision making. Few studies acknowledge these contradictory functions ascribed to DS,
let alone aim to bridge this gap. The aim of this thesis was to directly contrast tests of a)
decision-making and b) stimulus-response learning functions, interleaved with one
another in the same experimental paradigm, and in the same participants to directly
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investigate the cognitive function(s) of DS particularly and of VS secondarily. Resolving
this discrepancy in the literature is of high importance because DS is impaired in many
disease states including PD and OCD, as well as many others.
Studies that suggest DS is a learning region often confound learning and decision-making.
In many learning situations, decisions are made and feedback is provided to update
decision accuracy. In behavioural tasks, learning is often measured by accuracy of the
decisions. However, deficits in either learning from feedback or decision-making can yield
impaired performance.

Secondly, in many fMRI experiments, decision-making and

feedback-based learning are modelled together and all active brain areas are ascribed a role
in learning. Few studies attempt to separate decision-making from learning, which has
perpetuated these discrepant views regarding DS’s role in cognition. Consistent with our
findings here, investigations that examine these processes separately have shown that DS,
caudate nucleus (Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014), putamen (Lam et al., 2016), or both
(Francois-Brosseau et al., 2009), are recruited during decision-making and not learning.
Upon closer review of the theories implicating DS in learning described in Chapter 1,
considering common methodological confounds and the division of the striatum into DS
and VS, each of these models can recast the role of DS as a decision-making region.

5.1.1 DMS- and DLS-mediated Decision Making
DMS- and DLS-mediated learning theories were originally proposed in the rodent literature
with some corroboration in homologous regions in humans. To reiterate, goal-directed
learning is often ascribed to DMS, whereas DLS is purported to mediate habit learning. In
humans, this takes the form of learning behaviours to the point of automaticity. VS,
including NAcc, activity is clearly modulated by reward and there is strong evidence that
this brain region mediates early stimulus-response learning. Our research suggests that
DMS and DLS mediate decision making. Experiments in which DMS is lesioned in
rodents often report the abolishment of goal-directed learning, leading to a release of
habitual behaviours (Hernandez, Redgrave, & Obeso, 2015; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012;
Macpherson, Morita, & Hikida, 2014; Redgrave et al., 2010; Voorn, Vanderschuren,
Groenewegen, Robbins, & Pennartz, 2004). Nishizawa et al. (2012) conducted a stimulus-
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response learning task involving auditory stimuli and lever-press responses for a food pellet
reward in rats. The task consisted of two phases. Phase 1 involved learning to associate a
lever (either right or left) with a specific auditory tone, one tone for each lever. All rats
were trained until a performance accuracy of at least 80% was reached. Once performance
accuracy reached greater than 80%, regions of the striatum were lesioned and after seven
days, Phase 2 was completed. In Phase 2, rats were required to perform the same stimulusresponse learning trials as Phase 1. Lesions of DLS resulted in significantly reduced
decision making accuracy during Block 1 of Phase 2. Towards the end of Phase 2, DLSlesioned rats regained decision making accuracy comparable to control rats. On a subset
of rats, a second lesion was carried out either in DMS or NAcc and then Phase 2 was
conducted. Dual DLS and DMS lesions resulted in similar decision making trajectories,
with significantly more errors early on and accuracy gradually increasing towards the end
of Phase 2. On the other hand, dual DLS and NAcc lesions resulted in impaired decision
making that did not improve across Phase 2. When all areas of DS were lesioned, decision
making performance was impaired and never improved irrespective of new training.
Associations could be re-learned through an intact NAcc, however, with responseselections potentially being taken over by different parts of the striatum following a lesion.
This would be supported by the fact that dual DLS and DMS lesions, even when NAcc was
spared (i.e., re-learning and new learning was possible), accurate performance of lever
selections related to tones could not be regained.
In a study that examined DLS-mediated habit learning in humans using fMRI, Tricomi,
Balleine, and O'Doherty (2009) found that an area of the putamen, that authors defined as
DLS, was more active in participants who underwent habit learning compared to those
whose learning remained goal-directed. The authors concluded that this area of the
striatum is specifically involved in stimulus-response habit learning. These results would
directly challenge our findings in Chapter 4 and our overall notions regarding DS’s role in
cognition. Upon closer examination of Tricomi et al., (2009), however, the area that was
specifically preferentially activated in habit learning was actually located in a region of the
ventral putamen that based on a number of approaches for distinguishing DS from VS
would be considered a region of VS (Di Martino et al., 2008; Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014;
Jung et al., 2011; Kwak, Müller, Bohnen, Dayalu, & Seidler, 2012; P. A. MacDonald &
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Monchi, 2011; Morris et al., 2012; Postuma & Dagher, 2006). Depending on the definition
that you have adopted for DS versus VS, these results could alternatively be interpreted as
evidence that VS mediates late-stage habit learning.

5.1.2 COVIS and SPEED Model
COVIS and SPEED, two models proposed by Gregory Ashby (Ashby, 1998; Ashby, Ennis,
& Spiering, 2007; Ashby, Turner, & Horvitz, 2010), aim to explain the neural correlates of
early category learning, and category learning moving towards automaticity, respectively.
To reiterate, the COVIS model suggests that stimulus-response learning─specifically
category learning─involves two competing systems, (1) a verbal system that classifies
stimuli into verbalizable categories, and (2) an implicit system that uses procedural learning
(Ashby, 1998).

Both learning systems intersect with DS, and it is here where the

competition takes place. In any categorization task, Ashby (1998) contend that only one
of the two systems will dominate and the DS is responsible for mediating and switching
between the two systems, and more importantly, it is suggested that the DS mediates the
stimulus-response association learning. SPEED, on the other hand, postulates that the role
of DS is to a) acquire stimulus-response associations and b) train cortical-cortical
connections between higher order sensory and pre-motor areas (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie,
Roeder, & Ashby, 2010; Soto, Waldschmidt, Helie, & Ashby, 2013). The theory maintains
that the head of the caudate nucleus mediates early learning (COVIS), and as the
associations become more practiced, progressing toward automaticity, more posterior
regions of the striatum, namely the body and tail of the caudate nucleus, are purported to
underlie late stage learning (SPEED). According to the SPEED account, once automaticity
has been achieved, involvement of dorsal caudate nucleus ceases, and stimulus-specific,
automatic behaviours become mediated by cortical regions (i.e. pre-motor, motor and
visual cortices; Ashby, et al., 2007). The experimental data that are cited as support for
these theories a) only consider neural activity in stimulus-response events, neglecting a
feedback event (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007; Helie et al., 2010; Soto et al., 2013), or b)
combine neural activity in stimulus-response and feedback events (Milton & Pothos, 2011;
Nomura et al., 2007). Helie et al. (2010) investigated neural substrates of automatization
of responses in a rule-based categorization learning paradigm that included over 10,000
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trials, across 20 separate learning sessions, with fMRI data obtained in Sessions 1, 4, 10,
and 20. They found that activity in DS was increased throughout Session 1, at the end of
which high levels of response accuracy were ultimately achieved (i.e., 89.6%).

In

subsequent sessions, DS activity was significantly attenuated (i.e., after Session 1) whereas
cortical activation continued to correlate with accurate categorization performance events,
even after extensive training. Only stimulus-response or decision-making events (i.e. time
period from the onset of the stimulus to the button-press response) were examined.
Consistent with our claims, DS activation at the time of response selection and enactment
could have arisen due to its involvement in decision-making processes that still require
deliberation and not with association learning per se.

5.1.3 Actor-Critic Model
To reiterate, the actor-critic model states that stimulus-response learning consists of two
separate components, a critic (i.e. the learner) which utilizes feedback to learn to predict
future rewards, and an actor (i.e. the selector) which uses the information from the critic
to make better decisions (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Sutton & Barto, 1998). O'Doherty et al.
(2004) scanned healthy participants using 3T MRI while they completed two versions of a
stimulus-response learning task, one instrumental and the other Pavlovian. The rationale
for using an instrumental and Pavlovian task was to examine value predictions by the critic
in the presence (i.e. instrumental task) and absence (i.e. Pavlovian task) of action selections
by an actor. The results showed that VS correlated strongly with the prediction error signal
in both tasks, whereas DS correlated with prediction error only during the instrumental
task. Authors concluded that VS is the critic, coding for the prediction error signal and
sending this information to the DS, or actor, where this information is used to learn the
stimulus-response association and perform rewarding future responses. In other words,
VS is implicated in reward processing and motivation and DS is implicated in stimulusresponse learning and decision-making. Our interpretation is that VS, named their critic,
is responsible for stimulus-response learning and DS, the actor, mediates decision making.
In O'Doherty et al. (2004), the critic appears when feedback is presented, and received and
processes feedback (i.e. learning), and the actor, is recruited prior to the response (i.e.
during decision making).
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With each of these models, the lack of agreement and/or distinction between DS and VS,
as well as not separately examining decision making and learning, leads to confounds and
controversies in the literature. The aim of this thesis was to unite two opposing literatures
implicating DS in learning versus decision making by discussing how many studies that
implicate DS in learning may actually be doing so erroneously, and rather the function that
DS is mediating is decision making.

5.2 The role of VS in stimulus-response learning
Initially, VS was considered a region specialized for reward learning and processing
(Camara et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2002; Delgado et al., 2000; Delgado, 2007; Knutson and
Cooper, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Sesack and Grace, 2010).
However, some recent studies implicate VS in learning situations that are devoid of reward,
punishment, or any feedback at all, challenging this specialization (Feigin et al., 2003;
Ghiladri et al., 2007; MacDonald et al., 2011; Reiss et al., 2005; Seo et al., 2010; Shohamy
et al., 2004; Shohamy et al., 2006; Tremblay et al., 2010). The results from Chapter 2 and
3 support this view.

5.3 Functions of DS and VS in Cognition
Our research refutes DS`s role in learning, assigning it a function in selection and decision
making. Further, our findings suggest that VS mediates stimulus-response learning.
Review of cytoarchitectural distinctions as well as dissimilarities in connectivity of DS and
VS, explain how these regions are adapted to these different functions. MSNs within DS
have a much higher dopamine turnover rate compared to VS. Specifically, DS MSNs have
a higher concentration of dopaminergic afferents, as well as of DAT compared to VS. A
large number of dopaminergic afferents results quickly in high amplitude stimulation,
whereas elevated DAT, responsible for synaptic clearance of dopamine, causes rapid drops
in synaptic dopamine (Wickens, Horvitz, Costa, & Killcross, 2007). The anatomical
makeup of DS, with high concentrations of dopaminergic afferents and DAT, results in
brief dopamine stimulation periods, almost binary (i.e., off or on) responding, with
maximal stimulation achieved quickly, across a wide range of dopamine firing frequencies,
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followed by rapid clearance of synaptic dopamine (Zhang et al., 2009).

These

characteristics suit the DS to functions such as choosing between alternatives and decision
making. VS, on the other hand, consists of much smaller MSNs with more widely-spaced
dendritic spines, lower concentration of both dopaminergic innervation and DAT.
Accordingly, dopaminergic pulses stimulate VS much more slowly, for longer periods of
time, and with more variable intensity compared to DS (Wickens et al., 2007). These
attributes are well suited to associating events or stimuli over time, for example in stimulusresponse learning.
Secondly, the distinct cortical and limbic connections to DS and VS support their
respective roles in decision making and learning. DS reciprocally connects to the primary,
supplementary, and pre-motor cortex, as well as to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), parietal association cortex, and somatosensory cortex (Leh, Chakravarty, &
Ptito, 2008). These cortical regions are largely effector areas as well as regions that aid in
resolving response conflict, making DS ideally situated to perform functions such as
deciding among alternatives and response selections. Particularly, DS is implicated in
decisions that require deliberation (DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007). Deliberation manifests
as DS a) disinhibits the cortical regions representing the correct stimulus-response
association and b) inhibits activity in cortical regions representing alternative stimulusresponse associations (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et al., 2010). Deliberation decreases as
the strength of cortical-cortical connections increases to the point that they no longer
require DS to facilitate them and inhibit alternative stimulus-response connections. We
contend that stimulus-response automaticity is achieved when these selections become
independent of DS.
VS, on the other hand, is reciprocally connected to regions associated with encoding such
as the hippocampus, amygdala, anterior cingulate, as well as to orbitofrontal (OFC),
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), and anterior temporal and insular cortices
(Kincaid, Zheng, & Wilson, 1998). VS projects directly to DS and has significant
projections to VTA and SNc.

VS is ideally suited for stimulus-response learning.

Connections between cortical representations of stimuli and of responses are learned and
also strengthened by VS. Projecting directly, and via spiraling connections through VTA
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and SNc, to DS, VS biases DS to select particular responses (Haber, 2014; 2016; Choi et
al., 2017).

When the consequence of a stimulus-response sequence is rewarding,

represented neurally by a dopaminergic pulse in VTA to VS, VS strengthens this
connection. When the consequence is negative, represented by silencing of dopaminergic
neurons in VTA projecting to VS, VS lessens connections. As stimulus-response-outcome
associations becomes well-learned, VTA responding becomes neutral unless there is a
violation of this expected pattern at which time new learning that implicates the VS begins
again.
Synthesizing the above paragraphs with our results from Chapters 2-4 below, we outline
our proposed model for the flow of information from novel stimuli and responses, to the
establishment of stable, automatic stimulus-response pairings.

In the formation of

stimulus-response associations, DS and VS are points of convergence between extrastriatal regions and serve to link and facilitate connections between far reaching cortical
areas. Prefrontal cortical areas, specifically the ventrolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal
cortices seem to be involved in storing stimulus-response pairings in working memory, and
storing outcome and motivational information, respectively (Boettiger & D'Esposito, 2005;
Choi, Ding, & Haber, 2017). VS serves as the hub for this information, and when the
correct action is performed and subsequently rewarded, a phasic dopamine signal is sent
from VTA to VS and evidence suggests that this influx of dopamine begins to facilitate
connections between VLPFC and OFC through long term potentiation (Choi et al., 2017).
Therefore, this suggests that VS is instrumental in enabling the learning of stimulusresponse associations. In Chapters 2 and 3, activity in VS peaked early on when stimulusresponse associations were first being formed. Additionally, high baseline dopamine
levels, as in the case of patients with OCD and PD patients tested in the ON state, impaired
learning, likely via impairments in the phasic dopamine response in VS.
Early in learning, DS is not biased in its selections and only becomes so with input from
VS. This bias can only occur once stimulus-response associations are beginning to be
learned, typically in later blocks of stimulus-response learning, as evidenced in Chapter 4.
Input from VS comes in the form of reciprocal, spiraling, feedforward loops that link VS
and DS through the dopaminergic midbrain (Haber, 2014). The increase in VS activity is
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transmitted through VTA/SNc and facilitates a dopaminergic pulse to DS. While the
stimulus-response association is being practiced, there are reports that DLPFC monitors
the relations and goal-relevant information (i.e. changes in outcomes) and is attuned to
stimulus-response ambiguities (Barber, Caffo, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2013; Blumenfeld,
Nomura, Gratton, & D'Esposito, 2013). This information in DLPFC, along with the
learned response biases from VS, converge in DS and are used in decision making carried
out by reciprocally connected effector regions such as, premotor, supplementary motor,
and primary motor cortices (Barber et al., 2013; Blumenfeld et al., 2013; Haber, 2014). As
practice continues and the response requires less and less consideration, the influence of
DS on cortical areas storing the stimulus, response gradually lessens.

Finally, as

deliberation ceases, cortical-cortical connections are strengthened to the point where they
can operate in the absence of DS, as supported in Chapter 4 (Ashby et al., 2007; Helie et
al., 2010; N. M. Hiebert, Owen, Seergobin, & MacDonald, 2017).

5.4 Implications for PD
Cognitive dysfunction is an undisputed symptom of PD that leads to significant impairment
in quality of life (Barone et al., 2009; Schrag et al., 2000). The etiology of cognitive
impairments in PD is complex, but it is now clear that at least a subset of these symptoms
arise from dysfunction of the striatum itself (Ray and Strafella, 2012). In PD, DS-mediated
functions are compromised at baseline, and improved by dopamine replacement therapy.
Conversely, VS functions are relatively spared off medication, and worsened by
dopaminergic therapy, most notably at early stages of the disease (MacDonald and Monchi,
2011). Understanding VS- and DS-mediated cognitive functions, therefore, informs at
least some cognitive symptoms in PD, and has implications for treatment. Currently,
dopaminergic therapy is titrated to relieve DS-mediated motor symptoms, without taking
into account the potential overdose of VTA-innervated regions. Ultimately, this greater
understanding will prompt clinicians to formulate medication strategies that consider both
motor and cognitive symptoms, as well as individual patient needs.
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5.5 Implications for OCD
The role of the striatum in OCD is only starting to be elucidated and studies like Chapter 3
aim to clarify the specific roles of DS and VS. The results from Chapter 3 indicate that
patients with OCD have task-related reductions in DS and VS function shown with
corresponding behavioural and fMRI measures. In contrast, at rest or baseline, high
baseline VS and low basal DS activity occurred relative to healthy controls. When
performing stimulus-specific responses in a stimulus-response learning task, patients with
OCD were impaired both during decision making and learning. Therefore, too low and too
high activity both yielded the same result; impaired function.
With respect to symptomatology, Chapter 3 results support a role of VS in compulsive
behaviours, specifically those patients with high baseline VS activity score lower on the
compulsions sub-score of the YBOCS. To reiterate, the YBOCS is designed to characterize
the presence and severity of obsessions and compulsions in patients with OCD (Kim,
Dysken, & Kuskowski, 1990). Evidence suggests that OCD may be characterized by a
dysfunctional reward system, reacting strongly to symptom-provoking stimuli and the
completion of compulsive actions, but blunted responses to natural rewards (Figee et al.,
2016; Figee et al., 2011). Within the OCD population, Chapter 3 results suggest that if
baseline VS is too high, completion of compulsions is seen as less rewarding in these
patients.

The VS operates through graded potentials stimulated by dopamine

dopaminergic neurons in the VTA (Wickens et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2009). Typically,
the dopaminergic pulse increases activity above baseline in VS to signal the receipt of a
reward (Wolfram Schultz, 1998, 2015; W. Schultz, Apicella, Scarnati, & Ljungberg, 1992).
In patients with OCD, the high baseline VS activity potentially obscures the positive graded
potentials that result from natural rewards, or even from the rewarding experience of
anxiety reduction that temporarily follows enactment of a compulsive behaviour (Figure
5.1). In this way, high baseline VS impairs learning, as well as the experience of natural
and even maladaptive rewards (Figee et al., 2016; Figee et al., 2011).
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Figure 5.1 Theoretical effect of VS hyperactivity on reinforcing actions.
There is evidence to suggest the VS is hyperactive at rest in patients with OCD compared to healthy
controls. This high baseline VS activity impairs the patient’s ability to respond to phasic dopaminergic
pulses leading to impaired reinforcement learning. In healthy controls, receiving a reward is followed by a
burst of dopamine sent from the VTA to VS leading to a phasic rise in VS activity (purple line). The large
magnitude phasic increase results in reinforcement learning and subsequently the healthy control will
choose that response again. In OCD patients (blue line), the high baseline VS activity leaves little room for
the phasic increase in activity, and the result may be impaired reinforcement learning. Clinically, performing
compulsions may result in a phasic dopamine release into VS, reinforcing the action and making it more
likely to be completed in the future. OCD patients that do not suffer from strong compulsions may have a
high baseline VS compared to OCD patients with compulsions, and the even more diminished phasic
response could result in unrewarded compulsive actions that do not continue.

The role of dopamine in OCD is currently an active area of research with much left to
understand. This elucidation could lead to alternative treatments for OCD. As stated
previously, SSRIs are the gold standard in treating OCD, pharmacologically. Typically
SSRIs are prescribed as an adjunct therapy to CBT (Hirschtritt, Bloch, & Mathews, 2017).
SSRIs method of action points to reducing symptoms of anxiety and depression related to
OCD symptoms by raising the synaptic level of serotonin (Insel, 1981), and may not
specifically be addressing the mechanisms of OCD symptoms, namely striatal deficits.
Indeed, approximately 30-40% of OCD patients do not respond to current therapies
(Atmaca, 2016), supporting the contention that current therapies may not be treating the
core deficits of the disorder. In Chapter 2, it was determined that exogenous dopamine can
simultaneously increase neural signal in DS and attenuate neural signal in the VS.
Considering the baseline hypoactivity of DS and hyperactivity of VS at baseline in OCD,
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this presents the intriguing possibility that exogenous dopamine might be helpful in
bolstering DS, and perhaps decision making, response inhibition, and behavioural
flexibility, while simultaneously diminishing the pathological hyperactivity in VS that
seems related to obsessional thought (Rauch, Jenike, Alpert, & et al., 1994). There have
been only very few studies investigating dopaminergic therapy in treating OCD
(Ceccherini-Nelli & Guazzelli, 1994; Stryjer et al., 2014). Ceccherini-Nelli and Guazzelli
(1994) administered bromocriptine, a dopamine agonist, in four patients with treatment
refractory OCD. Three out of the four saw dramatic improvements in OCD symptoms.
Delle Chiaie, Scarciglia, Pasquini, Caredda, and Biondi (2011) tested the efficacy of
aripiprazole, an atypical antipsychotic and partial dopamine agonist, as an adjunct to SSRI
or clomipramine therapy in treatment-resistant OCD patients. 20 subjects completed the
12-week study and at the end of the study, authors saw a significant reduction in YBOCS
scores in 18/20 patients. The authors conclude that the partial agonism of dopamine
receptors can aid in the treatment of OCD patients who are resistant to SSRI monotherapy
(Delle Chiaie et al., 2011). Further research into this area is warranted and a direct follow
up of this is planned presently.

5.6 Limitations
There are several limitations in Chapters 2-4. Firstly, it is difficult recruiting and testing
representative samples of patient populations, and ensuring control groups are adequately
matched. Patients with neurological or psychiatric disorders are highly variable, both in
terms of severity of the disease and co-morbidities. In Chapters 2 and 3, several steps were
taken to reduce the variability due to noise between patients to facilitate accurate
conclusions drawn from the data. Patients tested must: 1) be diagnosed with the disease of
interest by a licensed physician, 2) be free of other neurological and psychiatric disorders
or other serious health concerns, 3) not taking cognitive-enhancing medications, and 4)
have no history of abusing alcohol, prescription medications or illegal drugs. Additionally,
control participants were age- and education-matched to patients, and had similar scores
on measures of cognitive health, such as MoCA, ANART, and verbal fluency. Recruiting
control participants that match on as many different aspects as possible yields more
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defendable results. In all experiments, these standard measures of cognitive health were
used to ensure all participants were cognitively intact, and able to complete the experiment.
Secondly, the spatial resolution of the neuroimaging data creates difficulty in
understanding fully the functional specificity of different brain regions. Brain tissue
contains many different small structures, such as receptors, neurons, and support cells, and
3T neuroimaging is unable to differentiate these structures or understand how they work
together to perform specific functions. For example, in each of the studies the voxel size
was 2.5 mm3 which is orders of magnitude larger than single neurons. Therefore, imaging
each voxel averages across many structures and neurons. There are many tradeoffs when
parameters are chosen for neuroimaging experiments. Decreasing the size of the voxels
can grant increased spatial resolution, but it also increases the total number of voxels as
well as the number of brain slices required to capture the whole brain. This results in a
decreased temporal resolution because it requires a much longer TR (i.e. the time required
to take one whole-brain picture). The voxel size chosen in this thesis and the corresponding
TR maximizes spatial and temporal resolution in the experiments.
Lastly, fMRI is correlational in nature and generally it is difficult to establish or claim true
causality. To reiterate, fMRI examines changes in blood flow and not neuronal activity.
Action potentials require a significant amount of energy in the form of oxygen and glucose
and because neurons are unable to efficiently store these molecules, they must be obtained
from oxygenated blood (Yablonskiy & Haacke, 1994). As a result, when a neuron fires,
an increase in deoxygenated blood surrounds the neuron to facilitate the action potential,
causing an influx of oxygenated blood, and it is this change in blood flow that is imaged in
fMRI (Yablonskiy & Haacke, 1994). This concept is almost wholly accepted in the
neuroimaging community and causality is often inferred from BOLD changes.
Nevertheless, pharmacological manipulation in a disease state such as PD facilitates
stronger inferences. The neuropathology of PD and the effect of dopaminergic therapy on
patients with PD is well-understood and this knowledge is combined with the
neuroimaging results. For example, it is understood that DS is dopamine deplete and
impaired at baseline and dopamine administration remediates this impairment. If decisionmaking performance is impaired at baseline and improved with dopamine therapy, along
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with an increase in BOLD signal in DS, it can be said with more certainty that DS mediates
decision making.

5.7 Conclusions
We completely refute the prevalent contention that DS mediates early (Boettiger &
D'Esposito, 2005; Brovelli, Laksiri, Nazarian, Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2008; Delgado,
Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; Foerde, Knowlton, & Poldrack, 2006; Brian Lau & Glimcher,
2007; B. Lau & Glimcher, 2008; R. A. Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, & Gabrieli, 1999;
Thompson, 1959; Thompson RL, 1963; Xue, Ghahremani, & Poldrack, 2008), and latestage, learning with or without feedback (Helie et al., 2010; R. A. Poldrack et al., 2005;
Soto et al., 2013; Yamamoto, Kim, & Hikosaka, 2013; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Our
research suggests rather that VS mediates early stimulus-response learning. In contrast,
our findings strongly support a role for DS in decision making (Atallah, Lopez-Paniagua,
Rudy, & O'Reilly, 2007; Nole M. Hiebert et al., 2014; Brian Lau & Glimcher, 2007; B.
Lau & Glimcher, 2008; Liljeholm & O'Doherty, 2012; A. A. MacDonald et al., 2014; P.
A. MacDonald & Monchi, 2011; Smittenaar et al., 2012; Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan,
2012), when there is ambiguity, and deliberation is required (Ali, Green, Kherif, Devlin, &
Price, 2010; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Daniel et al., 2010; DeGutis & D’Esposito, 2007;
P. A. MacDonald et al., 2011; Ohira et al., 2010; Robertson, Hiebert, Seergobin, Owen, &
MacDonald, 2015).
DS is a region implicated in many disorders ranging from Parkinson’s disease, obsessivecompulsive disorder, and addiction. Elucidating the function(s) of DS is integral to
developing cognitive and symptom profiles of these diseases, as well as in identifying
and understanding new targets for therapy and potentially new therapeutic approaches.
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Ontario Graduate Scholarship (Declined) – Value $15,000
Jonathan and Joshua Memorial Graduate Scholarship in Mental
Health Research – Value $15,000
Second Place in Neurosciences Division – Department of Physiology
and Pharmacology Graduate Research Day – Value $100
Dean’s Honor List, University of Western Ontario

Teaching Experience during University
Sept. – Dec.,
2012 – 2017

Teaching Assistant, University of Western Ontario
Course Title: Physiology 4710: Physiology of the Senses
• Assisted the professor in ensuring the accuracy of lecture
material.
• Reviewed and revised online quiz, and exam questions.
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•
•
•
•
Research Experience:
2014 – Present

2012 – 2014

2011 – 2012

•

Held online and in-class tutorials, and one-on-one tutoring
sessions for students.
Created review session quizzes before midterm and final
exams.
Responded to student questions during tutorial and by
email.
Trained and assisted new teaching assistants in learning
the material and conducting tutorials.
Proctored midterm and final exams.

Doctoral Student, Department of Physiology and Pharmacology,
University of Western Ontario
• PhD Project: Investigating striatal-mediated cognition using
healthy participants and patients with striatal dysfunction (i.e.,
Parkinson’s disease, Obsessive compulsive disorder,
substance abuse, etc.)
• Conducting behavioural and functional magnetic resonance
imaging experiments involving: stimulus-response learning,
implicit and explicit word learning, reversal learning, and
cognitive control
Master’s Student, Department of Physiology and Pharmacology,
University of Western Ontario
• Master’s project: investigating the roles of the dorsal and ventral
striatum in stimulus-response learning and decision-making
using fMRI in healthy participants and patients with Parkinson’s
disease on and off dopaminergic medication.
• Conducted additional behavioural and fMRI experiments
involving: stimulus-response learning, implicit and explicit
learning, working memory, as well as Stroop tasks.
• Drafted a research proposal investigating the effect of genetic
polymorphisms on cognition in patients with Parkinson’s
disease.
• Drafted a research proposal investigating the effect of
methylphenidate on cognition in patients with Parkinson’s
disease.
• Wrote and revised research ethics approved by Health Sciences
Research Ethics Board (HSREB) of the University of Western
Ontario and the Ethics Review Board of the Sudbury Regional
Hospital.
Undergraduate Student, Department of Physiology and
Pharmacology, University of Western Ontario
• Undergraduate thesis project: examining the effect of
Bisphenol A on the expression of specific glucocorticoidregulated genes in human syncytiotrophoblast cells

229

•

Researched and proposed a project examining the effect of
reactive oxygen species on preadipocyte proliferation in rats

Publications, Presentations and Abstracts
Publications
Hiebert NM, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and MacDonald PA. (2017) Dorsal striatum
mediates deliberate decision making, not late-stage, stimulus-response learning. Human
Brain Mapping 38(12): 6133-6156.

Hampshire A, Hellyer PJ, Parkin B, Hiebert N, MacDonald P, Owen AM, Leech R,
and Rowe J. (2015) Network mechanisms of intentional learning. NeuroImage 127:
123-34.
Robertson BD, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Owen AM, and MacDonald PA.
(2015) Dorsal striatum mediates cognitive control, not cognitive effort per se, in
decision making: An event-related fMRI study. NeuroImage 114: 170-184.
Hiebert NM, Vo A, Hampshire A, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and MacDonald PA.
(2014) Striatum in Stimulus-Response Learning via Feedback and Decision making.
NeuroImage 101:448-457.
Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Vo A, Ganjavi H, and MacDonald PA. (2014)
Dopaminergic Therapy Affects Learning and Impulsivity in Parkinson’s disease.
Annals of Clinical and Translational Neurology 1(10): 883-843.
Vo A, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Solcz S, Partridge A, and MacDonald PA.
(2014) Dopaminergic Therapy Impairs Learning but not Decision-making in
Parkinson’s disease. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:784.
Presentations and Abstracts
Hiebert NM, Kahn AR, Naci L, Vo A, Wang BT, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and
MacDonald PA (2018, June) Structural and functional biomarkers of Parkinson’s
disease: Using structural and functional neuroimaging to identify the presence and
severity of Parkinson’s disease. Poster presentation at the CIHR Research Poster
Presentation at the Canadian Student Health Research Forum, Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada.
Hiebert NM, Khan AR, Vo A, Wang BT, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and
MacDonald PA (2018, May) Biomarkers of Parkinson’s disease: Striatal subregional structural morphometry and diffusion MRI. Poster presentation at the 12th
annual Canadian Association for Neuroscience, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada.
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Hiebert NM, Naci L, Owen, AM, and MacDonald PA (2018, May) Functional
Biomarkers of Parkinson’s disease: Changes in brain-wide network connectivity in
Default Mode and Frontal-parietal Control Networks. Poster presentation at the
12th annual Canadian Association for Neuroscience, Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada.
Hiebert NM, Lawrence M, Watling M, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and MacDonald
PA (2018, April) Role of baseline dorsal and ventral striatum activity in stimulusresponse learning in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Platform
presentation at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research Day,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Owen AM, Ganjavi H, Jenkins ME, Mendonça D, Seergobin KN,
MacDonald and PA (2017, April) Dorsal caudate nucleus mediates response
selection and not feedback-driven stimulus-response learning.
Platform
presentation at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research Day,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Khan AR, Vo A, Wang BT, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, and
MacDonald PA (2017, April) Biomarkers of Parkinson’s disease: Striatal subregional structural morphometry and diffusion MRI. Platform presentation at the
Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research Day, University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Gustainis RV, Seergobin KN, Hiebert NM, Vo A, and MacDonald PA (2017, April)
The Effects of Parkinson’s Disease and Dopaminergic Medication on Driving
Performance and Cognitive Measures. Platform presentation at the Department of
Clinical Neurological Sciences Research Day, University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Owen, AM, Seergobin KN & MacDonald PA (2016, September) The
effect of dopaminergic therapy on stimulus-response learning and decision-making
in Parkinson’s disease using 3T MRI. Poster presented at the 4th World Parkinson
Congress, Portland, Oregon, United States of America.
Hiebert NM, Owen, AM, Seergobin KN & MacDonald PA (2016, May) The effect
of dopaminergic therapy on stimulus-response learning and decision-making in
Parkinson’s disease using 3T MRI. Poster presented at the Canadian Association for
Neuroscience conference, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, & MacDonald PA (2015, March) Does
Dorsal Striatum Mediate Habit Learning or Decision-making?
Platform
presentation presented at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences
Research Day, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
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Robertson B, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, MacDonald PA. (2015, March) Does the
dorsal striatum mediate cognitive flexibility? An event-related functional MRI study.
Platform presentation at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research
Day, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Owen AM, Seergobin KN, & MacDonald PA (2014, October) Does
Dorsal Striatum Mediate Habit Learning or Decision-making? Poster presented at
the Department of Physiology and Pharmacology Graduate Research Day,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Vo A, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Solcz S, Partridge A, & MacDonald PA. (2014,
July) Dopaminergic medication impairs learning but not decision making in
Parkinson’s disease. Poster presented at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Canadian
Society for Brain, Behaviour, and Cognitive Science (CSBBCS), Ryerson
University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
MacDonald PA, Hiebert NM, Vo A, Hampshire A, Owen AM, Ganjavi H,
Seergobin KN. (2014, May) Understanding the role of striatum in learning and
decision-making using fMRI. Presented at the 18th International Congress of
Parkinson’s Disease and Movement Disorders, Stockholm, Sweden.
MacDonald PA, Vo A, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN. (2014, May) Learning and
decision making in Parkinson’s disease. Presented at the 18th International Congress
of Parkinson’s Disease and Movement Disorders, Stockholm, Sweden.
Robertson B, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, MacDonald PA. (2014, May) Does the
dorsal striatum mediate cognitive flexibility? An event-related functional MRI study.
Poster presentation at the Southern Ontario Neuroscience Association, London,
Ontario, Canada
Hiebert NM, Vo A, Seergobin KN, Hampshire A, Solcz S, Owen AM and
MacDonald PA. (2014, March) The Roles of Dorsal and Ventral Striatum in
Stimulus-Response Learning: Implications for Parkinson’s disease. Poster
presentation at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research Day,
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Robertson B, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, MacDonald PA. (2014, March) Does the
dorsal striatum mediate cognitive flexibility? An event-related functional MRI study.
Poster presentation at the Department of Clinical Neurological Sciences Research
Day, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Robertson B, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, MacDonald PA. (2014, March) Does the
dorsal striatum mediate cognitive flexibility? An event-related functional MRI study.
Poster presentation at the London Health Sciences Research Day, London, Ontario,
Canada
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Vo A, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Solcz S, Partridge A and MacDonald, PA.
(2014, February) Dopaminergic medication impairs learning but not decision
making in Parkinson’s disease. Paper presented at 43rd annual meeting of the Lake
Ontario Visionary Establishment (L.O.V.E), Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada.
Hiebert NM, Vo A, Seergobin KN, Hampshire A, Solcz S, Owen AM and
MacDonald PA. (2013, October) The Roles of Dorsal and Ventral Striatum in
Stimulus-Response Learning: Implications for Parkinson’s disease. Poster
presentation at the 3rd World Parkinson Congress, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Vo A, Hiebert NM, Seergobin KN, Solcz S, Owen AM, Partridge A and
MacDonald PA. (2013, October) Recasting the role of dorsal striatum in learning
and decision-making. Poster and platform presentation at the 3rd World Parkinson
Congress, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Leadership Experience during University
Sept. 2013 – May
2018

May 2013 – May
2014

Senior Lab Member, Dr. Penny MacDonald’s Lab
University of Western Ontario
• Assisted in the supervision of a three undergraduate and
one medical student.
• Taught basic research methods such as proper data
collection and data management, as well as more
sophisticated methods such as collection and analysis of
functional magnetic resonance imaging data.
• Reviewed and edited manuscripts and presentations before
submission to supervisor.
Society of Graduate Students Representative for the
Physiology and Pharmacology Graduate Student Council,
University of Western Ontario
• Debate and vote on issues pertaining to the student body
of the University of Western Ontario
• Disseminate information obtained at Society of Graduate
Student meetings to the Physiology and Pharmacology
Graduate Student Council

